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ABSTRACT
The most pressing contemporary version of the problem of evil is called the evidential
problem of evil. No clear theodicy has yet emerged for the evidential problem. This study
seeks to find out how a theological metanarrative of a Great Cosmic Controversy between
Christ and Satan functions as a theodicy in response to the evidential problem of evil.

The first chapter develops a map of how major theodicies resolve or respond to the evidential
problem. This map highlights the importance of the free will and greater good defences to
theodicies. The strength of these defences, criticisms of them, and the recent quest for
alternatives is analysed.

The second chapter analyses the innovative Cosmic Warfare Theodicy of Gregory Boyd.
Boyd’s theodicy is studied because of its similarities to the Great Controversy metanarrative
and because it interacts with the contemporary discussion. This analysis forms the basis of a
comparative evaluation in the fourth chapter.

The third chapter develops an initial analytical, descriptive, and constructive outline of the
Great Controversy as a theodicy. The Great Controversy is revealed to have a uniquely
narrative approach to the problem of evil centred in a cosmic political and ideological
controversy overs God’s love, law and government. This metanarrative approach contrasts
sharply with the typical reliance on metaphysical approaches.

The fourth chapter is a comparative evaluation of both Boyd’s (chapter two) and the
preliminary Great Controversy theodicy (chapter three) in light of how each resolves the
evidential problem of evil and handles the major problems specific to their shared cosmic

iii

warfare framework. Special attention is paid to the coherence of free will models and ethical
theory within these two theodicies. Further constructive revision and refinement of the Great
Controversy Theodicy is made possible.

The fifth chapter applies the refined Great Controversy Theodicy directly to the evidential
problem of evil. Two complementary modellings of the Great Controversy are offered to
demonstrate how it functions as a theodicy. Use is made of the Doctrine of Double Effect and
a modified form of virtue libertarianism to resolve ethical and free will problems that warfare
theodicies face when dealing with the evidential evil.

The sixth chapter concludes by finding that the Great Controversy Theodicy builds on the
free will defence, and cosmic warfare theodicies like Boyd’s, but goes beyond both of them
with its unique narrative approach. This narrative approach offers unexamined and new ways
to respond to the difficulties the evidential problem of evil places on traditional theodicies.
The new responses of the Redeemed Good Defence based in a Felix Soter theodicy stand in
direct contrast to traditional greater good defences and represent a genuinely new alternative
approach to theodicy.
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INTRODUCTION

Theodicy and the Problem of Evil
The first formal statement of the problem of evil appears to be made by Epicurus
(341-270 B.C) who framed it as a logical dilemma.1 It was put into more concise and
memorable form by David Hume (1711-1776). Speaking of God, Hume asks, “Is he willing
to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”2 The logical thrust of the
problem comes in the form of a syllogistic trilemma involving a perceived incompatibility
between a simultaneous affirmation of God’s goodness, God’s power, and the reality of evil.
Evil here is usually understood to be both moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is evil
expressed in wrong acts (e.g. lying, murdering) or bad character traits (e.g. greed, cowardice).
These are the things for which we hold people morally responsible.3 Natural evils are events
of physical pain and suffering (e.g., natural disasters, disease, and physical defects) for which
people are not morally responsible.4 The crux of Hume’s argument is that it is impossible to
hold all three propositions together, and so one of them must be logically untenable. The
prime target for sceptics is the proposition of God’s existence. Both atheists and theists

Epicurus is quoted by Lactantius, “A Treatise on the Anger of God,” in The Ante-Nicene
Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, ed. Alexander Roberts,
Donaldson, and A Cleveland Coxe, vol. 7 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1886), 271.
1

2

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Nelson Pike (NY: Macmillian
Publishing Company, 1985), 88.
3

Michael Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 93.
4

Ibid., 93.
1

consider the problem of evil to be the foremost barrier to belief in God.5 One of the tasks for
theologians has been to offer responses to the problem of evil that have become known as
theodicies. The word ‘theodicy’ was coined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) for
his work by the same title.6 It combines two Greek words, theos (God) and dike (justice), and
implies a justification of God in the face of the problem of evil. All such attempts by
theologians, both before and after Leibniz, are now termed theodicies. Mark Scott believes
there are five questions essential to theodicy. These are “1. Origin of evil: How does evil
originate? Who is responsible? 2. Nature of evil: What is the ontology of evil? How does it
exist? 3. Problem of evil: How does evil pose a problem for theology? 4. Reason for evil:
Why does God permit evil? What is the morality sufficient reason? 5. End of evil: How will
God end evil and/or ultimately bring good out of evil?”7 Scott suggests that “a complete
theodicy will respond to all five questions.”8 These questions will lie in the background of
this study, although they will not control it.

Logical Form of the Problem of Evil
The problem of evil commonly exists in a generic, ill-defined, everyday form – “Why
does a good God allow suffering and evil?” The problem is instinctive but imprecise. Among
academics the problem of evil takes on more technical formulations. Hume’s articulation is

5

Millard J Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books,
1998), 436.
6

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God the Freedom of Man
and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. M. Huggard (La Salle: IL: Open Court, 1988). Leibniz is (in)famous
for his “best of all possible worlds” theodicy in which “if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the
world were missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all
allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who choice it.” Leibniz, 128.
7

8

Mark S. M. Scott, Pathways in Theodicy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 64.
Ibid., 65.
2

more precise than its generic cousin yet even his formulation never demonstrates a
contradiction. It only advances that one exists. There is a surprising lack of rigor. Australian
philosopher J. L. Mackie (1917-1981) understood this and put forward the most rigorous
version of the logical problem of evil. To do so Mackie had to add another proposition,
without which the argument does not work. The addition is that “a good thing always
eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can
do.”9 The key is ‘always’ and ‘as far as it can.’ That evil still exists leaves the impression that
the propositions about God must be false. Mackie argued that this was a fatal contradiction.10
Hume’s and Mackie’s specific formulations are no longer presented with the same
confidence, nor do they command the focus in contemporary discussions. The reason for this
is the belief that effective theistic defences have been put forward in response.11 A number of
writers, both atheists and theists, claim that Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence, in particular,
provided an adequate logical response.12 It is not that Plantinga has resolved the wider
problem of evil but he has shown that it is not illogical to hold that God can be good and allpowerful and that evil exists. Plantinga succeeded in showing that no disproof of God had
been established by presenting a defence rather than a theodicy. The difference between them

J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200. Or “a being who is
wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being
can do.” J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 150.
9

Stewart calls it the “inconsistency strategy” on the part of the sceptic Melville Y. Stewart,
The Greater-Good Defence: An Essay on the Rationality of Faith (NY: St Martin’s Press, 1993), 5.
10

“Few atheologians still maintain that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God.” David Basinger, “Evil as Evidence
against God’s Existence,” in The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, ed. Michael L Peterson (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 141.
11

For many Plantinga “was an instance of philosophical victory being snatched from the jaws
of final defeat. At the very least, there can be no denying that the tide turned.” Kevin Timpe and
Daniel Speak, eds., “Introduction,” in Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and
Concerns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5.
12

3

is that a theodicy seeks to explain the reason why God permits evil, whereas, a defence only
attempts to explain what God’s reason might possibly be.13 The burden of proof is thus
lowered. Plantinga’s response was to show clearly that there is nothing about Mackie’s
additions which are necessarily true (necessity not possibility is needed for the logical
problem of evil to succeed). In simple terms, Plantinga did this by the addition of a missing
premise, that of free will.14 If God creates creatures with free will then he cannot
“cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't
significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely.”15 God cannot logically give
freedom and withhold it at the same time. Sadly, some of God’s free creatures choose evil.
But this “counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could
have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral
good.” 16 The use of free will in theodicy is not new to Plantinga. It was and is the most
common approach to the problem of evil. Timpe and Speak note that “[n]early every recent

13

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1977), 28.
A defence need not even be correct, as long as it suffices to meet the logical objection.
For a detailed discussion of how Plantinga’s argument works see Stephen T. Davis, “Free
Will and Evil,” Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis, 2nd edition
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 76.
14

15

Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 30 (italics in original).

Ibid., 30. Critics asked why God couldn’t create a world in which creatures are free and yet
always do what is right. This criticism only works if the form of freedom is compatibilist, however,
Plantinga’s concept of freedom is libertarian. “A person is free with respect to an action A at a time t
only if no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine either that he performs A at t or that he
refrains from doing so.” Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),
170–171. Mackie countered that it is not logically impossible for libertarian free creatures to be good
in one, many, or even every occasion. He asks why didn’t God actualise a world in which everyone
always performs what is right (see, Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 209). Plantinga’s response was
to introduce the concept of “transworld depravity.” This is the idea that is it possible that in whatever
world God actualises there will be people who will do at least one wrong act. Plantinga even suggests
“it is possible that everybody suffers from it.” Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 48.
16

4

systematic effort to address the shifting problem of evil rests significantly on robust (and,
indeed, quite frequently libertarian) freedom.” 17

Evidential Form of the Problem of Evil
With the failure of the logical problem of evil critics of theism have shifted the debate
to what is called the evidential problem of evil.18 This is now the most common form of the
problem of evil.19 The evidential argument is an inductive one which looks at the scale,
magnitude and intensity of evil. Some forms argue probabilistically that given the scale and
scheme of things it is highly unlikely that the God of theism exists. 20 Other forms argue that
given theistic assumptions about the world, evil (especially horrendous evils) should not be
present. In this case it is not that theism is logically inconsistent with itself but that it is
inconsistent with what we would expect the world to be like if theism were true.21 Theism is
not inconsistent but implausible. Sceptics agree that theists can give a reasonable explanation
for some forms of evil but there are other instances of evil for which no good explanation
exists, these are pointless or gratuitous evils and they “constitute prima facie evidence against
the existence of God.”22 The best-known advocate of the evidential argument is William

17

Timpe and Speak, “Introduction,” 9.

Michael L Peterson, “Christian Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil,” in
Philosophy and the Christian Worldview: Analysis, Assessment and Development, ed. David Werther
and Mark D. Linville (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 175.
18

19

Bruce A. Little, A Creation-Order Theodicy: God and Gratuitous Evil (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 2005), 2.
20

Stewart terms this the probabilistic strategy in contrast to the inconsistency strategy,
Stewart, The Greater-Good Defence, 7.
21

See Edward Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield, IL: Charles
C. Thomas, 1968).
22

Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 98.
5

Rowe (1931-2015).23 Rowe’s argument will be discussed in more depth later but a version of
it will be given here:

(1)
There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater
good.
(2)
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some
greater good.24
Therefore,
(3)
There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.25

The first premise argues that genuine gratuitous or pointless evil exists (the factual
premise).26 The second premise is a statement about God and how he would act (the
theological premise). Connecting the two premises is what has been called the ‘noseeum’
inference.27 This is the argument that we ‘no see um’ the greater goods, that is, we cannot see
any of these greater goods that morally justify God’s permission of evil. This is undergirded
by the assumption that it is likely that we could discern such goods.28

23

William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 3rd edition (Belmont: CA:
Wadsworth, 2001).
Rowe adds the following for completeness in his footnotes “or permitting some evil equally
bad or worse” Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, 109, fn. 3.
24

25

Ibid., 99. Rowe has gone through a number of different formulations of the argument.

26

Rowe usually illustrates this with two paradigmatic examples of gratuitous evil. The first
case illustrates natural evil. It is a fawn (termed “Bambi’) trapped in a forest fire and undergoing days
of terrible agony before dying. The second is the morally evil case of a five-year-old girl Sue who was
raped, beaten and murdered by strangulation. These two illustrations occur throughout Rowe’s work.
See William L. Rowe, William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion: Selected Writings By William L.
Rowe, ed. Nick Trakakis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 195.
27

“No-see-ums” is an American colloquialism referring to small hard-to-see biting midges or

sand-flies.
Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa, “Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to
Almeida and Oppy,” Ars Disputandi 4 (2004): para. 1, http://www.arsdisputandi.org/ (accessed June
27, 2013).
28

6

Table 1: The Transformation of the Problem of Evil into its Evidential Form
Basic
problem of
evil
Trilemma:

Changes to
POE by
EPOE

Evidential
formulation

Evil exists

+

God is All-powerful

Relevant category of evil is
specified as gratuitous evil

+

God is All-loving

Divine Attributes (& Divine
Providence) are understood in a more
specific way

Gratuitous Evil exists
(which an Omni-God could
prevent without losing some
greater good or permitting a
worse evil)

An Omni-God would prevent
gratuitous evils (unless it could not do
so without losing some greater good
or permitting a worse evil)

Factual Premise:
Gratuitous evil exists

Theological Premises:
Meticulous Providence &
Restricted Standard Theism

= Logical
Contradiction

Shift from
deductive logic
to inductive
inference

Therefore, an
Omni-God does
not exist (is not
likely to exist)

The Topic of Study: The Great Controversy
The preceding discussion will prove an all-important context for this study. But first
there is a need to clarify what is the purpose of this study. It will look at the Seventh-day
Adventist concept of the ‘Great Controversy’ and its relationship to the problem of evil. In
Adventist thinking all of history and existence is understood under a theme known simply as
the “Great Controversy”.29 It is one of the 28 fundamental beliefs of the Seventh-day
Adventist church and affirms that “All humanity is now involved in a great controversy
between Christ and Satan regarding the character of God, His law, and His sovereignty over

29

The phrase is shorthand for the fuller idea which is captured in the book title by Ellen G.
White, The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1911).
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the universe.”30 But more than a belief, the Great Controversy functions as the central
organising principle, worldview, and metanarrative of Adventism.31 It is the big picture idea
within which Adventist thought places all doctrine, beliefs, mission and practice. This Great
Controversy idea or narrative naturally and necessarily gives rise to a Great Controversy
theodicy. Ellen White (1827-1915) is explicit about the link between the Great Controversy
and the problem of evil.32
The significance of this opening discussion of theodicy is in providing an introduction
and context for this investigation. It shows what is the problem of evil and the recent shift
from the logical to evidential forms. This highlights what a Great Controversy theodicy must
respond to. Of special note is that the evidential argument is something the logically
orientated free will defence is inadequate to answer. Any trouble for the free will approach
will mean trouble for the Great Controversy as it is heavily dependent on the concept of free
will. The key challenge the evidential argument makes against free will (and therefore the
Great Controversy) is based on the amount of evil in the world. Even if free will is an

30

Ministerial Association of the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, Seventh-Day
Adventists Believe: An Exposition of the Fundamental Beliefs of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,
2nd edition (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 2005), 113.
Richard M. Davidson, “Cosmic Metanarrative for the Coming Millennium,” Journal of the
Adventist Theological Society 11 (2000): 102–19; Norman R. Gulley, “The Cosmic Controversy:
World View for Theology and Life,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 7 (1996): 82–124
and Herbert E. Douglas, “The Great Controversy Theme: What It Means to Adventism,” Ministry,
2000.
31

White writes that the Great Controversy is given “to present a satisfactory solution of the
great problem of evil, shedding such a light upon the origin and the final disposition of sin as to make
fully manifest the justice and benevolence of God in all His dealings with His creatures.” White, The
Great Controversy, xii. White’s problem of evil is generic and does not distinguish between logical or
evidential forms. Evil calls into question God’s character, not his existence. The approach takes a
narrative, historical form instead of a theoretical or syllogistic one.
32
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inherent good it does not outweigh the amount of evil in the world nor especially extreme or
gratuitous evils.33 Is free will itself even worth it?34

The Thesis Question
The question which drives this study is how does the Great Controversy resolve the
problem of evil? How does the Great Controversy function as a theodicy? The goal is to
uncover the inner workings of a Great Controversy Theodicy. This study is warranted on the
grounds that while the issue of theodicy lies at heart of the Great Controversy, very little
attempt has been made to articulate it as a theodicy in dialogue with the modern discussion of
theodicy. The exceptions to this are some short works by Richard Rice and Martha Duah’s
PhD thesis comparing Gregory Boyd and Ellen White’s Warfare Theodicies.35 Rice’s
discussion, while limited in size (an article and a chapter), offers a penetrating look at the
Great Controversy as a theodicy and raises a number of challenges that will be addressed in
this study. Duah’s thesis is substantial and shares some organisational similarities to this
work.36 Her goal is to ascertain the viability” or feasibility of Boyd’s and White’s models in

Peter van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil,” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil,
ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2004), 64.
33

34

There are other objections to free will we will also consider: If freedom entails risk, and
freedom is essential to intelligent beings, then risk is eternal; how could evil arise in a perfect
environment in the first place? Giorgio Pini, “What Lucifer Wanted: Anselm, Aquinas, and Scotus on
the Object of the First Evil Choice,” in Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, 2012, 3;
How can free will explain natural evils such as earthquakes, diseases etc? See Peter van Inwagen,
“The Argument from Evil,” 64.
Richard Rice, “The Great Controversy and the Problem of Evil,” Spectrum 32, no. 1 (2004):
46–55; Richard Rice, Suffering and the Search for Meaning: Contemporary Responses to the Problem
of Pain (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 75–90; Martha Duah, “A Study of Warfare
Theodicy in the Writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A. Boyd” (PhD dissertation, Andrews
University, 2012).
35

36

Duah surveys the wider field of theodicy (howbeit only three theodicies: Augustine; Hick;
Griffith), and compares Boyd and Ellen White as I do in a similar progression of chapters.
9

comparison to others, and to see if they are “contradictory, unrelated or complementary” to
each other.37 She concludes the models are distinct and that White’s warfare theodicy is a
more satisfactory response to the problem of evil.38 Despite some overlap, a reading of both
studies reveals striking differences. This study’s thesis question is focused on the Great
Controversy, while Duah’s is also on Gregory Boyd. This study does use Boyd but in an
analogical and instrumental manner in order to more closely analyse the Great Controversy as
a theodicy. Duah focuses on the relationship between science and theodicy, critiquing Boyd’s
view of origins/creation (which have since changed) and natural evil. This study does not.
Duah critiques Boyd’s earlier views on Hell. He has since changed to an annihilationist view.
This work recognises this. Duah’s work is descriptive, analytical, comparative and
evaluative. This study is all of these but also constructive. It seeks to uncover the inner
workings of the Great Controversy as a theodicy and construct a working model of it that is
in dialogue with the wider contemporary field of theodicy. The survey of theodicies
(including anti-theodicy), in the light of the evidential problem, is much more extensive in
this study than Duah’s and makes clearer how diverse theodicies work. Discussion of ethical
assumptions is central to this study but not Duah’s (although she shows awareness of such).
The discussion of libertarian freedom in this study is a more distinct and radically
constructive one. The degree of overlap between the studies is eclipsed by different goals,
discussions, and conclusions.
This examination of the Great Controversy will focus on Ellen White’s articulation.
White’s version is paradigmatic for Adventism and while not widely known in theological or

Duah, “A Study of Warfare Theodicy in the Writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A.
Boyd,” 14.
37

38

She outlines four reasons for this, 1) explanatory adequacy and coherence, 2) comparative
uses of sources (Scripture, science, philosophy), 3) contrasting models of divine foreknowledge, and
4) long-term viability or obsolescence of models. Ibid., 370–388.
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theodicy discussions, it is the most integrated warfare perspective on the problem of evil in
Christian history.39 At the same time, some other more recent representative Adventist
sources which share the same paradigm will be referenced. Focusing on White will give unity
to the study, supplementing it with others within the paradigm will give greater depth and
breadth.

Delimitations
The field of theodicy is vast and so delimitations are essential.40 Virtually all the
major theologians, whether ancient or modern, address the topics of pain, suffering and evil
in some way. This means theodicy, whether explicit or implicit, is also ubiquitous. This study
will restrict itself to a limited number of representative and explicit models of theodicy.41 To

39

So says Gregory Boyd, God at War: The Bible & Spiritual Conflict (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity, 1997), 307, endnote 44. Although, after his contribution, Boyd somewhat rivals White.
40

For example, Barry Whitney documented over 4200 works on the problem of evil just
between the years 1960-1991, see Barry Whitney, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the
Problem of Evil, 1960-1991 (Bowling Green State University: Philosophy Documentation Center,
1998).
Potential theodicies not covered in our analysis abound and include Origen’s theodicy,
aptly explored in Mark S. M. Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012). For the view of Thomas Aquinas, see his On Evil, ed. Brian Davies,
trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For a more recent interpretation of
Aquinas, see Herbert McCabe, God and Evil: In the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas (London:
Continuum, 2010). Barth’s controversial and paradoxical idea of evil as das Nichtige (evil as
nothingness), see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, ed. G. W. Bromiley and
T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley, G. T. Thomson, and Harold Knight, vol. III/3, §50 (London: T
& T Clark, 2009). For a discussion of Barth’s theodicy see R. Scott Rodin, Evil and Theodicy in the
Theology of Karl Barth, Issues in Systematic Theology 3 (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). There are a
number of significant modern approaches that articulate a practical theodicy emphasising divine
suffering. Preeminent among them is Jürgen Moltmann. see his The Trinity and the Kingdom of God,
trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 21–60. For an introduction and
evaluation of Moltmann’s theodicy see, Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 71–98. For a concise introduction that looks at both the Germanspeaking and English-speaking discussions of theodicy, see Klaus Von Stosch, Theodizee, vol.
Grundwissen Theologie, 3867 vols. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh GmbH & Co, 2013). There are
also the person-centred theodicies, for example, see Armin Kreiner, Gott Im Leid: Zur Stichhaltigkeit
Der Theodizee-Argumente (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), and Marilyn McCord
41
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provide clarity this study will limit itself to the evidential problem of evil. Further, it will
focus on the question of moral evil not natural evil. This study will also assume the viability
of a warfare perspective and will not engage in apologetic questions.

Methodology
This study will proceed along the following methodological lines. Chapter 1 is
descriptive and analytical in nature. It reviews and surveys the literature on major theodicies,
as well as anti-theodicy, in the light of the evidential problem of evil. The goal is to provide a
map which situates theodicies, anti-theodicy and the evidential problem in the wider
discussion. Before understanding how the Great Controversy works as a theodicy there needs
to be a study of how other theodicies work and what problems they face. This will all help in
the ongoing analysis and construction of a Great Controversy theodicy.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine two cosmic warfare theodicies.42 Chapter 2 is an
examination of Gregory Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy. This chapter is analytical and
descriptive. Boyd’s view is examined because it is a highly developed warfare theodicy
similar to the Great Controversy. This is something both fortuitous and rare. The similarity
will enable a closer inner-category analysis of the Great Controversy not possible with
dissimilar theodicies.
Chapter 3 is an examination of the Great Controversy metanarrative to discern and
articulate its latent theodicy. This examination will be descriptive and analytical, but it will

Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 1st ed., Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of
Religion (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 2000).
Boyd defines warfare worldviews as the “perspective on reality which centres on the
conviction that the good and evil, fortunate or unfortunate, aspects of life are to be interpreted largely
as the result of good and evil, friendly or hostile, spirits warring against each other and against us.”
Boyd, God at War, 13.
42
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also begin synthetic and constructive work. This is necessary because much of its theodicy is
implicit or pre-systemised. The goal of this study is to uncover and make explicit the inner
logic of the Great Controversy narrative as a theodicy. This chapter is preliminary to further
constructive and comparative work in chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4 involves an inner-cosmic warfare category comparison between Boyd’s
warfare theodicy and the Great Controversy. This chapter is comparative and critical. It
identifies the major challenges specific to cosmic warfare theodicies and how they respond.
This will reveal any areas of weakness within this approach that the Great Controversy must
resolve and how it does so.
Chapter 5 is the final stage where the key ideas are brought together in order to
construct a model which reveals how the Great Controversy functions as a theodicy in
resolving the issues surrounding the evidential problem of evil. This chapter is comparative
(comparing the discoveries of chapters 3 and 4 in the light of chapter 1), critical and
constructive. A working model of the Great Controversy theodicy will be provide a
demonstration how it works. The final section offers a conclusion to the entire work.
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CHAPTER 1: MAPPING THEODICIES

Theodicies and the Evidential Problem of Evil
The failure of the logical problem of evil led critics of theism to shift the debate to the
evidential problem of evil. This chapter will look at the wider field of theodicy and its
response to the evidential problem. This survey will highlight the predominant usage of the
greater good defence. This defence argues in essence that evil is permitted and justified
because it helps produce some greater good. This survey will also show the more recent
discontent with the greater good defence in the form of protests against the whole theodicy
enterprise (anti-theodicy) or a quest for an alternative approach. This chapter will map out the
field of theodicy and finish by articulating how different theodicies attempt to resolve the
problem of evil. This map will later help to situate the Great Controversy theodicy resolution
to the problem of evil in awareness of other theodicies.

Preliminary Responses: Sceptical Theism
This study focuses on theodicy responses to the evidential problem of evil. There are
other less ambitious responses tailored to the evidential argument that do not attempt to
construct global theodicies. Due to its relevance to later discussions, this study will briefly
consider the response of Sceptical Theism. Many Christian theologians and philosophers
accept the narrow confines of the evidential framework and offer, from within it, a type of
response which is known as ‘sceptical theism.’43 This refers to a theism that is sceptical of
our human ability to know whether any given set of events are justified or unjustified by
See one such attempt by Michael Bergmann and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Grounds for
Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism?,” in God and the
Problem of Evil, ed. William L. Rowe (Malden: MA: Blackwell, 2001), 140–55.
43
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some set of divinely intended greater goods. Instead of denying Rowe’s first premise they
argue that we must be sceptical about our ability to evaluate, let alone affirm, the first
premise. Stephen Wykstra44 has offered his well-known CORNEA (Conditions of Reasonable
Epistemic Access) critique. “The heart of Wykstra’s critique is that, given our cognitive
limitations, we are in no position to judge as improbable the statement that there are goods
beyond our ken secured by God’s permission of many evils we find in the world.”45 Wykstra
emphasises the difference between our finite intellectual powers and God’s infinity and thus
our inability to know that something could not be justified by a greater good. “We are not
entitled to move from a claim about what appears to be the case to a claim about what
probably is the case.”46 Rowe cannot meet conditions needed for his first premise. William
Alston lists some of our cognitive limitations which justify the sceptical theism posture such
as: lack of data; complexity greater than we can handle; ignorance of full range of
possibilities; ignorance of full range of values; and limits to our capacity to make wellconsidered value judgments.47 Ganssle and Lee summarise sceptical theism as advancing two
basic claims:

Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On
Avoiding Evils of Appearance,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73–93.
44

Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument
from Evil, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 77.
45

Gregory E. Ganssle and Yena Lee, “Evidential Problems of Evil,” in God and Evil: The
Case for God in a World Filled with Pain, ed. Chad Meister and James K. Dew (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2013), 19.
46

47

Alston, “The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” 59–60.
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•
•

(ST1) We do not know whether the good and evil we know of are representative of all
the good and evil that exist.
(ST2) We do not know whether the connections between a case of evil and various
goods that we know of are representative of all the connections between good and evil
that exist.48

Sceptical theism is controversial and has garnered a range of responses from both
non-theists and fellow theists.49 For many, including theists, sceptical theism is too sceptical
and its price is too high.50 Critics argue that it advances a scepticism concerning human
epistemic limits that undermines theistic claims about God’s goodness (e.g., can we ascribe
any good events to God), a large portion of theological knowledge (e.g. the design argument),
and leads to moral scepticism, as much as it undercuts the evidential problem of evil.51
Several defences have been offered in return.52 This is an ongoing debate that currently sits at
a stalemate. It should be remembered that the conversation between sceptical theists and nontheists operates in an exclusively philosophical domain in which faith claims and arguments
from authority (i.e. Scripture) lack philosophical validity.53 This study will now turn to actual
full-scale theodicies.

48

Ganssle and Lee, “Evidential Problems of Evil,” 23.

For an extensive survey see Justin P. McBrayer, “Skeptical Theism,” Philosophy Compass
5, no. 7 (2010): 611–23.
49

William Hasker, “All Too Skeptical Theism,” Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68, no. 1
(2010): 15–29.
50

51

Mark Piper, “Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism,” Sophia 47, no. 2 (2008): 13.

John Snapper, “Paying the Cost of Skeptical Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion 69, no. 1 (2011): 45–56. Justin P. McBrayer, “Are Skeptical Theists Really Skeptics?
Sometimes Yes and Sometimes No,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72, no. 1
(2012): 3–16.
52

53

Piper, “Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism,” 146.
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Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy
St Augustine (374-430) is generally credited with producing the first fully formed
Christian theodicy.54 The problem of evil was a lifelong interest for Augustine.55 Because so
many theodicies and critics proceed in reference to Augustine it is essential to examine his
position. At this point it is helpful to mention the now widely recognised distinction between
Augustinian and Irenaean theodicies. This distinction is due to the work of John Hick (19222012) who will be examined later. Hick argues that Augustine is the fountainhead for the
majority report within Western theodicies. Hick seeks to retrieve the lesser known minority
report which he terms Irenaean.56
In much of his early thinking about evil Augustine is responding to his previous belief
in Manichaean dualism. The Manichaean belief that two equal but morally opposite cosmic
powers are eternally at war in the universe offers an obvious answer to the problem of evil.
Having become a Christian, Augustine saw his previous Manichaean beliefs as shocking,
detestable and profane.57 He now needed to account for evil within his new framework and
demonstrate its superior coherence and plausibility. A central means to this was Augustine’s
denial that evil is the work of God, and his deeply biblical affirmation that everything God
has created is good. How then does evil exist? Augustine, drawing on Plotinus’ Neo-

54

Michael L Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998), 85.
55

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke & London: Macmillian Press,
1977), 37. The Irenaean theodicy purportedly goes back to Irenaeus. It suggests that humans begin
immature or imperfect (they don’t fall from perfection) and must progress toward perfection in a
process that requires a struggle with suffering and evil. See the discussion below on pages 21-26.
56

Ibid.

Augustine, “Against the Epistle of Manichæus Called Fundamental,” in The Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. R Stothert, vol. IV, (Buffalo:
NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887), chap. 24, 140.
57
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Platonism, develops his idea of privatio boni or the ‘privation of the good’ theory of evil.58
This theory is a metaphysical explanation for evil which accounts for its possibility based in
the nature of being (or in regards to evil, its sheer nonbeing). Evil is not a thing that has been
made. It has no positive or substantive existence. Evil is the absence of good.59 A ready
analogy is that of darkness and light. Darkness is not a ‘thing’ but the absence of light.60
Privatio boni exists alongside a number of other metaphysical claims such as the great
chain of being (or hierarchy of being), the principle of plenitude61 and the principle of
harmony or the aesthetic theme. The ‘great chain of being’ is the mature neo-platonic view of
the world in which the whole of reality is ordered from the highest forms of life to the lowest.
Within this chain or ladder every level is filled with innumerable forms of existence or being.
This is the outworking of the principle of plenitude, and this vast array of higher and lower,
greater and lesser, superior and inferior forms, taken together as a whole, make up a
harmony. The seemingly ugly or comparatively horrible, serve the higher and more beautiful
by way of their contrast with the higher.62 Augustine explicitly denies that there is any
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Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 40–43.

“What is called Evil in the Universe is but the Absence of the Good,” Augustine, “The
Enchiridion,” in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff,
trans. J. F. Shaw, vol. III (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887), chap 11, 240.
59

60

G.R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1,2.

This principle states “that the richest and most desirable universe contains every possible
kind of existence: lower and higher, imperfect and (relatively) perfect, ugly and beautiful, cholera
germs and humming-birds.” Aidan Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to Its
Sources, Principles and History (Collegeville: MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 69. Augustine explicitly
references Plato as a source, see, “The City of God,” in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. II (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature
Company, 1887), Book XII, chap 26, 243.
61

God only creates what can be part of “an exquisite poem set off with antitheses … [where]
the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries arranged, as it were,
by an eloquence not of words, but of things.” Augustine, “The City of God,” Book XI, chap 18, 214,
215.
62
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“natural evil.”63 By being what they are, they contribute to the greater good of the whole.
Augustine even extends this aesthetic theme to cover moral evil and sinners. 64 While sin
provides the contrast to righteousness it also enables the display of God’s justice to be seen in
punishing sin. The retributive penalty on sin corrects the dishonour of sin and maintains the
harmony of the whole.65 In this way even hell can be incorporated into Augustine’s theodicy.
Aesthetics explains the place of evil in Augustine’s thought from a wider framework
while privation explains that evil doesn’t come from anything God created because creation
is good.66 But how did evil emerge from a good creation? Augustine explains that evil may
emerge due to creation’s inherent finite mutability. He states that because creatures “are not,
like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good may be diminished and
increased.”67 The good creation is liable to corruption due to the relative nature, or
changeableness, of its being.68 So evil is a privation but it is also parasitic. Because evil has
no substance of its own, it doesn’t exist of its own; rather it requires the good. “Accordingly,
there is nothing of what we call evil, if there be nothing good … Nothing, then, can be evil

63

Augustine, Book XI, Ch 22, 217.

“According to Augustine, the totality of things is better and more beautiful than any
individual thing. Even evil, if it is considered within the universal order of things, does not disturb the
beauty of the whole, since it makes the good stand out by contrast. In this way God is capable of
putting even evil things to good use.” Oleg V. Bychkov, Aesthetic Revelation: Reading Ancient and
Medieval Texts After Hans Urs Von Balthasar (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2010), 233.
64

J. Richard Middleton, “Why the ‘Greater Good’ Isn’t a Defence: Classical Theodicy in
Light of the Biblical Genre of Lament,” Koinonia 9 (1997): 82.
65

“All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are
themselves good.” Chapter 12 “All Beings were made Good, but not being made Perfectly Good, are
liable to Corruption,” Augustine, “The Enchiridion,” chap 12, 240. Hick, Evil and the God of Love,
44,45.
66

67

Augustine, “The Enchiridion,” chap 12, 240.

68

This relative nature is due to everything, except God, being made out of nothing, and thus
mutable. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 46,47.
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except something which is good… Therefore every being, even if it be a defective one, in so
far as it is a being is good, and in so far as it is defective is evil.”69 Evil is spoiled or corrupted
goodness.
Augustine’s account is not yet finished. Evil is not only a privation (absence of good)
and parasitic (needing the good in order to be), it is also a perversion or corruption or turning
or falling away from the good.70 “This remained the fundamental paradox of evil for him.
Deprivatio is one thing – a mere absence; but depravatio is something altogether more
fearsome in its positive potential for doing damage.”71 This perversion can only come about
by the power of personhood. Augustine finds the source of corruption or evil in “the rational
will, which is free to choose between good or evil.”72 This is because inanimate objects
cannot turn from the good. “It is in this sense that every evil event may be said to have a
mind behind it.”73 In keeping with his ontology Augustine describes how the will can make a
decision for evil within a good order. Augustine argues that humans possess goods which fall
into three levels. At the lowest level are those of bodily existence, in the middle (intermediate
goods or medium bonum) are the will, and the highest goods are virtues. Sin happens, and
therefore evil, when the will turns either to itself or to the lower good, instead of attaching

Chapter 13 “There can be no Evil where there is no Good; and an Evil Man is an Evil
Good,” Augustine, “The Enchiridion,” chap 13, 241.
69

“Much of Augustine’s vocabulary for describing the ways in which evil manifests itself has
to do with turning away or falling away or movement from the good: perversys, perversitas, aversion,
defection, lapsus, deformitas, deviare, infirmare.” Evans, Augustine on Evil, 95.
70

71

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 95. If evil is nothing then how can it apparently cause so much damage. “In the will
of rational beings who have turned from goodness there is power and substance, that which makes the
‘nothing’ of evil a ‘something.’ Ibid. 99. See also Augustine, “The Confessions of St. Augustin,” The
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. I (Buffalo, NY:
Christian Literature Company, 1886), Book VII; chap XVI, 111.
72

73

Evans, Augustine on Evil, 95.
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itself to God and virtue. “The evil lies in the aversio, the turning away (De Lib, Arb.
II.xix.53.199), not in the nature of the will or its objects, since they are the creation of a good
God.”74 By use of privation theory and locating evil in the will Augustine can show that evil
does not originate with God or his works, instead it arises from creatures.
It has not been possible to do justice to Augustine’s vast work on the problem of evil.
But even what has been examined reveals tensions. The gains of Augustine’s free will
defence in securing God’s innocence for evil are in danger of being lost in other elements of
his theodicy. These include his aesthetic theme, the divine incorporation of evil and hell75 into
a greater good, and Augustine’s increasing soteriological determinism. 76 All of these tend to
make evil a necessity and thus shift the cause for evil back toward God. While the free will
defence helped the early Augustine in his dispute with Manichaeism, he appears to have
backtracked somewhat embarrassingly from it in his later disputes with the teachings of
Pelagius.77 It is helpful to be aware of both the overlap and the potential difference between
Augustine’s version of a free will theodicy and how the free will defence is used by others.

John Hick: Evil and the Love of God
One of the most influential recent theodicies is the soul-making theodicy of John
Hick. Hick’s book Evil and the Love of God is now considered a classic in the field. Hick
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Ibid., 116.

Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 177. Hick notes the Hell means “sin will continue without
end, accompanied by unending punishment.” Evil is not defeated.
75

What a theodicy might look like that more fully reflects Augustine’s determinism is
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claims there are two predominant theodicies in the Christian tradition which he terms the
Augustinian and the Irenaean. Hick attempts to recover and adapt a modern, credible version
of the Irenaean. Hick’s theodicy belongs in the large grouping designated as greater good
theodicies. While Hick believes in free will he rejects a free will theodicy because he claims
that no one now believes in an angelic or human fall by perfect beings (or demonic
influence).78 For Hick these ideas are pre-scientific and implausible. Rather, evolution has
shown us that suffering has been present from the beginning.79 Hick grounds this
theologically by adapting the Eastern Orthodox distinction between the image of God and the
likeness of God. In Hick’s view, the ‘image of God’ refers to the appearance of rationality
and the capacity for relationship with God in humans.80 It comes as a result of God working
in the evolutionary process to produce such a creature. These creatures are spiritually and
morally immature beings. The next stage is the ‘likeness of God’ which is a goal to be
reached and obtained. This goal is for creatures to love God of their own free volition. Hick
sees coerced love and worship as oxymoronic.81 This goal cannot be reached in the same way
as the first stage. “It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but through the uncompelled
responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in the
world in which God has placed them.”82 Perfection lies in the future as a result of a present
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process. “The reality is not a perfect creation which has gone tragically wrong, but a still
continuing creative process whose completion lies in the eschaton.”83
Central to the growth from the ‘image’ to the ‘likeness’ of God is humanity’s
experience within a world in which there is suffering and struggle, where a being must meet
and overcome temptations, and where character is developed. Hence the designation ‘soulmaking theodicy.’84 This soul built through suffering is considered superior to undeveloped
beings created innocent. The worldly conditions of suffering and evil are necessary for the
realisation of the beings God desires. Thus, the perfected soul is the greater good which
justifies and necessitates the existence of suffering and evil.85
For Hick not only does humankind need an environment in which there is pain and
suffering but in order for the love of God to be unconstrained there is need for epistemic
distance between God and humanity. This is so that finite beings will sense no pressure from
an overwhelming and infinite God. God must endow humans with a certain relative
autonomy over and against God.86 The world must be “as if there is no God” and “God must
be a hidden, deity veiled by His creation.”87 This is needed for morally immature but free
beings to attain goodness.88
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An Eschatological Solution
It becomes clear that Hick’s theodicy is eschatological in nature.89 Appeal is not made
to a perfection lost in the past (as in Augustine) but to a perfection yet to be obtained in the
future. Thus, “our theodicy must find the meaning of evil in the part that it is to play in the
eventual outworking of that purpose; and must find the justification of the whole process in
the magnitude of the good to which it leads.”90 We have seen that Hick is quite willing to
leave aside major orthodox beliefs (i.e. rejecting the fall). This change in beginnings is
matched by a comparable departure in endings. Hick’s eschatological orientation means the
notion of an afterlife is of supreme importance.91 Hick sees the traditional notion of eternal
suffering in hell as in tension with his soul-making theodicy.92 Indeed it would be the
supreme example of “dysteleological” suffering in which no constructive purpose is served.
Hick believes hell makes theodicy essentially impossible.93 As a result, he considers other
eschatological alternatives. He acknowledges that annihilation does not have “eternally
useless and unredeemed suffering” and a theodicy would be possible but even here God’s
good purpose would fail for those souls who suffer extinction.94 Instead Hick turns to
universalism because “God will eventually succeed in His purpose of winning all men to
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Himself in faith and love.”95 Hick realises this is in tension with his acceptance of free will96
and he has rejected any form of Augustinian or Calvinistic predestination. He therefore
softens his approach, “The least we must say, surely, is that God will never cease to desire
and actively work for the salvation of each created person. He will never abandon any as
irredeemably evil.”97 This softening seems to be temporary and rhetorical as Hick continues
by asking “Can we go beyond this and affirm that somehow, sooner or later, God will
succeed in His loving purpose? It seems to me that we can, and that the needs of theodicy
compel us to do so.”98 For those who die in wickedness Hick draws upon the idea of a
‘purgatory’ in the after-life which will help bring about final and universal reconciliation.99 In
this way universal salvation ensures compensation for the difficulties and sufferings of soulmaking.

Gratuitous Evil and Soul-Making
Suffering and evil are necessary in Hick’s theodicy. What then of horrendous evils
which serve no purpose? It is true that much suffering when properly faced does lead to
maturity and development of character. But much suffering and evil has the opposite effect.
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Some suffering is so excessive it is ‘dysteleological.’ Critics have pointed out that the world
contains evil so great it can soul-destroy instead of soul-make. Hick is aware of this and
admits to the problem of ‘dysteleological suffering’ which is “unjust, inexplicable, haphazard
and cruelly excessive.”100 On this point, Hick appeals to mystery confessing he has no current
answer.101 But then he tentatively attempts to pull even extreme evils into the soul-making
scheme by suggesting that the very mysteriousness of evil may play a role in soul-making, as
unjust suffering calls forth acts of great human mercy, sympathy, service and love which are
not done for reward.102 And for souls seemingly destroyed by misery and evil in this life,
Hick can always fall back on his afterlife progression and universalism.

Process Theodicy
Another more recent but distinct theodicy is process theodicy.103 This theory takes the
process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) as
basic.104 Process theists, in common with the logical and evidential problems of evil, see an
inevitable conflict between the affirmations of traditional omnipotence and the reality of
genuine or gratuitous evil (evil without any point or divine allowed purpose) which process
theists affirm.105 Because genuine evil is real and God’s goodness is non-negotiable, the “only
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possible way to solve the problem of evil is to modify the traditional doctrine of divine
power. That modification lies at the heart of process theodicy.” 106 The first element to the
process solution to evil is defining God’s power as persuasive and not controlling.107 David
Ray Griffin acknowledges that some traditional theodicies also say God’s primary modus
operandi is persuasion, “But they have regarded the reason for this to be moral rather than
metaphysical.”108 In these traditional theodicies God’s choice to persuade results from a
divine self-limitation (e.g., God will not compel free will), in contrast, the process God
cannot control creatures even if he wanted to. He lacks such power.
Process theodicy builds this understanding on a rejection of the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo (out of nothing). In its place is the alternative conception of creation of order out of
chaos.109 This means there are some actualities that pre-exist God’s ordering of them and
these actualities must possess some level of power of their own. There is a power which is
common to both God and all actualities and is foundational to both. “Process theism
distinguishes between God and the aboriginal power of the universe, which it calls creativity.
Creativity is not a thing, or a being. It is simply the ultimate activity that all concrete
actualities embody.”110 Whitehead maintained that Creativity is ‘the “ultimate metaphysical
principle” which lies in “the nature of things” and this means that the world’s actual entities
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having creative power is not a contingent feature of reality, “It is beyond all volition, even
God’s.”111 “Accordingly, it is impossible for God to have a monopoly on power.”112 The
process of creation and the activity of creativity is not due to the sole power of God.113 God
has evocative power but he can’t unilaterally control. Instead he can take the long view and
draw creatures over time to higher aims.
God ‘creates’ by luring the creation. God can do this because all pure possibilities are
contained in the unchanging primordial nature of God.114 This gives the initial aim for
creatures or actual occasions. But each actual occasion has its own ‘subjective aim’ which is
the aim the subjective agent actually chooses which can differ from the initial aim evoked by
God. “The initial aim is given by God; the subjective aim is chosen by the subject.”115 This
initial aim by God is not coercive and must itself elicit the freely given creativity of the
subjective entity. This avoids determinism. At the same time, because God is active in
attempting to lead creation in this manner, there is such a thing as divine providence at work.
The concept of an independent subjective aim not under the control of the divine
initial aim opens the possibility of evil. But how and what is evil? Process theodicy has two
criteria for an intrinsic good. Something is good to the extent that it is characterised by beauty
which consists of the aesthetic values of harmony and intensity. The criteria for evil is the
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opposite of these “values.” In contrast to harmony is disharmony or discord, and the opposite
of intensity is triviality or even ‘boredom.’116 How evil arises is due to the tension between
harmony and intensity. Changes in one effect the other. An increase in intensity requires an
increase in complexity to sustain the harmony. When this doesn’t happen, discord results.
The interesting feature is that as God lures subjects (in the evolutionary process) to greater
complexity, to a higher aim, tension inevitably arises and evil can result. God’s luring of
creation to higher aims necessarily involves the emergence of evil. This is because there are
necessary metaphysical correlations of value and power which exist within creation. For
example, the capacity for intrinsic good (what affects oneself) correlates to that of intrinsic
evil, the capacity for instrumental good (that which affects others) correlates to that of
instrumental evil. “The correlations among these variables are positive – as one rises, the rest
rise proportionately. They are also taken to be metaphysically necessary.”117 So as freedom
increases so do all the other variables. Something with increased freedom can experience or
cause more good or evil as a result. Like the free will defence this doesn’t mean all specific
occurrences of suffering are necessary, only that “the possibility of all this evil is necessary if
there was to be the possibility of all the good that has occurred and may occur in the
future.”118 There could have been less suffering.
How then does process theism alleviate the problem of evil and function as a
theodicy? Process theism advocates a metaphysical state of affairs in which evil is
unavoidable in whatever world God creates. The process theologian doesn’t need to justify
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God’s establishment of these things.119 God ‘creates’ or lures this world to higher forms but
he does not create the underlying metaphysical characteristics of the world. God finds himself
in a universe in which these are givens he is powerless to change. Any horrors that occur are
the responsibility of agents who possess a self-determination over which God has no control.
In order to achieve higher forms of experience God has persuasively led the finite realm out
of a state of trivial chaos, and as a result discord has appeared as “the half-way house
between perfection and triviality”120 God is responsible for bringing creation to the ‘place’
where intense discord is possible but he is not responsible for the fact that this progress
inevitably produces discord. God’s purpose in engaging in this creative activity is “to
maximize intrinsic good in the present in such a way as to provide the foundations for greater
good in the future.”121 For Griffin, God is good in spite of evil “because the conditions for the
possibilities of greater good are necessarily the conditions for the possibilities of greater
suffering; because God does not promote any new level of intensity without being willing to
suffer the possible consequences” and because he is always seeking to overcome evil with
good and enlisting us in the same.122 From the perspective of classical theism, process
theodicy, with its denial of creation ex nihilo and its rejection of divine omnipotence, resolves
the problem of evil by positing a finite deity.123

119

Ibid., 296. There is a direct correlation between creation out of chaos and the notion that
there are metaphysical principles which are beyond divine decision. It is the nature of things. Ibid.,
297.
120

Griffin, God, Power and Evil, 300 (Griffin is here quoting Alfred Whitehead Adventures of
Ideas, New York, Macmillan Company, 1933, 355).
121

Ibid., 291.

122

Ibid., 310.

123

Mormon theology with its finite god constructs a theodicy strikingly similar to process
theodicy. See Carl Mosser, “Exaltation and Gods Who Can Fall: Some Problems for Mormon
Theodicies,” Element 3, no. 1 & 2 (2007): 45–67; Carl Mosser, “Evil, Mormonism, and the
Impossibility of Perfection Ab Initio: An Irenaean Defense,” SBJT 9, no. 2 (2005): 56–69; R. Dennis
30

Natural Order Theodicies
Another important theistic response to the problem of evil is the natural order or
natural law theodicy. Like the free will defence this approach can be incorporated into
theodicies. There are some theologians or philosophers whose work is particularly centred on
this argument, although each gives it their own shape.124

Richard Swinburne
Richard Swinburne’s theodicy combines natural order, free will, Open Theism, and a
version of soul-making. Swinburne argues that a world with evil and suffering is necessary to
the development of certain goods, the most important being character and virtue. Suffering
and evil thus serve a greater good and are essential to it. Moral character and virtues can only
be developed in an environment in which people must face evils and learn by experience and
induction of the consequences and causes of actions.125 Having this, people can then choose
either good or evil. This requires a natural order, predictable and constant, in which there are
cause and effect.126 Natural evil is not gratuitous but purposeful. Swinburne illustrates his
view in many ways. Humankind must see rabies in order to learn to prevent it, and must
observe the effects of asbestosis to prevent it in the future. To learn to build earthquake-proof
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buildings they must first learn of the effects of earthquakes on buildings.127 Swinburne even
tries to show the greater good that comes from Rowe’s example of a fawn (Bambi) dying
from burns due to a forest fire. The fawn’s suffering provides an opportunity for courage to
rescue and help. Its death helps other deer and people learn to avoid or prevent fires. It is an
opportunity to show compassion to the fawn.128 Swinburne summarises his position by saying
that the “fewer natural evils a God provides, the less opportunity he provides for man to
exercise responsibility … the less natural evil, the less opportunity for the exercise of the
higher virtues ... for freedom and responsibility.”129 Any less would be a ‘toyworld.’130

Bruce Reichenbach
Whereas for Swinburne there is a natural order in which moral evil is possible and
natural evil is necessary for soul-making, in Bruce Reichenbach’s theodicy, natural evil arises
as an inevitable by-product of the natural order. Evils “are not willed by God, but are the
consequences of the outworking upon sentient creatures of the natural laws according to
which God’s creation operates.”131 Reichenbach’s theodicy combines free will defence with
natural law. This natural order that makes free will human beings possible, is also the same
thing that makes possible disease, sickness, disasters, and birth defects. God is justified in
doing this because these are by-products “made possible by that which is necessary for the
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greater good.”132 There is an inevitability to this state of affairs. God only had the option of
either, (a) this world with its natural laws or (b) a world which operates according to
continuous miraculous intervention. But Reichenbach argues that (b) is not possible. In such
a world, rational action would not be possible as there would be no cause and effect. One
could not exercise freedom, God would be deciding all that comes to pass, and no one could
will evil or observe its results.133 It could be asked then why didn’t God make a world in
which the natural laws never lead to suffering. Reichenbach suggests that for the sceptic to
plausibly outline such a world system, which also contains moral free will, is impossible.134

Alvin Plantinga’s Felix Culpa
Alvin Plantinga is best known for his free will defence response to the logical
problem of evil. However, when Plantinga responds to the evidential problem he offers not
the free will defence but something different, the felix culpa theodicy.135 In many respects this
is Plantinga’s real thinking behind the problem of evil.136 Felix Culpa means ‘happy fault’
and refers to the fortunate benefits or greater goods that result from the fall into sin. Plantinga
discusses good possible worlds God could create and the good-making qualities that make
these good possible worlds, but notes that in Christian belief there is a contingent good-
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making characteristic of our world “that towers enormously above all the rest of the
contingent states of affairs included in our world: the unthinkably great good of divine
incarnation and atonement.”137
These states are far greater and more valuable than worlds without them, however,
you “can’t have a world whose value exceeds L [L = Level of goodness] without sin and evil;
sin and evil is a necessary condition of the value of every really good possible world.”138
Given this, the answer to the question of “why is there evil in the world?” is that God wanted
the best of all possible worlds. All such worlds have incarnation and atonement, and
therefore, all also have sin and evil. “So if a theodicy is an attempt to explain why God
permits evil, what we have here is a theodicy - and, if I’m right, a successful theodicy.” 139
Plantinga anticipates three main objections. The first objection is: why does God
permit suffering as well as sin and evil? To explain moral evil Plantinga uses the free will
defence (significantly free and rational creatures are a good-making feature of a world and
yet they also may and do commit evil). In response to natural evil he plays with a Natural
Law Defence, “perhaps … this is the price God had to pay for a regular world.”140 But in the
end appears to opt instead for collapsing natural evil into moral evil by means of a
Satanic/angelic fall previous to humanity, “much of the natural evil the world displays is due
to the actions of Satan and his cohorts.”141 He also argues that suffering itself is
instrumentally valuable, adapting the soul-making defences of Hick and Swinburne, with the

137

Ibid., 7.

138

Ibid., 12.

139

Ibid., 12.

140

Ibid., 15.

141

Ibid., 16.
34

added Christian element that suffering enables believers to experience solidarity with Jesus
Christ.142 With the second objection, “why does God permit so much suffering and evil?”
Plantinga eventually says we can’t know how much is needed and finds this objection
inconclusive. The third objection is more challenging. It asks, “if God permits human
suffering and evil in order to achieve a world within incarnation and atonement, would that
make him manipulative, calculating, treating his creatures like means instead of ends?” Does
God suffer from ‘a sort of cosmic Munchausen syndrome by proxy’?143 This is a telling
objection and it is hard to see how Plantinga convincingly responds to this objection.
Plantinga toys with ideas that he does not necessarily commit to. He reasons that it is possible
that God is right in allowing us to suffer if our suffering benefits someone else or achieves a
great good if we consent to it. But, of course, we didn’t consent to suffering. We were born
into it. Plantinga argues that sometimes we make decisions involving other people and their
suffering who don’t have all the information (e.g. on behalf of children, or people in comas).
These are decisions that the person would make if they were able to. Maybe God has done
that for us. If we knew what God knows, we would freely make the same decision he makes
and it is only our ignorance that holds us back from seeing that (how could we ever know or
substantiate this?). Additionally, God may know that if I didn’t have a disordered disposition
or affections then I would freely choose to undergo suffering (this appears to undercut the
libertarian understanding of free will). In all these cases God is not simply treating people as
means to an end.144 Plantinga then pulls back from this specific individual-centred course of
argumentation and resorts back to the broad greater good of incarnation and atonement. Here
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he says that a world with incarnation and atonement is a better world for the human beings
(He is no longer arguing for an individual benefit) within it than one without. So “his perfect
love perhaps mandates that he actualize a world in which those who suffer are benefited in
such a way that their condition is better than it is in those worlds in which they do not
suffer.”145 In both his initial individual-centred musings and his latter greater good/better
world argument the acclaimed benefits only apply to the redeemed. What of the lost? Are
they not the means to an end that does not benefit them?

Deterministic Theodicy: The Divine Glory Defence
Given the dominance of free will in historical discussions of the problem of evil one
could be forgiven for thinking that all theodicies pivot on the question of free will.146 But this
is not the case. A powerful counterpoint to free will theodicies is found in the realms of
theological determinism. This study will look at one important Calvinistic response called the
divine glory defence that is found in the thought of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) and many
modern-day influential Calvinists.147 If Calvinists cannot appeal to libertarian concepts of
freedom then what do they do? They appeal to a set of “demonstrative goods of uncertain
size”, that is greater goods which justify the occurrence of evil, in this case goods connected
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to divine glory.148 The central claim is that “there are certain excellences of God (justice and
mercy, for example) that cannot be displayed or manifested in the creation unless there are
evils to be punished or forgiven.”149 Evil has teleological and eschatological significance in
providing the context for God displaying his glory. For the divine glory defence to work it
needs to show that glory requires two features. First, that it is such a profound good that it is
“worth allowing the moral evil in our world for its sake,” and, second, that it “cannot exist
without the evil that exists, or at least that certain kinds or amounts of glory cannot exist
without the evil that exists.”150 Advocates recognise that God’s innate glory does not need
evil’s existence but the display of divine glory does need evil.151
Johnson notices the structural similarity to Plantinga’s felix culpa theodicy and even
claim that his theodicy is a version of the divine glory defence.152 Others state that Edward’s
divine glory theodicy is a version of felix culpa.153 Both are versions of the traditional greater
good approach. But what makes the difference between Plantinga’s felix culpa and the divine
glory defence, is that in the divine glory view Plantinga’s justifying greater goods,
incarnation and atonement, do not exhaust or adequately fulfil the requirements for the full
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display of God’s glory.154 While Christ’s work did reveal God’s glory, it did not properly or
fully reveal God’s attributes of wrath and judgment.155 This is for a number of reasons:
because Jesus wasn’t the actual object of God’s wrath; Jesus’ sufferings were only of a
limited duration; and on the Cross we see a singular undifferentiated judgment, what we do
not see is the different demands and punishments justice places on specific sins.156 What all
this adds up to is that evil is necessary, and with that an eternal, observable hell is necessary.
God’s “program of self-glorification in eternity necessitated the eternal, conscious experience
of this wrath on the part of its objects, as well as the observation of the fruits of divine
disfavour by the redeemed.”157 If evil or hell do not eventuate then the fullness of God’s glory
is not displayed. Bruce Davidson says that Edwards “aggressively recommends hell as an
essential manifestation” of divine glory which is the “’chief end’ of everything God does.”158
Without a hint of irony Davidson says for Edwards that “Thanks to hell, God is glorified
much more profoundly and comprehensively than he would be otherwise.” 159 The divine
glory defence is thus used by Calvinists as a defence against the problem of evil and the
problem of hell.
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There are several obvious objections to the divine glory defence. One is the tension
between the absolute divine control and the emergence of genuine opposition to God. Where
did the first sin come from? How could evil arise without it being traceable to God’s desire
that it arise? This is usually where appeal to libertarian free will is made but of course is not
available to compatibilists. Green mentions Edward’s seeming side-step in he which claims
God only withheld the grace needed for obedience but humanity choose to sin, therefore,
humanity and not God is directly responsible for sin.160 He recognises this still has problems,
“Even if God cannot be charged with evil person E’s evil actions as such, he might still be
charged with (a) making it the case that E has E’s character, and (b) making it the case that
E’s evil actions affect others the way they do.”161 Green’s follow-up is striking as it reveals a
reasoning that non-determinists find highly objectionable. Green argues that God creates
Hitler, in order that Hitler commits evil, in order that God might punish Hitler and show his
hatred of such a character.162 What is ‘positive’ is that Hitler makes possible a mode of
presentation of God’s glory achievable in no other way.
What some non-determinists find so appalling is the implied ethics which brings us to
another major objection to the divine glory defence. “The objection is that this defense [sic]
seems to portray God as using human beings as mere means to his own ends rather than as
ends in themselves.”163 In response Johnson argues that when God seeks the greatest good for
himself it is also the greatest good for human beings (vice versa). He gives the example of the
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elect, for whom God displaying his glory also means eternal life for them.164 Of course, this
argument works for the elect but not for the reprobate! God’s glory means their eternal pain.
Johnson’s response to this is relegated to a footnote in which he acknowledges that the lost do
serve as a means to God’s ends!165 How then does he avoid this defeater? He simply argues
that God’s love does not require that God never treats someone as a means to an end. Here
love is defined/redefined to allow for an instrumental use of another. This appears to amount
to ethical consequentialism. Such an ethical stance occurs again in another objection
concerning the scale of evil and the vast numbers who will be in hell.166 Could not God
achieve his goals with only a few hundred damned? Hart claims no. God could not achieve a
number of ‘goods’ for the elect unless vast numbers are condemned. 167 These are goods such
as feelings of gratitude and appreciation for salvation by the elect in view of how rare and
infrequent salvation is.168 All this is for the greater good of the elect’s observation of divine
wrath on the reprobate.169 It appears as if God has made the reprobate the instrumental means
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of the ‘good’ of displaying his glory and the ‘good’ of the elect observing it.170 This is again
ethical consequentialism. There are more arguments and defences but this gives us a sense of
how the divine glory defence is perceived to work or not.

The Greater Good Defence and Gratuitous Evil
Earlier it was seen that theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil challenge
Rowe’s first premise, the factual premise, which affirmed the existence of gratuitous
suffering/evil.171 Traditional theodicy denies gratuitous evil (the exception being Process
Theodicy) by offering both positive and negative responses to the factual premise. The
positive response constructs a theodicy which defends the notion that God has a greater good
which justifies his permission of all evil.172 For every evil that occurs there is a corresponding
good which justifies its occurrence. The negative response of sceptical theism denies that
non-theists have the epistemic ability to declare that no such greater goods exist and thus no
one can claim an evil is gratuitous. Both of these positive and negative approaches accept the
second premise, and its idea of a greater good, and reject the first premise and its idea of
gratuitous evil.

“I suggest it is for the sake of the occupants of heaven that God creates people to occupy
hell.” Ibid., 250. This is clearly instrumentalist.
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The Greater Good Theodicy or Defence
The greater good approach to evil is of immense significance. It has been the classical
and predominant approach. Melville Y. Stewart states that “Most if not all theistic attempts to
resolve the problem of evil make use in some way of the greater-good defence.”173 Stewart
has offered what he sees as a defensible version of the greater good theodicy. His definition
of a greater good defence is:

GGD = “For every evil that God permits there is a good state of affairs which
counterbalances and which logically requires the evil in question (or some other evil
of at least equal negative value), and some evil is overbalanced by a good state of
affairs (or good states of affairs) which logically require the evil in question (or some
other evil of at least equal negative value).”174

Most of the theodicies examined employ the greater good defence in some form. For
example, despite free will putting a distance between God and evil, Augustine’s views on
predestination and his aesthetic theme of overall harmony (involving the beauty of antitheses)
make both evil and evils necessary. 175 Griffin sums up Augustine’s position by saying “there
is only one thing that is clearly evil intrinsically, and this is sin, or evil willing. But this prima
facie evil is only apparently evil, for the universe is a better place with sin than it would have
been without it.”176 Hick positioned his Irenaean soul-making theodicy as the great alternative
to Augustine. Yet he also employs a strong greater good theodicy. Souls created in the image
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of God cannot become like God unless they exist in the soul-making environment this world
is. Evil and suffering are unavoidable and necessary features in order to bring about the
eschatological greater good of matured souls who love God and are like him. Swinburne’s
views are similar to Hick’s but with a more much stronger emphasis on the greater good. He
thinks the natural order necessarily brings about a world of good and evil in order for people
to make choices between them and learn and grow. Natural evil is required and thus not
gratuitous. Swinburne states strongly that “Every moral evil in the world is such that God
allowing it to occur makes possible… the great good of a particular choice between good and
bad… Every pain makes possible a courageous response... and normally the goods of
compassion and sympathetic action… And all animal pain gives knowledge and opportunity
for compassion to animals and humans if they know of it.”177 In the felix culpa and divine
glory defences evil is necessary for the greater good, and for the displaying the divine glory
in incarnation and atonement or wrath and punishment.
The only exceptions to this are process theology and the concept of free will. If
creatures are capable of free but evil decisions, neither ordained by God or metaphysically
necessitated, then gratuitous evil is a genuine possibility. This realisation, as well as concern
at the moral and theological implications of the greater good defence, has led to alternative
theodicies.

Problems with Greater Good Theodicies
Bruce Little has strongly criticised the greater good theodicy response to the
evidential argument from evil. He argues that horrific evil is the greatest challenge to greater
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good theodicies.178 Little believes that claiming that a greater good obtains for every evil,
including horrific evils, places an unnecessary and impossible empirical burden of proof on
the theist. The evidential argument becomes unanswerable and the retreat into sceptical
theism unavoidable.179
A number of criticisms have been raised against the greater good approach. First, by
suggesting that evil is necessary to good a new dilemma arises: “either evil is necessary for
God to bring about greater good than would have otherwise transpired, or evil is morally
unnecessary.”180 If evil is necessary then God’s goodness is questioned, as he operates on an
end justifies the means principle181, and his omnipotence is questioned, as he is unable to
achieve his aims without evil. This appears to undercut and nullify any of the gains made by
the free will defence.182 Second, the greater good approach raises ethical questions about God
and the good. The very concept of the good is relativised.183 Good is not understood in an
intrinsic sense, but in relation to something thing else. Good then cannot be judged by itself
but in relation to its consequences and outcomes. This is a consequentialist ethic. What
appears to be a morally good action may, in fact, bring about evil or a lesser good, and
conversely an evil action may bring about a greater good. Good becomes relativised and
equivocal, something that appears to be at odds with theism and perfect goodness. Third, a
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further difficult question is raised – who receives the good?184 Is it God? The sufferer? The
onlooker? Often a victim or sufferer of an evil receives no good. The good appears to go
somewhere else. It seems questionable that suffering and evil is inflicted on one simply as a
means for another’s good. This reduces the person to an instrumental means. How is that
good? Fourth, a greater good theodicy also appears to lack objective criteria for good and
evil.185 How does one calculate (quantitatively or qualitatively) the amount of good needed to
outweigh an evil? What measure is used? For example, what resulting greater good justifies
the rape and dismemberment of someone? And if horrendous evil necessitates an extreme
greater good that means that mild evil produces only mild good, whereas extreme evil
produces extreme good. The perverse result is that “it is better to be beaten and raped than
only beaten since the good is greater (something no one actually believes).”186 The greater
good belief consistently applied produces a morally confusing world.187 Fifth, the net effect of
the greater good approach is that evil ceases to be genuinely evil. J. Richard Middleton argues
that “to claim that every evil in the world contributes to some equal or greater good which
would be otherwise attainable means quite simply that there is no genuine evil.”188 Sixth,
efforts at social justice are undercut. After all, why stop evils that are necessary to produce
greater goods?189 Seventh, is the problem of purely mental evil. Little asks how does the

184

Ibid., 119–120.

185

Ibid., 121–122.

186

Ibid., 121.

Kirk R. MacGregor states, “The absurdity of the Greater-Good Defence is multiplied by its
transformation of the universe into a philosophically overdetermined system, where hidden benefits
are needlessly assigned to all instances of ostensibly pointless evil therein.” MacGregor, “The
Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil,” 168.
187

188

Middleton, “Why the ‘Greater Good’ Isn’t a Defence,” 86.

189

Little, A Creation-Order Theodicy, 115. The same reasoning raises issues about petitionary
prayer, see, Middleton, “Why the ‘Greater Good’ Isn’t a Defence,” 91.
45

greater good defence deals with evil which is thought or imagined but never practiced or
acted on? That appears to be a class of evil for which there is no greater good.190 Eighth, on
the theological front Middleton claims that greater good theodicies do not take the Bible
seriously enough nor the ruthlessly honest way it speaks of pain, evil and suffering
(especially Laments such as those in the Psalms). Theodicies take the form of apologetics,
whereas the Bible takes the form of prayer or complaint to God about his justice (or delay of
it). Theodicy discusses God abstractly as a third person, whereas biblical theology directly
addresses God and wants to hear his answer. Classical theodicy can lead to passivity
regarding the status quo, whereas, biblical theology questions the present social
arrangements.191 Much of Scripture does not resolve the problem of evil as much as intensify
it.192 Middleton believes greater good theodicies take rationality far too seriously, that
Scripture instead suggests the inscrutability of evil and hence the apparent impossibility of
theodicy, and that this should turn our focus to the participation of God in our suffering and
his eschatological work.193

Discarding the Greater Good Theodicy
These crushing criticisms have led to a search for alternative theodicies. Positions
which reject the greater good approach accept the first premise that gratuitous evil/suffering
exists, and instead questions how the second premise, the theological premise, is understood.
This is a radical inversion of the traditional greater good approach. For example, William
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Rowe took it as uncontroversial that the second premise “is held in common by many theists
and nontheists” and that it expressed “basic moral principles, principles shared by both theists
and nontheists. If we are to fault this argument, therefore, we must find some fault with its
first premise.”194
But not all theists are so persuaded. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Little,
and others respond to the evidential argument by acknowledging gratuitous evil and
questioning the second premise. Michael Peterson is important as he is an early exponent of
this alternative approach. Peterson claims that the implied theological assumption underlying
the second premise is that of ‘meticulous providence’ and that it should be rejected.195
Meticulous providence is the belief that God doesn’t allow any gratuitous evil.196 Its most
well known in its Calvinist form, where every event, no matter how small, whether good or
evil, has been ordained and meticulously rendered certain by the determination of God. We
have encountered it in Augustine and the divine glory defence. Peterson rejects such a
doctrine as it makes the theist’s position extremely difficult. In contrast to this Peterson’s
theodicy is a complex combination of a free will defence, natural-law theodicy, apparent
Open theism197, and a version of soul-making. Peterson claims the created world order makes
possible freedom (stability and predictability are required for deliberation and free choice).
And this freedom for great good entails the possibility that freedom could be used for
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gratuitous evil.198 Trakakis comments that “in providing an environment in which free will
can operate, a natural order makes possible the existence of gratuitous moral evil.” And as
regards gratuitous natural evil, “it is difficult to imagine that God would or could arrange all
natural events so that they always realized some higher goods.” This would require God to be
always interfering and thereby eliminating the natural order.199

Issues with Alternatives to Greater Good Theodicies
This move to reject the greater good approach, meticulous providence, and acceptance
of the reality of gratuitous evil is a very significant recent alternative to the majority of
standard theodic approaches. Ronald Nash (1936-2006) believes that, if successful, it would
tip the balance of probability in the evidential problem of evil away from the sceptic and
toward the theist!200 However, several thinkers such as Feinberg, Stewart, and Trakakis are
less sanguine and have identified a major challenge to the current formulation of this
alternative. Stewart claims Peterson’s dismissal of the greater good defence is unsuccessful
and in the end he still remains within the greater good tradition. His main argument is that
“(1) Peterson’s gratuitous evils are not really gratuitous, since they are subsumed under one
or some combination of three general justificatory patterns.”201 The three justificatory patterns
Stewart refers to are the free will defence, natural law theodicy, and soul-making theodicy.
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These are the greater goods which justify God allowing evil, including gratuitous evil. Given
the definitions and frame of the debate it appears that Peterson has not fully escaped the
dilemma. John Feinberg is of a similar opinion. “If the evil is genuinely pointless, then why
present the free will defence, for example, to explain its point? If it is genuinely pointless,
nothing will explain it. On the other hand, if the free will defence does explain its point
(which it seems to do), then why call it pointless?”202 Trakakis concurs, “Peterson, then, finds
himself in a quandary: he cannot reject the factual premise without the credibility of Christian
theism being diminished in his eyes, and he cannot reject the theological premise without
importing a non-standard definition of gratuitous evil.”203 Peterson seems to be both denying
the greater good approach and utilising it. He is caught on the horns of a new dilemma and
his position appears inconsistent and possibly incoherent.

Retrieving Peterson’s Alternative by Modification and Clarification
Peterson’s position is not as hopeless as it may seem. It is possible to modify the
argument, and in fact, both Feinberg and Nash provide ways of doing so. Once modified,
Peterson’s formulation emerges as a genuine alternative. Nash notes the problem outlined
above204 but then offers the following clarification; a distinction can be made between general
evil and specific particular evil. “When a theist says that he believes God’s creation contains
gratuitous evil, he means that it includes specific instances of moral and/or natural evil for
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which there is no specific reason or purpose in God’s plan.”205 God has a reason and purpose
for allowing evil in general (preserving the existence of the ‘good’ of free will, sustaining the
‘necessity’ of a stable natural order) but God does not have a specific reason or purpose for
each and every specific evil. Specific evils are either the actions of individuals, and find their
meaning in their choices, or the unfortunate outworking of natural law, and in neither case is
God meticulously guiding these events in order that they happen for a specific purpose. These
evils can be pointless in themselves. While free will may have meaning, not every exercise of
it need be.
In addition to Nash’s distinction between general and specific instances of evil, John
Feinberg’s offers a further and complementary distinction. Classic greater good theodicies
claim that there is no evil for which God does not produce a greater good. The good is
subsequent to the evil event, and either outweighs it or prevents a worse evil from coming,
and this subsequent good is the higher reason justifying God’s ordaining or allowing of it.
The realisation of the higher good required the evil to occur (think Augustine’s antitheses).
Peterson denies this and yet appeals to a greater good to give divine reason for allowing the
evil. Feinberg helps clarify that Peterson is not contradicting himself, although he claims his
argument and language is muddled. What Peterson is not denying, is that an antecedent good
(e.g., free will) may be what makes possible the evil event, but does not require it. Peterson’s
argument does work if the good is antecedent. Whereas, the greater good theodicy sees the
good as subsequent. For Peterson, the antecedent good is necessary, but the evil is not
necessary nor is there a point to it. There is a point to the antecedent good (free will). It is a
‘great good’, but there is no divine purpose to the non-necessary evil event. And since God
does not meticulously control all things, the explanation for the evil is with the agent not
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God. God’s purpose is the existence of free will and its proper exercise, not the commission
of evil.
Instead of a simple division between greater good theodicies and those others that are
not, it is more accurate to recognise a distinction between full greater good theodicies which
deny gratuitous evil and limited or partial greater good defences which allow for gratuitous
evil. Theists who acknowledge gratuitous evil must still recognise some kind of greater good
defence which seems unavoidable (God is not without purpose). The distinction between full
and partial greater goods brings out more clearly Peterson’s important discussion.206 Table 2
below outlines a clearer picture of the alternative way the idea of a ‘greater good’ functions
within theodicies.

Table 2: Two Kinds of Greater Good Approaches
Full Greater Good Theodicy

Partial Greater Good Defence

Every evil is linked to the accomplishment of
a greater good or the prevention of a greater
evil

Not every evil is linked to the
accomplishment of a greater good or the
prevention of a greater evil (although some
evil can be so linked)

The greater good is subsequent to the evil
(justifies the evils occurrence)

The greater good is antecedent to the evil
(the evil itself is not justified, although its
permission is)

No evil is truly gratuitous or pointless

Evil can be gratuitous and pointless

God’s providence is meticulous and ensures
the realisation of a subsequent greater good
from an evil act

God’s providence is general, upholds the
antecedent good, and can sometimes bring
greater goods subsequent to an evil act

The allowance of evil (in general) is justified
and all (particular) evil that is allowed is
justified by God who ensures and renders
certain all things and brings good from it

The allowance of evil’s possibility (in
general) is justified by a greater good – but
the (particular) evil itself is not
(responsibility rests with the causative agent)
and may not bring any good
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These distinctions are significant and make a considerable difference to how a
theodicy responds to the problem of evil. The limited greater good defence avoids many of
the criticisms levelled against the full greater good theodicies mentioned earlier. Because of
this they deserve to be considered as distinct approaches.

Anti-Theodicy
Bruce Little’s and Richard Middleton’s comments have highlighted the ethical
criticisms of the greater good approach. Such criticisms are at the heart of another response to
theodicy known as ‘anti-theodicy.’ Anti-theodicy rejects the whole attempt to construct
theodicies.207 This is not to be confused with atheistic rejection of theodicy. These are theistic
objections to theodicies. No modern discussion of the problem of evil can ignore this
important stream of thinking. There are several kinds of anti-theodicies. Protest theodicies
(such as John Roth), practical theodicies (advocated by Kenneth Surin), and for clarification
atheistic or sceptical denials of theism will be termed pure anti-theodicies. This studies
interest is in the first two which share considerable overlap.

Protest Theodicy
Protest theodicy is a form of anti-theodicy that protests either God (esp. John Roth),
or theodicies in defence of God (Terrence Tilley). Roth’s protest draws on ancient dissenting
Jewish voices that quarrel “with God over his use of power.”208 While many theodicies affirm
God’s eschatological ending of evil as an answer to the problem of evil, protest theodicy does
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not as “too much has been lost.”209 Protest theodicy “puts God on trial, and in that process the
issue of God’s wasteful complicity in evil takes center stage,” and as a result “human
repentance will have to be matched by God’s.”210 Protest theodicy calls into question, but
does not completely reject, the goodness of God.211 Protest theodicy leads to activism on
behalf of the suffering and thus overlaps with practical theodicy.212 Roth does not want to
lessen human responsibility for evil by scapegoating God. We must fight evil but Roth also
hopes his protesting activism will shame or spur a morally ambiguous deity to act against evil
and reduce his neglectful inaction and waste.213 Critics draw attention to Roth’s decision to
reject God’s goodness and yet hope that God will eventually do good. They ask how likely
this is. If God has a demonic side then how can we hope?214 Griffin notes that such a moral
lack in God would be as irreversible as an ontological limitation in God, “I see no basis for
hope that a partly evil deity could be lead to repent.”215 There is no demonic in Roth’s
theodicy, or rather it seems to be partially incorporated into God. It may be that Roth needs to
take seriously the biblical concept of Satan and evil as external to God. Middleton protests
that Roth has taken the biblical supplicant’s questioning of God’s justice and reified it into a
systemised foundation for constructing a doctrine of God. He sees this as inappropriate and
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isolates the complaint from the dialogue of prayer.216 Roth’s view is rare but interesting
because unlike the majority of theists he questions God’s goodness not his power.

The Evils of Theodicy
Terrence W. Tilley’s book The Evils of Theodicy is not a solution to the problem of
evil but a book about “the problems such solutions create in their attempts to justify God’s
ways to those who think the problem of evil is solved by producing an explanation.” Tilley
lists the problems that theodicies create as (1) misportraying and effacing genuine evils, (2)
warping the way traditional texts are read today, (3) consigning other “discourse about God
and evil to philosophical and theological irrelevance,” (4) silencing “powerful voices of
insight and healing,” and (5) contributing to “the power of the “classical” Humean problem
of evil, the alleged incoherence of belief in an all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing God, and
that there is genuine evil in the world.”217 Tilley traces theodicies back to the advent of the
Enlightenment where attempts were made at constructing totalizing systems to answer the
philosophical questions. Previous answers to evil were pastorally motivated and offered
defences of God but not global explanations. Tilley is disturbed by the academic nature of
theodicy and how it offers little pastorally (i.e. comfort to those suffering) and marginalises
the concept of social evils in favour of natural or moral evils. Ultimately, Tilley goes too far.
The problem of evil can be traced back to Epicurus well before the enlightenment. While
Tilley rejects theodicy he allows for a defence against the problem of evil. However, Phan
has pointed out that all his complaints about theodicy can be charged against the ‘defence’ to
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the problem of evil he allows.218 In the end Tilley’s work functions as a warning about
theodicy poorly practiced219 but fails to sustain its case against theodicy by making absolute
its claim that any attempted at theodicy is evil.

Practical Theodicy
Another version of anti-theodicy, only slightly friendlier to the exercise of theodicy, is
that of ‘practical theodicy,’ exemplified in the writings of Kenneth Surin. He, like Tilley,
believes theodicy is a modern enlightenment practice that is largely ahistorical and
theoretical. He claims theodicies frustrate a historically situated reflection on various forms
of evil but worse than this they militate “against a properly Christian response to the
‘problem of evil.’”220 Theory triumphs over practice and actual evil remains untouched.
Practical theodicy protests theodicy but also its equally theoretical nontheistic critics.
Yet theologians come under greater criticism because they have allowed nontheistic critics
the shifts from practice to theory; from a ‘problem of evil’ to a ‘problem of God’; and from
the God of Christian theology to the God of the philosophers.221 Surin protests the
“metaphysical theodicist,”222 This appears to be a protest against the radical reductionism that
follows theodicy’s polemic turn in the Enlightenment era. This reductionism led to an
Peter C. Phan, “The Lesser Evil of Theodicy,” in Evil and Hope (Catholic Theological
Society of America, NY, 1995), 194,195.
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abstract concept of evil (no longer the particular evils of victims but an ahistorical, abstract
category and its theoretical implications),223 and as a result the attempted solution is found in
“the application of reason to that which transcends rationality.”224 Surin observes that,
ironically, this is itself irrational. “Evil and suffering in their innermost depths are
fundamentally mysterious; they confound the human mind. And yet the goal of theodicy is,
somehow, to render them comprehensible, explicable.”225 The effect of this is that the
theodicist tries to “render the intractable tractable,” trusts words to answer a “wordless
abyss,” and “promotes a non-tragic vision of the realities of evil and suffering.”226 They
become Job’s comforters, the “prototypical theodicists.”227 “Theodicy, it could be said,
founders on the ‘mystery of iniquity’.”228
For Surin, theodicy and theodicists are concerned with 3 main questions: (1) Can evil
be rendered intelligible? (2) Is the existence of God logically compatible with the existence of
evil (or with the varieties and profusion of evil)? And, (3) does the existence of evil constitute
evidence that counts against (or reduces the possibility of the truth of) theism?229 Two more
questions can be added to these three. These are: (4) What does God do to overcome the evil
and suffering that exist in his creation? And, (5) what do we (creatures of God) do to
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overcome evil and suffering?230 Does the unintelligibility of evil, just discussed beforehand,
mean that all theodicy is impossible and the whole enterprise is broken and irreparable?231
Theodicist’s may reply that they do not try or have to try to make evil intelligible but only to
make theism intelligible. The rejoinder is that by seeking to situate evil within a wider
theological framework is still an attempt to rationalize evil by the principle that God permits
evil.232 Surin accepts this and argues that the theodicist needs to leave questions (1) to (3) and
move to (4) and (5), or in other words, to “evacuate theodicy from the realm of theory in
order to relocate it in the realm of practice.”233
Before looking at practical theodicy it needs to asked what are the theoretical
theodicies that Surin refers to? Not simply the more obvious culprits such as Leinbiz and his
‘Best of all possible worlds,’ but Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence, Swinburne’s natural law
theodicy, David Ray Griffin’s process theodicy, and John Hick’s soul-making theodicy,
which for Surin all bear the unmistakable theoretical bent.234 This does not mean that Surin
opposes any intellectual response to evil but only a theoretical one. Surin instead advocates
that the only allowable and needed theodicies are those which may be termed ‘practical
theodicy.’ Surin’s examples of this kind of theodicy include the theological responses to evil
and suffering in the works of Dorothee Soelle (1929-2003), Jürgen Moltmann and P.T.
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Forsyth (1848-1921).235 What is common to these theodicies and what sets them apart from
their theoretical cousins? Surin tells us they display the following commonalities:

1. They affirm the principle that God in some sense suffers with his creatures.
2. They maintain that the God who suffers in this world cannot be an immutable and
impassible deity.
3. They insist that the question of overwhelming import to the sufferer is not ‘Is theism
unintelligible because I am suffering?’, but ‘Is this God a God of salvation – is this a
God who can help?’
4. They claim that it is a corollary of (1) and (3) that a theological approach to the
‘problem of evil’ from the standpoint of victims will necessarily lead to soteriology,
or more precisely (given the framework of the Christian mythos), into the doctrine of
atonement.236

For Surin, what is wrong with theoretical theodicies is their immutable, impassable
God incapable of suffering with us, their preference for intellectual solutions instead of
practical soteriological solutions, and, finally, their resolution in theoretical theory rather than
atonement. Theoretical theodicy discusses evil from the ‘tranquillity of the study.’ In
contrast, practical theodicy discusses evil from the place of the victim, aiming to be in
solidarity with the cross-revealed-God who is in solidarity with the victim, and working
toward salvation. This highlights that questions are ‘interest relative’, the theorist’s interest is
in seeing if theories of ‘soul-making’ or ‘free will’ account for evil, whereas the victim and
the praxis-orientated theodicist, wants to answer the question ‘Why am I here imprisoned?’,
‘Why am I being tortured?’ or ‘Why is God an indifferent spectator?’237 Thus, the “only
theological discourse about Auschwitz which can be permitted is the one that could have

235

Ibid., 112–141. Key works include Dorothee Soelle, Suffering (London: Darton, Longman
& Todd, 1975); P. T. Forsyth, The Justification of God: Lectures for War-Time on a Christian
Theodicy (London: Duckworth, 1916); Moltmann. The Trinity and the Kingdom of God.
236

Ibid., 137.

237

Ibid., “Taking Suffering Seriously,” 341,342.
58

been enunciated in Auschwitz.”238 Only a fellow sufferer can speak and bring answers to the
situation of evil. Hence the crucial need for God to be a fellow sufferer and in that suffering
to be working out salvation.239

Response to Surin
James Wetzel has responded to Surin and raised a number of issues. He notes the
interesting progression in theodicy debates. From defending God against charges of a lack of
justice in ancient times, to removing obstacles to belief in God in modern times, to the
questioning of theodicy itself. Surin epitomises this last stage.240 Anti-theodicists are more
concerned with “elimination of evil than with its explanation, and gauge the success of their
theodicies by their political and societal consequences.”241 But Wetzel argues that theodicy is
unavoidable. And that Surin in fact engages in a kind of ad hominem argument against
theodicists along the lines of ‘if you engage in theodicy then you are morally corrupt’ and
insensitive to people’s suffering.242 But theodicists are aware of this danger, and are explicit
that their theodicies are not meant to respond to people in the midst of suffering. That
requires the work of a pastor, not a philosopher. Wetzel distinguishes between minimalist
theodicy (concerned only to answer logical objections to theism) and speculative theodicy (to
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offer an explanation of evil and shows how it fits within God’s providence), a distinction
which parallels that of Plantinga’s defence versus theodicy. Accordingly, Wetzel uses
Plantinga as the representative minimalist. Wetzel maintains that minimalism may satisfy
conditions of logic but satisfies no person.243 There is a need to go beyond it. This is what
speculative theodicies aim to do. However, the “vice of speculative evil is that it cannot
accept the possibility of irredeemable evil. Many theologians of course may not see this as a
vice at all, but as a hopeful conclusion of religious faith.”244 Speculative theodicists give the
impression that they are committed to a redescription of evil, as a means to a greater good,
and struggle to avoid appearing as an apologetic for evil.245 This does not mean Wetzel sides
with practical theodicy. Instead, he claims that evil fails to respect the theoretical/practical
distinction and “neither side can avoid coming to terms with the possibility of irredeemable
suffering” unless they sink into a total silence.246 He argues that practical theodicy be seen as
the tradition’s loyal opposition.247 “Neither the poles of theodicy nor tragedy seem to be
acceptable standards for God’s sovereignty, but the alternatives, if there are any, await
articulation.”248
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Overview of Different Key Areas of Choice in the Problem of Evil
The investigation so far has revealed no singular way theodicies seek to resolve the
problem of evil, instead a range of distinctly different approaches can be discerned. Each
approach makes distinctive choices in the following three areas.

1. Choice of Overall Method of Response: Defence, Theodicy or Anti-theodicy
Theists respond to the evidential problem of evil with a variety of methods. One is the
minimalistic approach of defence. As Plantinga’s used his free will defence in response to the
logical problem of evil, so many theists utilise sceptical theism as a minimalistic defensive
strategy. The majority of thinkers have undertaken the more ambitious task of trying to
construct a theodicy in which actual reasons and explanations are offered to vindicate God in
the face of evil. This is a theoretical approach but can have an eye on the practical. On the
other end of the spectrum is the direction taken by anti-theodicies.249 Anti-theodicies are
marked by protest against an abstract and theoretical resolution of the intellectual problem of
evil, and argue for a shift to a practical response to evil by God and/or believers. God’s
practical response is in a work of atonement that overcomes evil, and in being a God capable
of both suffering and entering the suffering of the world. Followers of God are called to
practically oppose evil and suffering in the world.

2. Choice of Justificatory Patterns and the Relationship between Evil and the Greater Good
Central to how theodicies answer the problem of evil is the use of major justificatory
patterns which occur again and again in the literature of theodicy. For the theodicist these
patterns act as missing premises which are added to the logical or evidential formulation of

This is apart from what I call ‘pure’ anti-theodicy which is the stance of atheists and
sceptics who formulate the problem of evil as an objection to theism.
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evil to diffuse the trilemma or render it solvable. There are many kinds of justificatory
patterns (free will, soul-making, natural order, higher harmony, divine glory defence, felix
culpa, etc.) which function within wider theological framework. It is common for a theodicy
to incorporate a number of patterns. Usually they underline some idea of a greater good
which either denies gratuitous evil or accounts for it in a way that doesn’t invalidate the
theodicy. Usually these responses do not focus on the theological premise (God is omnipotent
and good) but seek to tackle the factual premise (evil and/or gratuitous evil exists). Table 3
below outlines three broad relationships between justificatory patterns, greater goods, and
evil.

Table 3: Justificatory Patterns and Theodicy Solutions
A: Solutions that rely on justificatory patterns to demonstrate a full greater good theodicy
and deny gratuitous evil (e.g., Leibniz/Augustine/divine glory defence)

B: Solutions that rely on justificatory patterns to demonstrate a partial greater good defence
which allows for the possibility of gratuitous evil (e.g., Peterson/Little)

C: Solutions in which both gratuitous evil and justificatory patterns are inevitable features
of natural reality which God cannot avoid. God achieves some greater goods despite
gratuitous evil (e.g., Process theodicy)

3. Choice of How to Formulate the Doctrines of God and Providence
Lying behind the way justificatory patterns are used and the manner of how the
greater good is advocated, are the important and interrelated areas of the doctrine of God, his
attributes, and his providence. Theodicies are the outworking of theological systems. The
range of theodicies is closely linked to these areas or potential modifications in each of these
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areas.250 Trakakis, for example, thinks Rowe is successful in his argument against theism and
suggests that if theists cannot appeal to their own evidence in support of God’s existence,
then the only option is to abandon theism or alter one’s conception of God.251 The God
debated within the logical and evidential arguments is always the threefold God who is
omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent (fourfold if creator is added which is usually
entailed in omnipotence). Every one of these divine attributes is open to more exact definition
or change. The different theodicy moves can be mapped as follows:
•

Goodness/Benevolence: This is denied by John Roth’s protest theodicy.

•

Omniscience: The traditional understanding is modified by Open Theism (e.g.
Swinburne) and process theology (i.e. Griffin).

•

Omnipotence: this is either denied (as in Process or Mormon theodicies) or refined as
a voluntary self-limitation for the existence of genuine free will (as in free will or
Arminian theologies).

•

Creator: Process theology (and Mormon theology) denies creation from nothing as
part of its denial of traditional omnipotence. This approach can be termed ‘finite
theism.’

Changes in divine attributes are directly related to views on providence and divine
limitations. Table 4 below outlines the various groupings in the following manner:
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Table 4: Theodicy and Doctrines of God and Providence
Doctrine of God

Limitations on God

Classical Attributes

Providence

Classical Full theism
(Augustine, Divine
Glory defence)

No limitations

Affirmed

Meticulous

Modified Full theism
(Reichenbach)

Self-limitations on
divine power

Affirmed/Revised

General

Modified Full theism
(Swinburne,
Peterson)

Self-limitations on
divine power & limits on
divine foreknowledge

Affirmed/ Revised (some
radically)

General

Process Finite theism
(Griffin)

Divine power limited by
external forces

Revised and/or Rejected

Externally
Constrained

These three areas of choice help in understanding the way theodicies work. It should
be remembered that any respective theodicy is usually more complex and intricate than
simply these areas and must be understood on its own terms. To display all of the complexity
and variety of approaches to the problem of evil is not possible in a diagram. While having
clear limitations Table 5 below attempts to provide a visual representation which maps out
some of the main approaches.
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Table 5: Theodicies and the Problem of Evil252

DETERMINISM

ATHEISM

FREE WILL DEFENCE

LIMITED GREATER GOOD DEFENCE
(Gratuitous evil)

FULL GREATER GOOD THEODICY
(No Gratuitous evil)
G W Leibniz
(Best of all Possible Worlds)

Michael Peterson

Alvin Plantinga

Divine Glory
Defence

David Ray Griffin
(Process Theology)

(Felix Culpa)

Mackie
(Logical POE)

Augustine
(Early Augustine)

Augustine

John Hick

(Late Augustine)

(Soul-Making)

Bruce Reichenbach

Mormon Theology

(Natural Law)

Rowe
(Evidential POE)

Richard Swinburne
(Natural Order)

FULL THEISM

FINITE THEISM ATHEISM

ANTI-THEODICY

Sceptical Theism Defence
(Stephen Wykstra, William Alston)

PRACTICAL

PROTEST

PURE

(Kenneth Surin)

(John Roth)

(Atheists)

Conclusion: Common Strategies among Theodicies
After this survey of the problem of evil, particularly in its evidential form, a common
strategy among theodicies can be observed. This observation can be stated in the following
way: In responding to the problem of evil theodicies tend to add a missing premise (usually
one or more justificatory patterns) while readjusting either the theological premise (doctrine

Michael Peterson’s theodicy appears Open Theist. Gregory Boyd’s is open theist (Boyd
will be examined in the following chapter) as is William Hasker, see his Providence, Evil, and the
Openness of God; and The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008). Hasker is also in the Natural Law category. Also in the Natural
Law (but not Open theist) category is Bruce Little in his A Creation-Order Theodicy.
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of God/model of providence) or the factual premise (deny gratuitous evil).253 This will help in
analysing cosmic warfare theodicies. This wider discussion highlights the following areas and
questions to be asked when formulating a Great Controversy theodicy. What justificatory
patterns are utilised? What approach is taken to the question of a greater good? Is there such a
thing as gratuitous evil? Does God have limitations, chosen or imposed? What is the doctrine
of God (including the question of divine suffering)? How are divine attributes understood?
What is the doctrine of providence? What role is given to atonement? And does the Great
Controversy significantly depart from well-established approaches? What is similar and what
is different?
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66

CHAPTER 2: GREGORY BOYD’S TRINITARIAN WARFARE THEODICY

The previous examination of theodicy in chapter one has shown that the problem of
evil has evoked a wide range of theological and philosophical responses. However, that
survey deliberately omitted cosmic warfare theodicies (of which the Great Controversy
theodicy is one) to which this study will now turn. One of the most thorough applications of a
cosmic warfare worldview to the problem of evil is that of Gregory Boyd.254 Boyd’s warfare
perspective appears in many of his works but it is spelled out in detail in his two volumes
God at War and Satan and the Problem of Evil.255 This study will now examine Boyd’s work.
256

It will centre on these two works but will also weave in insights and perspectives from his

other works.257 In God at War Boyd introduces the problem of evil258 and presents the biblical
case for a warfare worldview which provides a necessary foundation and biblical justification

C Peter Wagner argues that from within the spiritual warfare perspective Boyd’s works are
“unrivaled [sic] in the literature of theodicy.” in James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy, eds.,
Understanding Spiritual Warfare: Four Views (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 169.
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for his theodicy.259 Boyd constructs a specifically Christian version which he terms a
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.260 In his follow up work, Satan and the Problem of Evil, Boyd
works out in detail the philosophical-theological-historical argument of his theodicy and
deals with challenges and objections.

Boyd’s Foil: The Blueprint Worldview
The main foil261 to Boyd’s warfare theodicy is the traditional and predominant
approach to theodicy which he calls the ‘classical-philosophical’ approach262 or alternatively
the ‘blueprint worldview.’263 This approach “assumes that everything somehow fits into
‘God’s secret plan’” or “a divine blueprint.”264 For Boyd this view covers different
theologies. Some versions state “that God ordains all things, others that he simply allows
tragic events to occur” but what is common to all of them is that they share the assumption
that “there is a specific divine reason for every occurrence in history.”265 This blueprint
worldview is another way of speaking of ‘greater good’ theodicies in which there is a divine
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reason behind all evils and it is this element which Boyd is at pains to challenge and reject.266
According to Boyd’s definition this blueprint worldview takes in the majority of classical
Christian thought after Augustine (including Augustinian,267 Thomist, Calvinistic,268 Molinist,
and even some Armininian theology). This classical viewpoint finds its roots in the encounter
between Christian and Hellenistic thought,269 and produces a theology which seeks to work
out the doctrines of God, providence, and theodicy, from a commitment to such constructs as
impassibility, immutability and timelessness.270

The Issue of Divine Power and Meticulous Providence
The problem of evil concerns the tension between God’s power and goodness and
evil’s existence. Boyd argues that the classical view of divine power is the real problem. This
is because the classical view defines omnipotence as omnicontrol, “an equation that forces
the problem of evil to be seen as a problem of God’s sovereignty”271 This understanding of
power gives rise to a doctrine of meticulous providence (i.e. God meticulously controls and
wills every event) which has the effect of absorbing and domesticating the warfare
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worldview.272 Cosmic or spiritual war is turned into a “sham war.”273 After all, a war that is
played out exactly as one side has determined is hardly a real war.
This leads to a search for a divine reason behind each and every evil. The difficulty
suggests “that perhaps the understanding of providence which lies behind this formulation of
the problem [of evil] is mistaken.”274 Boyd argues that the classical approach has generally
framed “evil as a problem of God’s providence and thus of God’s character.”275 What kind of
God (i.e. moral character), who controls all things (i.e. has power and providence), would
ordain such evil? Like Peterson, Boyd rejects the common assumption that theism necessarily
entails a belief in ‘meticulous providence’ because this reframes the problem as one of
“locating a loving and good purpose behind evil events” and this view of divine providence
makes theodicy an impossible and unsolvable task.276 Because a mysterious divine plan or
greater good purpose is assumed to be behind evil events, the problem of evil becomes “an
intellectual problem to be solved rather than a spiritual opponent to be overcome.”277 This is a
crucial point for Boyd. Classical theism intensifies and to a significant degree creates the
problem of evil while rendering it unsolvable.278
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Undermining the Free Will Defence
All this has implications for theodicies’ use of free will. Some forms of classical
theism appeal to free will as a partial explanation for evil.279 However, Boyd argues that
under the influence of Platonic/Aristotelian thought, climaxing in Augustine’s neoplatonic/Christian synthesis, freedom was subsumed within the sovereign will of God, this
meant that there was a transcendent divine purpose behind the freely chosen evil making it
contribute to some higher good.280 This undermines the free will defence because whatever
freely chosen evil that happens is also what God deliberately willed or ordained to happen.
The point of the free will defence is to deny this connection and instead affirm that the freely
chosen evil was contrary to God’s will.281

The Issue of the Minimal Recognition of a Personal Satan
Boyd’s wider objection to classical theodicy is its failure to appreciate the central role
of angelic freedom and particularly that of Satan in understanding evil.282 This understanding,
while not entirely absent from classical theism, exists more as an echo, and especially since
the time of Augustine few thinkers have “conceived of Satan as a being in any way relevant

279

Such theodicies assume libertarian understanding of free will in contrast to deterministic
theologies which assume a compatibilist form of freedom. Libertarian free will refers to the ability to
choose between alternatives (it is not compatible with the determinism of only one alternative),
whereas, compatibilist freedom refers to the ability to choose to freely do what you desire to do, but
you cannot choose what your desires will be (they are determined by other factors).
280

Boyd, God at War, 47,48,67.

281

Boyd argues that classical theists who are Arminian and affirm free will still maintain a
qualified ‘blueprint’ version of providence and are still left with the unsolvable question of what
loving reason did God have for allowing Zosia’s suffering. Ibid., 49. Boyd outlines four reasons why
this is do, see ibid.
282

Ibid., 53,54.
71

to, let alone central to, the solution of the problem of evil.”283 Instead of Satan and the
corresponding warfare explanation for evil, the ultimate explanation for evil has been God’s
meticulous providence. “By contrast, the New Testament and early postapostolic church
always thought of the problem of evil in the context of spiritual warfare. The world is caught
up in a cosmic battle and thus is saturated with horrifying suffering and diabolical evil. That
is the final explanation of evil.”284 For Boyd, the combination of undermining the ultimate
role of angelic freedom, and thus the ultimate explanatory power of cosmic war, for the sake
of preserving the view of meticulous providence, generates the unsolvable nature of the
problem of evil.285 Bringing together these ideas Boyd states that “the main difference
between the warfare worldview and the blueprint worldview is that the former does not
assume that there is a specific divine reason for what Satan and other evil agents do. To the
contrary, God fights these opponents precisely because their purposes are working against
his purposes. The reason why they do what they do is found in them, not God.”286

Reframing the Problem
Against this blueprint worldview Boyd offers the cosmic warfare worldview which
will now be explored. The essence of the warfare worldview is that “divine goodness does
not completely control or in any sense will evil; rather, good and evil are at war with one
another.”287 The world has become a place of competing wills with no secret purpose behind
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every evil. One of the most important implications of this view is that evil, especially
gratuitous evil, is to be expected in a condition of war. Gratuitous evil is normative.288 Boyd’s
acceptance of the factual premise of the evidential problem of evil (i.e. gratuitous evil exists)
and the denial of the theological premise (meticulous providence) marks a significant
departure from the majority of theodicies. Positing a cosmic war with gratuitous evil and
locating all evil in the will of creaturely rebels and not in the will of God allows Boyd to
distinctly separate evil from God. God does not will evil; he fights it. If this is true then much
of the force of the problem of evil (in its evidential form) is overcome. Does this move by
itself completely resolve the problem of evil? Boyd cautiously avoids such a claim. He argues
that because God is the sole creator of all things, the metaphysical question still remains of
why God would create a world capable of cosmic war in the first place. Boyd concedes that
due to this, “the problem of theodicy remains, even within a warfare worldview,” but
immediately contends that “unlike the futile quest for the elusive good divine motive for any
particular evil within the world, this metaphysical question is answerable.”289
This optimism is based, in part, in Boyd’s belief that solving the problem of evil is
linked to a correct framing of the issue. “It is all a matter of where one starts: do we start with
a view of God as being at war with evil or with a view of God as controlling evil?”290 This
reframing radically alters the entire response.291 The problem changes from unanswerable to

against, other created beings. While none of these can ever match God’s own power, each has some
degree of genuine influence within the cosmos.”
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answerable. Instead of an intellectual conundrum to solve, it is transformed into the practical
problem of a spiritual opponent to be overcome.292 Freed from fruitless speculations as to
why God might will or ordain evil we can rise up and combat evil. Another way of saying
this is that a warfare theodicy leads to a theology of revolt against evil rather than a theology
of resignation. Theologies of resignation theologise about evil (and personal sin) rather than
fight it.293
Despite this sanguine note, Boyd still has to face a continued challenge to warfare
theodicy: even if God doesn’t ordain evil, he still has the power to prevent it. The dilemma is
thus: “It seems we must either believe that God does not prevent certain events because he
chooses not to or because he is unable to.” It appears that the “warfare worldview must
accept that at least sometimes God is unable to prevent them. But how can we continue to
affirm that God is all-powerful?”294 The goal of Boyd’s volume Satan and the Problem of
Evil is to answer that very question and thus render the warfare view philosophically
coherent.295 Boyd’s answer is summed up in one word: love. God is love. He designed
creation for love. But “the possibility of love among contingent creatures such as angels and

upon how one frames the problem. And how one frames the problem is decisively colored by the kind
of world, the kind of God and the kind of evil that one thinks needs explaining.”
Ibid., 21, 291. “when we accept the warfare worldview of Scripture, the intellectual
problem of evil is transformed into the practical problem of evil, just as it was in the New Testament.”
Ibid., 291.
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humans entails the possibility of its antithesis, namely, war. If God wanted the former, he had
to risk the latter.”296 Love is risky.
This summary might appear to be merely a restatement of the free will defence but
Boyd has a very important caveat. The warfare theodicy is epitomized by Satan and cosmic
war. The fall out arising from the dark possibility inherent in contingent love, is first and
foremost a struggle between God and Satan.297 Because Satan is more powerful than any
other creature opposing God, and because he is the leader of this opposition, to account for
him is to account for lesser rebels. Cosmic war and evil is epitomised in Satan.298 Boyd
appears to wager the success of his warfare theodicy on its account of Satan. This will be of
particular interest in this study. While some might conclude that Satan will function as
Boyd’s ultimate explanation for moral evil and not natural evil, he pre-emptively states “there
is a class of evils in the world that cannot be explained adequately except by appealing to
Satan.”299 By this Boyd means natural evils and animal suffering.300 Traditionally, explaining

Ibid., 16–17. “To create a cosmos populated with free agents (angels and humans) who are
capable of choosing love requires that God create a cosmos in which beings can choose to oppose his
will, hurt other people, and damn themselves. If love is the goal, this is the price. The solution to the
problem of evil, I believe, is found in this insight.” God of the Possible, 135. Emphasis mine.
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natural evil has been considered a major weakness of free will theodicies.301 But here Boyd
turns everything on its head and argues that natural evil constitutes evidence for a cosmic
warfare explanation rather than against it. 302

Six Theses of Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy
This study will now turn from an overview of Boyd’s approach and its comparison to
the blueprint viewpoint to a closer examination of Boyd’s central theses. Boyd’s argument
can be summarised in six tightly argued interlocking theses. For these theses Boyd uses the
abbreviation ‘TWT’ which stands for Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy. This study will follow
Boyd in this and maintain his nomenclature. The six theses are:
1. TWT1: Love must be freely chosen.
2. TWT2: Love entails risk.
3. TWT3: Love and freedom entails that we are to some extent morally responsible for
one another.
4. TWT4: The power to influence one another for the worse must be roughly
proportionate to our power to influence for the better.
5. TWT5: Love entails a freedom that is within limits irrevocable.
6. TWT6: Our capacity to freely choose love is not endless.303

The traditional theodicy of free will theism “provides no answer to the question of what is
usually called “natural evil,” meaning the forms of evil that are not due to human volition.” Griffin,
“Creation out of Nothing, Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil,” 117.
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The theses are outlined on pages 23-24 and detailed in chapters 2-6 of Satan and the
Problem of Evil. A different wording of the theses appears in the article “Six Theses of the Warfare
Worldview,” accessed April 11, 2014, http://reknew.org/2007/12/six-thesis-of-the-warfareworldview/“Six Theses of the Warfare Worldview.” This version is: 1. Love Requires Freedom; 2.
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Formal similarities with the free will defence can now be noted. Theses 1, 3, 5 and 6
explicitly mention the notion of freedom. Chapter 2 of Satan and the problem of Evil is
entitled “The Free Fall: Free Will and the Origin of Evil.” The cosmic warfare theodicy
clearly uses the free will defence as a justificatory pattern and is thus a version of a free will
theodicy. But Boyd is not simply trying to present a free will theodicy. Instead, and this
constitutes part of his uniqueness and importance, he is trying to place freedom within the
larger issue of cosmic warfare and situate freedom as a dimension of a more foundational
characteristic of love. Boyd is moving free will beyond a mere defence against the problem of
evil to a viable theodicy by means of cosmic warfare based in the metaphysical requirements
for love.

TWT 1: Love must be Freely Chosen
Why does Boyd start here? Why position freedom within love and why place love
first? Boyd argues that because the Trinitarian God is a God of love his desire for his creation
is that it loves also. God’s goal for creation is a ‘bride’ who would receive, embody and
reflect his love back to him.304 He then asks “If love is the goal, what are its conditions?”
More specifically, what are the kinds of creatures that must be created in order to participate
in this goal?305 Creatures who love can only do so if they love freely. Creatures who love
must have the capacity not to love.306 Many things can be forced or compelled but as
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The same is not true of God. God is not a contingent creature but a necessary being whose
essence could not be other than it is. Ibid., 53.
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everyone knows by experience, love cannot be coerced or forced.307 “The possibility of
saying no to God must be metaphysically entailed by the possibility of saying yes to him.”308

Libertarian Freedom vs. Compatibilistic Freedom
Boyd’s view requires a libertarian view of freedom as opposed to a compatibilist view
of freedom. Libertarian freedom as a view recognises the power of various influences and the
constraints of particular circumstances upon a person’s decision but believes that the final
decision is nevertheless determined by the individual. The final and ultimate explanation for
an agent’s decision is the agent herself/himself. People possess a self-determining freedom
rather than one truly determined by someone or something else.309 A person could have
chosen otherwise.310 Pre-existent conditions influence but do not coerce the decision. This
contrasts with compatibilist freedom in which all that is required for someone to do
something freely is for them to do what they want to do. But they are not free to determine

Boyd illustrates this with his ‘perfect wife’ analogy in which a computer chip is placed into
his wife’s head which would make her behave in a deterministic fashion (and yet she would
experience it as her own freely chosen decisions). Although exhibiting loving behaviours, would she
be genuinely loving her husband? Would Boyd actually find this love unfulfilling knowing that she is
not feeling or deciding this of her own accord but only in accordance with the computer chip. She is
in effect a puppet. Boyd would really be interacting with himself in the form of the computer chips.
See Boyd, 55. This illustration appears in a simpler briefer form in God of the Possible, 134,135.
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“The nature of the freedom TWT1 postulates is self-determining freedom.” Ibid., 56.

See Boyd’s discussion in Satan 56,57. Roger Olson explains libertarian freedom this way,
“When an agent (a human or God) acts freely in the libertarian sense, nothing outside of the self
(including realities within the body) is causing it; the intellect or character alone rules over the will
and turns it one way or another. Deliberation and then choice are the only determining factors,
although factors such as nature and nurture, and divine influence come into play. Arminians do not
believe in absolute free will; the will is always influenced and situated in a context. Even God is
guided by his nature and character when making decisions. But Arminians deny that creaturely
decisions and actions are controlled by God or any force outside the self.” Roger Olson, Arminian
Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 75. See also Hasker,
The Triumph of God over Evil, 150.
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what they want (this is determined by other causes whether circumstances, history, biology or
divine activity through secondary agents or direct primary causation). Hasker explains
compatibilism as “the claim that everything we do is causally determined, either by the
“strongest motive” (psychological determinism) or by physical causes … [or] with the
theological view according to which everything we do is determined by immutable divine
degrees.”311 In this view, predestination (as absolute divine sovereignty) and freedom are not
seen as contradictions because “we “freely” choose to do exactly what God has predestined
us to do.”312 Boyd offers two main reasons why he rejects compatibilism. First, it does not
adequately explain moral responsibility. Second, its “failure to consistently affirm agents as
the ultimate producers and ultimate explanations of their own actions intensifies the problem
of evil.”313 From Boyd’s perspective “compatibilism and the problem of evil are inextricably
connected.”314 The significance of this for Boyd’s view is his claim that the ultimate
explanation for moral evil is to be found in the agents themselves.315 This means that there is
no need to look outside of the person’s choice for the ultimate explanation for evil to some
higher greater good which God wishes to achieve and in which he requires certain evils in
order to achieve it.
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Ibid. “In compatibilist free will, person are free so long as they do what they want to do –
even if God is determining their desires … people sin voluntarily and are therefore responsible for
their sins even though they could not do otherwise.” Olson, Arminian Theology, 75.
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That the “Creator is all-holy and thus does not himself will evil, leads inexorably to the
conclusion that these cosmic forces have made themselves evil... Only this view can provide an
adequate foundation for theodicy within a creational-monotheistic framework” Boyd, God at War, 99.
Boyd, Satan, 56,57.
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TWT 2: Love entails risk
Boyd’s first thesis is crucial and everything else follows from accepting this account
of love and freedom. Given the nature of love as freely chosen, it follows that a free
individual may choose not to love. This is the “metaphysical price” God pays for love. “The
possibility of evil is not a second decision God makes; it is implied in the single decision to
have a world in which love is possible.”316 There is a risk in making creatures who can love,
hence the second thesis – love entails risk (TWT2). This means that it is logically impossible
for God to both create creatures who can freely choose to love and yet creatures who can
never freely choose not to love. God cannot both give and withhold freedom. The positive
side of this realisation is that God is not expected to do the logically impossible, therefore, it
is no slight on God if he cannot guarantee that love will always be chosen. This ‘inability’
needs to be understood as a voluntary self-limitation317 that God has freely willed and choose,
once he decided to make this kind of creature. This limit is not imposed on God by nature or
reality or another power. In this way Boyd steers clear of finite theism.318 This also means
that a risky creation conflicts with the idea of divine sovereignty as divine control of all
events (i.e. Augustinian and Calvinist determinism). The nexus of freedom and love involves
a risk that divine power cannot eliminate without also eliminating those very things. But
interestingly, Boyd chooses not to make this point in the chapter which outlines this second
thesis, even though earlier he has stated that traditional understandings of divine power are
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Two significant versions of finite theism are Process theology and Mormon Theology. For
Mormon theodicies see Mosser, “Evil, Mormonism, and the Impossibility of Perfection Ab Initio: An
Irenaean Defense,” 56; Mosser, “Exaltation and Gods Who Can Fall: Some Problems for Mormon
Theodicies,” 46; Potter, “Finitism and the Problem of Evil.” For a Process theodicy see Griffin, God,
Power and Evil.
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the problem. Instead, Boyd chooses to highlight what he sees as the incompatibility of risk
with divine foreknowledge. Classical theism believes God possesses exhaustive definitive
foreknowledge (EDF) of the future. This means the future is not an unsettled field of
possibilities but a fixed and known fact to God. Therefore, “attributing risk to God seems to
contradict the classical understanding of God’s foreknowledge.”319 This is where Boyd
introduces his Open Theism into his theodicy.320 He proceeds to contrast simple
foreknowledge with Open Theism.321 Simple foreknowledge believes that God simply ‘looks’
and sees the future. God does not determine the future by divine decree, as in Calvinism, or
by selecting a potential world to actualise, as in Molinism. The problem for Boyd with simple
foreknowledge is that while it affirms genuine risk for God, it is a risk that God is unable to
change. The future is fixed. God’s foreknowledge is more like hindsight and offers God no
providential advantage in response to what will happen.322 In contrast to this, Boyd argues
that the “open view of God (or of the future, as I prefer) avoids the difficulties associated
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Boyd’s discussion of Open theism is extensive and takes up the greater part of chapters 3
and 4. These chapters rehearse Boyd’s views which are detailed in a number of other works, see
Boyd, God of the Possible; Gregory A. Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” in Divine Foreknowledge:
Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001),
11–47; Dennis W. Jowers, ed., Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
2010), 183-208; Gregory Boyd, “Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God,” Philosophi
Christi, 2003, 187–204. For how neo-molinism helps improve standard Open Theism understandings
of God and the future (in this case Clark Pinnock’s) see Gregory A. Boyd, “Unbounded Love and the
Openness of the Future: An Exploration and Critique of Pinnock’s Theological Pilgrimage,” in
Semper Reformandum: Studies in Honour of Clark H Pinnock, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Anthony R.
Cross (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003).
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with the EDF [exhaustive definitive foreknowledge] doctrine and allows us to consistently
attribute risk to God.”323
Having highlighted problems with exhaustive definitive foreknowledge, especially in
the form of simple foreknowledge, Boyd then pulls back from his presentation of Open
Theism.324 His point “is not that believers cannot embrace the Trinitarian warfare worldview
without also embracing the open view of the future, that is, without denying that God
possesses EDF.”325 Rather he wishes other Arminians to see that their current views are
inconsistent and that there are advantages in approaching the warfare view from an open
theological perspective. Boyd finishes by saying “it is not my intention to wager the entire
credibility of the Trinitarian warfare theodicy on my defence of the open view of the future.
At its heart the Trinitarian warfare theodicy is simply an expansion and fleshing out of the
free will theodicy that Arminians have always appealed to.”326 Boyd positions his view within
Arminian theology as a theology that is compatible with a warfare view but in such a way to
show the advantages of his own position. The rest of Boyd’s presentation of the warfare view
will reflect this stance. The warfare view unfolds in a way that does not necessitate Open
Theism but it will often appear as the preferable providential model for the warfare
perspective.

323

Ibid., 90.

324

The appearance of Open theism in the second thesis may imply that the remaining theses
are essentially constructed on an Open theism platform but this is not so. This is for two reasons.
Firstly, Boyd makes clear that it is possible to understand this thesis from non-openness perspectives.
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Risk and Divine Sovereignty
The first two theses (TWT1 and TWT2) aimed to show how evil is an unavoidable
risk that is entailed in the creation of beings who love. This is a standard free will defence. In
many respects what Boyd has done is offer a variation of the free will defence, only this time
articulated through the lens of love. A free will defence may explain evil per se but can it
explain the magnitude and extremity of evil? Boyd’s theodicy develops beyond a free will
defence by looking further at the implications of love in the context of cosmic war. Now that
risk has been introduced it is hard not to be struck by the scale and dimensions of the risk
involved in a cosmic warfare perspective. Risk is a disturbing idea if even God is subject to
it. It should be noted that for Boyd’s cosmic warfare theodicy the issue of risk has been
severely heightened by the inclusion of Open Theism, especially in comparison with
traditional ‘no-risk’ doctrines of providence.327 Boyd is aware of this and the issue of risk will
preoccupy the rest of Boyd’s six theses. After all, the God of Open Theism may be viewed as
an irresponsible gambler uncertain of the future yet risking both our and his future. Boyd
wants to show why this is not the case.
Leaving aside Open Theism for issues more central to our concerns, there are a
number of questions following from the element of risk that arise as a result of these initial
two theses and must be dealt with by any warfare approach (open theist or non-open theist).
How can God be guaranteed to win a cosmic war if he can never be guaranteed of winning
each or any particular battle? It appears theoretically possible that God could fail and that no
one will choose God’s way. Why will this not happen? How can we trust a God who is not in
meticulous control of the world? He may be God but why trust him? An additional question
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asks why creatures that reject love are allowed to then significantly hurt others? Why doesn’t
God prevent angels and humans from harming other each other?328 Abusing your own
freedom is one thing abusing someone else’s is another. The risk seems to be the creature’s as
much as the Creator’s. These questions are particularly important because they represent the
objections that the blueprint worldview, with its meticulous providence and no risk stance,
levels against free will theologies.329
Because the remaining theses (TWT3-TWT6) deal with risk, Boyd considers the
development and understanding of these as the heart of the Trinitarian warfare theodicy.330
These theses aim to explain and mitigate the nature of that risk. They reveal that the evils
resulting from cosmic war operate within limits. Therefore, God’s risk is a rational and
knowable (even if not exhaustively known in the classical sense) risk, and because God
perfectly understands the parameters of this risk, he is able to deal with it.331 In showing how
the warfare theses dealing with love can answer the blueprint objections, Boyd also shows
how his alternative understanding of divine providence and sovereignty (general as opposed
to meticulous) is also not subject to these objections. The problem of evil always concerns the
tight connection between the God-World relationship. Boyd’s six theses explain the nature of
the World God has made, while doctrines of divine sovereignty and providence explain the
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Boyd’s example is R. C. Sproul who argues that if chance exists then God cannot be
sovereign. Even one lone molecule not under God’s control could prevent Christ from returning!
Boyd, 146,147. See R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God (Wheaton, Il: Tyndale House, 1986), 26; idem, Not
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Boyd uses his divine chess master analogy here, Ibid., 112–114. While the precise details
of the future are not exhaustively known, the limits on the possibilities of the future are clearly
knowable to God. For more references to the divine chess master see also Boyd, “The Open-Theism
View” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, 44.
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God involved. One cannot work without the other. Thus, Boyd’s discussion of his theses on
the nature of love constantly requires clarifying and arguing for the complementary
theological framework in which they work. Meticulous providence, divine determinism,
divine power as omni-control, all nullify or falsify a free will-and-cosmic-warfare-theodicy.
The cosmic warfare worldview only emerges from the interaction between a particular
understanding of God and a particular understanding of the world (the same is true for
blueprint worldviews). Therefore, before Boyd moves to his remaining theses (about the
world-reality) he makes way for them by outlining how his doctrines of providence (Godreality) mitigate risk.
Consequently, Boyd presents four arguments against the idea that risk threatens divine
sovereignty. All address divine determinism in some way. The first two concern God and the
last two concern the world. First, Boyd wants to affirm a sovereignty that is adventurous
rather than unilaterally controlling. His sovereignty is adventurous because it allows for God
the experience of risk and novelty rather than simply control.332 Second, Boyd argues that a
God who must unilaterally control all things, else he would not be God, is an inferior God.
This view undermines real divine sovereignty. Such a God is a weaker God who is threatened
if he is not controlling everything. In reality this is a denial of real sovereignty. An analogy is
apparent in human leadership. Leaders who must control others to get their own way are
viewed as insecure, manipulative and weak in comparison to leaders who lead by character.333
Third, general determinism and specific indeterminism are not opposites but
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complementary.334 What this means is that God can know the general and ultimate outcome
of history even if he cannot know or control every specific. Boyd is thinking here of current
scientific theories which map the interaction of order and chaos in nature and even society.
The indeterminism of the quantum world yields surprisingly predictable and determinable
outcomes. A world filled with indeterminism does not mean a world that is unpredictable.
Risk, on a general level, is not complete or unknowable risk. The spiritual world is analogous
to the quantum world.335 Advocates of no-risk providence fail to understand that it is a
question of balancing control and freedom; 336 not a question of either/or. Fourthly, the
complementary nature of determinism and indeterminism is universal. Whether it be the
behaviour of subatomic particles, the economy, the flight pattern of bees, prevalence of crime
or disease, the rate of suicides in a particular area, all of these are predictable. While it is not
easy to predict what any individual will do, the behaviour of groups or systems is quite
predictable.337
Even with these four arguments, people may continue to ask if God might still fail.
Boyd adds two important additional arguments. First, in giving humans freedom God actively
sets the parameters of that freedom. God knows what humans, created in a certain way, are
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capable of. He also knows the percentages of how creatures will act. This capacity and
percentage is one he can deal with.338 A somewhat similar point entailed in Boyd’s
metaphysics of love in TWT6 can be seen. But whereas TWT6 concerns the metaphysical
limitations of a creation capable of love, Boyd’s point here is theological and providential.
God knows and thus actively set limits to human action. These ideas will later develop into
Boyd’s important ideas on ‘probation.’ Second and logically related, God knows his own
character and ability. He knows he can cope with the situation. Elsewhere Boyd makes this
point through two related theological affirmations: Infinite intelligence339 and Omniresourcefulness.340 Infinite intelligence is the idea that God’s intelligence is never taxed or
divided up. God is able to devote complete and total attention to each and every challenge as
if it was the only challenge he faces. No number of situations to attend to could ever lessen
God’s capacity devoted to them. God’s intellect can never be ‘spread thin’ as ours is. We can
handle only one focus at a time whereas God can handle an infinite number of focuses as if
each of them were the only focus he had.
In this outline and defence of Boyd’s providential model, risk is reduced but
uncertainty still remains high especially in the areas of specifics.341 For example, Boyd
suggests that God reasoned about the future in terms of percentages (i.e., before creating God
knew that a fall into sin was a high possibility or even inevitable. God also knew that a
certain percentage of people would reject an offer of salvation and a certain percentage of
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people would accept).342 The uncertainty in regards to who and how many will be saved
parallels uncertainty about when God’s goal of the acquisition of a ‘bride’ will be achieved.
This means the end of the cosmic war which frustrates God’s goal is uncertain. In response
Boyd declares that God’s love “refuses to give up” and will do whatever it takes “for
however long it might take” to see his plan fulfilled. 343

TWT 3 and TWT 4: Moral responsibility and Proportionality and Risk
Clarifying God’s providence has shown that risk is not a total threat to God’s plan yet
it still leaves a great many questions about risk. Boyd then moves to questions about the
range, effects and value of God’s risk. God might be able to handle the risk and ensure he
achieves his goal of a “bride”, but is it worth it? Or has God wagered too much in his
‘gamble’? These questions shift the discussion from querying God’s power and ability to
handle risk, to his wisdom and goodness in allowing such a risk. Specific questions include:
Why does God allow free agents so much influence and power over other free agents
(specifically to harm and even to kill)? Why can angelic decisions influence human agents to
such a vast degree? Has God overplayed his hand and wagered too much on angelic and
human freedom? Is Satan’s freedom worth it? Considering the degree of suffering in cosmic
war, is freedom itself worth it?344 These questions all address the issue of the balance between
control and freedom in Boyd’s theodicy. They ask if God has got the balance wrong? Wasn’t
a different balance possible?
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Boyd relies heavily on ideas of necessary proportionality and responsibility to
illustrate the unavoidable conjoined value and cost of the risk. It is within an understanding of
a relational creation that Boyd articulates further his metaphysics of love with his 3rd and 4th
theses in answer to these questions. Boyd argues that Creation (both in its sentient and
inanimate forms, and “above”/heavenly and “below”/earthly dimensions) is an interconnected
whole which operates on the same moral principles, and as a result there necessarily exists
within it an interlocking moral tapestry which includes both the human and the angelic.345 To
love is to be able to relate, influence and affect others deeply. Unfortunately, this capacity to
bless others, when freedom goes wrong, turns into the capacity to curse others. Because
freedom involves the ability to bless or harm others, by granting it God has made us “morally
responsible for each other.”346 This is “the dark side of the potential to love.”347 This
articulates the third thesis that love and risk means we are morally responsible to and for
each other.348 Boyd recaps the sequential logic by stating that just as “love requires freedom
(TWT1) and freedom requires risk (TWT2), risk entails moral responsibility (TWT3).”349
Moral responsibility means that God could not have created us with the capacity to influence
each other and yet that influence have no moral dimension. Influence is unavoidably moral
(i.e. good or evil). Because angels and humans are part of the same creation they participate
in this shared moral influence and responsibility. Boyd is quick to caution that other free
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agents may influence us but they cannot determine our choices or behaviour. There can be no
blaming of other free agents for our own decisions.350 Thus Boyd is able to defend God’s
wisdom because he shows God could not have made creatures with the capacity to love while
withholding from them the unavoidable moral responsibility that comes with love. The
unifying idea is that of influence. To give or receive love is to influence or be influenced. To
influence is to be responsible for what you do. Here is where Boyd also brings out the social
aspect of love. Love requires others. With this element risk is no longer simply the created
agent’s risk to God (rejecting his love) but, importantly, free agent’s risk to each other. This
helps address some of the questions which ask about the cost of risk to beings other than God.
Freedom for an individual to love is predicated on the interlocking shared freedom of others
to love. Freedom to love cannot be isolated to an individual or cordoned off from society.
Therefore, freedom for part is entailed in freedom for the whole. Freedom to love requires the
existence of others, power to influence them, and responsibility to others. The social and the
moral are inseparable.
Having answered why it is that free agents (including angels) can potentially cause
harm to other free agents Boyd tackles the follow up question. Is freedom itself worth it? This
is the abstract form of the question. In a cosmic warfare context it has a special concrete
epitomising counterpart. Is the freedom of the one being Satan worth it?351 After all, Satan
seems to be the free agent who is the genesis for evil and suffering. Surely it would have been
possible and permissible to have compromised his freedom to prevent the resulting evil? Has
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God gambled too much on freedom?352 In a special way Satan is the paradigm case for
cosmic warfare theodicies. To account for Satan and God’s treatment of him is to be able to
explain lesser and resultant evil as well as the wider foundational problem of evil. To answer
this element of the problem of risk Boyd introduces his fourth thesis – the principle of
proportionality. “As the fourth structural thesis of the trinitarian warfare theodicy, therefore, I
submit that moral responsibility is proportionate to the potential to influence others
(TWT4).”353 Moral responsibility establishes the fact of influence and risk, proportionality
establishes the scope and scale of that influence and risk. Boyd’s theory suggests that God
undertook a God-sized goal with a God-sized risk. Boyd points out that if TWT 2 (freedom
entails risk) says “Nothing ventured, nothing gained” then TWT4 goes further and says, “The
more that is ventured, the more that can be gained – or lost.”354 We should expect that the
proportional potentiality of good, and hence of evil, inherent in creation to be truly immense.
“Why does it seem that God risks so much – sometimes, seemingly, too much – on freedom?
According to TWT4, it is because he is aiming too high.”355
Not all creatures or free agents have the same level of influence or potential.
Proportionality varies. Some free agents are capable of great good or evil while others
possess more modest limits. The question of Satan then is partially answered by
acknowledging that he is a creation who possessed the highest potential. The “extremity of
Satan’s evil is itself an indication of how much potential for love was thrown away by his
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fateful decision.”356 Boyd illustrates this by making the point that a world capable of a Mother
Theresa must allow for the possibility of a Adolf Hitler. In like manner if God wanted a
glorious Lucifer he had to accept the possibility of a diabolical Satan.357 Satan is an example
of degree not kind. Eliminating him would not eliminate the dark side of love, but simply a
creature of high potential for love or harm. The principles of love, freedom, risk, influence
and moral responsibility remain. He is not a special case in a metaphysical sense. He is a
special case in an individual, historical sense. He, and not someone else, sinned first but this
is not because he was of a different metaphysical make-up or nature. His sinning is so
significant because his original potential was so significant.
Nevertheless, Boyd has another important point to make. Proportionality applies to
groups and not simply individuals. Moral responsibility is both individual and collective.
Satan’s degree of power could not happen without the cooperation of others. The scale of evil
is the result of many free agents, angelic and human, using their influence and potential in a
way that aligns with Satan. “Evil on a grand scale, like goodness on a grand scale, always
involves cooperation on a grand scale.”358 Moral potentiality is shared potentiality.
Proportionality and its collective application mean that elimination of evil is not as simple as
it seems. There is a catch. God can only eliminate creation’s potential for evil by also
eliminating its potential for goodness. This seems to exist in an inverse relationship. Some
might say that God shouldn’t have allowed as much evil as has happened. But Boyd makes
the argument that whatever point God decides to cap our capacity to love or harm, it would
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invariably seem too much to us.359 Boyd’s argument has been to show that while risk was an
inevitable part of God’s decision to make a creation capable of love, it was a good and wise
risk. This is especially so because God knew he would succeed and acquire a bride (he knew
some would choose his way even if he didn’t know initially who would). The overall claim
then is that love is worth the risk. This may sound like the standard greater good approach but
it is not. It says God has good reasons for creating a world with the possibility of evil. It does
not say that God wills or ordains every evil for a specific good. This is a soft or partial greater
good claim, not the traditional greater good approach.

TWT 5 and TWT6: The Irrevocability and Finitude of Freedom
Boyd then moves to his last two theses which round out the Trinitarian warfare
theodicy. Worded in such a way to highlight the continued development of the nature of love
TWT5 states that ‘Love entails a freedom that is within limits irrevocable’360 and TWT6
states that ‘our capacity to freely choose love is not endless.’ Put more succinctly freedom is
irrevocable and freedom is finite. These theses build on and complete the previous four
theses, extending the cosmic warfare theodicies ability to answer questions put to it. The
questions Boyd has in mind are three in particular:

1. Why does God tolerate on-going activity of evil agents?
2. Why is God arbitrary in his intervention? Why does he sometimes allow evil and
sometimes intervene to stop it?
3. Will heaven be eternally risky?
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TWT5 and TWT6 form their own complementary tension. One proposition (TWT5)
argues that there is something about freedom which places a (self-created and self-accepted)
limit on God, while the other proposition (TWT6) clarifies that there is a limit to creaturely
freedom. TWT5 will help explain why God can allow evil but not himself be culpable for
doing do. TWT6 will help explain why evil will not be indefinite and eternal, and assure us of
God’s triumph without resorting to arbitrary divine action or meticulous divine control.
God’s ending of evil is in accordance with the nature of freedom and love. While Boyd has
shown how evil appears as a slim but tangible dark potential in contingent love he hasn’t
explained why God has allowed evil to go on so long. This is particularly important because,
unlike process theology, Boyd affirms divine omnipotence. God has the power, so why
doesn’t he exercise it and destroy the rebels and end pain?361 Boyd’s answer is that freedom is
irrevocable. The claim is essential an argument about the vital unavoidable importance of
temporality to love, freedom and relationships. Creatures “must have the power to exercise
their influence over time, for better or for worse.”362 Creation exists in time or it doesn’t exist
at all. No time means no love and no influence. “Hence, in my view, once God gives the gift
of self-determination, he has to, within limits, endure its misuse. This constitutes the fifth
structural thesis of the warfare theodicy: the power to influence is irrevocable (TWT5).”363
Irrevocable influence applies to the ongoing distinct decisions and actions of agents.
This means that if God allows a free agent to exist he cannot then unilaterally or coercively
pick and choose what decisions and actions he will allow the free agent to make. “If God
were to retract our freedom every time we were about to choose something against his will,
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then it cannot be said that he really gave us freedom or that we are in fact genuinely selfdetermining.”364 God either creates real ‘others’ or he does not. We are presented with
mutually exclusive options – either ongoing existence with freedom or not. “In short, the
genuineness of the gift of self-determination hinges on its irrevocability.”365 This genuineness
is measured in allowing free agents time and the absence of coercive micro-control during
that time. The two points go together. For this last point Boyd argues for an implicit divinely
chosen covenant. “God’s design to have creatures who are capable of moral decision making
requires a sort of “covenant of non-coercion” with each of them.”366 Without this covenant of
non-coercion, the gift of temporal existence would be meaningless and agents would be
incapable of real freedom and love or even mental deliberation.367 Without non-coercion,
agents could not live and develop as moral beings. Any moral decision would ultimately be,
at best, a choice about continuing to have power over our own thoughts or have God assume
control over certain of our thoughts, or at worst, a choice to continue to exist or be eliminated
by God in view of a wrong choice. As Boyd puts it the “choice to follow God would be a
matter of survival, not of morality.”368 God cannot have a creation with the potential to love
unless he opts for a creation whose basic freedom is irrevocable. Eliminating the potential for
evil could be forestalled only by “creating a risk-free robotic creation” without the possibility
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of genuine love.369 The covenant of non-coercion highlights freedom’s riskiness and
irrevocability. 370 God can’t undo the risk of evil without also undoing the goal of good.371
TWT5 seems to place God in a very limited position largely at the behest of creation.
On the one hand it seems creation has too much power, so how can God end evil without
ending freedom? On the other hand, it also seems to contradict what we see in Scripture,
where God does seem to revoke freedom by ending life in judgment and punishment. Why
does God seem to violate his own covenant of non-coercion? And why are these violations
arbitrarily applied, with God sometimes abiding by this covenant of non-coercion and
sometimes not? In response, Boyd’s delicate balancing act continues and is rounded out in his
final thesis TWT6. Freedom’s irrevocability and temporality is open ended, but not eternal, it
is genuine but not unconditional.372 Freedom has limits. “This constitutes the sixth and final
structural thesis of the Trinitarian warfare theodicy: the power to influence is finite
(TWT6).”373 Temporality is given with purpose. Freedom is not an unconditioned absolute. It
is given within the wider context of God’s plans and purposes. TWT5 is an important part of
the story but it is not the whole story. With this last thesis Boyd aims to finally tame the risk
that has haunted his model. This last thesis explains in principle three crucial issues: 1) Why
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God can intervene in the world sometimes but not always; 2) Why God can eventually win
the cosmic war but not immediately and; 3) Why we can never know the extent of an agent’s
freedom and thus why God’s interaction with agents can appear arbitrary to us.374
How is freedom finite and how is it relevant to Boyd’s argument? To answer this
Boyd references a complex interaction of a diverse range of factors. Experience teaches us
that freedom is constrained by elements of creation such as by our genetic make-up, our
environment, and the free will of other agents. It is also wisely limited by the Creator who,
like a wise shareholder, would never give away so many shares that he lost power.375
However, the most important arguments, which lie at the heart of TWT6, concern the
interaction between divine providence and creaturely probation in relation to the development
of character. Boyd argues that God has given us a probationary period in which to develop
character. This is an inherently finite process. In this probationary period “we make the
choices, though in time our choices make us.”376 Our moral choices over time form our moral
character.377 Eventually we take on a particular moral character. “Self-determining freedom is
about what morally responsible contingent beings choose to do on their way to deciding what
they are going to permanently be.” Eventually the shape of our character becomes morally
settled and fixed. “For better or worse, we irreversibly become the decisions we make.”378
Boyd terms this ‘character solidification.’
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How does solidification of character relate to cosmic war, providence, risk, and the
problem of evil? The question of character provides answers to the question of time.
Character needs time to develop but a thoroughly evil character is no longer owed time. Boyd
links the length of the probationary period attached to character to several factors. The first
factor is the relative state of an agent’s character. When an agent’s character is settled, their
probation is up, this leaves God free to intervene and thus curtail evil. Once an agent has
spent their freedom, God is under no obligation to refrain from intervening on the agent’s
freedom.379 The mechanism and logic behind Boyd’s conclusion is important to understand
for reasons that will become apparent later on. Boyd describes probation as a process in
which our freedom is changed from libertarian freedom to compatibilistic freedom. 380 This is
equivalent to saying the libertarian ‘power to do otherwise’ diminishes over time. Eventually
we can no longer change.381 Freedom has the divinely intended goal of becoming “a person
who eternally receives and reflects God’s love…” and “self-determining freedom is not an
end in itself – it gives way either to higher freedom (love) or lower bondage.”382 The second
factor affecting probation is the original state of an agent’s moral potential or capacity to
influence for good or evil. This capacity or potential is distinguishable from character. God’s
toleration of an agent “depends on the potential he originally gave to the agent … The more
that is risked, I have argued, the more that can be gained and lost (TWT4). What I am now
arguing is that this dual potentiality must have a temporal element to it. If Satan has the
capacity to corrupt the cosmos for billions of years, it is only because he originally had the
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capacity to bless the cosmos for this same length of time. He could not have the former
without having the latter”383 The third factor is the relative state of an agent’s salvation
decision about God. God is waiting to see if free agents will choose him or not. This is
obvious for human beings who are invited to choose God in the invitation of the gospel. But
curiously for Boyd it also applies to a certain class of angels. “True, there seems to be a
certain class of angels whose destiny is not yet resolved for or against God. God thus corrects
them, warns them and encourages them to follow his ways, lest they perish (e.g., Ps 82).”384
In summary, probationary time is delimited by character, capacity and choice.
TWT6 is especially important in completing the explanatory power of Boyd’s cosmic
warfare worldview. TWT6 allows Boyd to affirm that the cosmic war is not an eternal war.385
Boyd can therefore avoid classical theodicies (“blueprint”) problem of finding higher reasons
(greater goods) for particular evils on the one hand and also avoid process dualism where evil
is never finally overcome on the other hand.386 One cannot make sense of the genuineness of
the war and its length without TWT5 (freedom’s irrevocability), but one cannot make sense
of the certainty of God’s victory without TWT6 (freedom’s finitude). TWT6 shows that love
entails risk but not eternal risk. Once an agent has spent their freedom God is under no
obligation (no longer bound by the covenant of non-coercion) to refrain from intervening on
the agent’s freedom.
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Arbitrariness, Divine Intervention, and the Quality of Freedom
While TWT5 (freedom’s irrevocability) and TWT6 (freedoms finitude) explain in
principle why God can sometimes intervene and why he sometimes cannot, it does not
answer the charge of God’s arbitrariness. Sometimes God intervenes and sometimes he
doesn’t. Why does God intervene when he does (e.g., the killing of Ananias)? And why does
he not intervene more often and in cases which seem warranted (e.g., when a person is about
to kill an innocent baby)? Boyd answers this charge, in part, with his discussion of the quality
of freedom. Any particular event (involving intervention or non-intervention) can only be
understood in relation to all the variables affecting someone’s freedom. These variables
condition, but do not determine, the quality of our freedom and its irrevocability.387 Boyd lists
five variables. First, quality of freedom is conditioned by the ongoing influence of God.
Creation is not left to itself. God is the providential ruler of the world. God controls factors
external to our will, such as the environment, but our actual ‘will’ he influences but does not
attempt to control. This is in order to maintain us and our personhood as this “freedom is, I
believe, the core of what it means to be made in the image of God.”388 Second, quality of
freedom is conditioned by our original constitution. We are all created different but we “do
not know the scope of any agent’s original potential or the extent to which this agent has
solidified his or her character through expenditure of this potential.”389 Third, quality of
freedom is conditioned by previous decisions. Because character is a work in process, an
agent’s quality of freedom is dynamic. “The current of the life gains momentum the further it
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flows.”390 Each decision an agent makes conditions his or her freedom in terms of both moral
direction but also remaining probationary existence. However, we cannot know exactly how
morally fixed someone’s character is or what remains of someone’s probationary potential.391
Fourth, quality of freedom is conditioned by other agents. No one lives in isolation. Other
agents, their influence, power and decisions all act to condition and limit another’s freedom.
For better or for worse “freedom is a dynamic reality largely defined by its relationship to
everything else.”392 It is important for Boyd to recognise that the quality of our freedom is
conditioned by both angels and humans. Social responsibility applies to angelic influence on
humans individually and collectively.393 Boyd is arguing that we must see TWT5 in light of
TWT3 “More specifically, we cannot understand God’s covenant of noncoercion with any
individual agent without understanding God’s covenant of noncoercion with every other
agent. The choices any particular agent makes have consequences for the quality of
irrevocable freedom for all the others.”394 Consequently, to understand God’s interaction with
someone we would need to understand his interaction with everyone else. The dizzying array
of interactions between such a vast number of beings is something utterly impossible for
human beings to fully trace. Boyd terms this the sociological nature of the cosmos and it
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means moral and social responsibility is always shared.395 Every event has been influenced
(but not determined) by an entire history of choices by a vast society of people. Fifth, quality
of freedom is conditioned by prayer. Prayer plays a very important part in Boyd’s overall
theology and he devotes an entire chapter of Satan and the Problem of Evil to the issue of
prayer. This fifth condition is a profound extension of variables one (the on-going influence
of God) and four (the influence of other agents).396 But here God and people are not separate
influences. Instead the divine and human combine. “God has significantly bound himself to
the power of prayer, so much so that there are things he would like to do that will not be done
unless people of faith pray.”397 Together these five variables relieve God of the charge of
arbitrariness and also clarify why we, in our limited knowledge and understanding, can
misjudge God as arbitrary.

Mystery of Creation
These five variables contribute to another wider overarching explanation Boyd has for
not only the apparent arbitrariness of God but also for the impenetrable arbitrariness and
mystery of evil itself. Boyd appeals to the sheer complexity of creation. But importantly in a
warfare theodicy “the impenetrable mystery is not about God’s character or plan, as in
blueprint worldview. It is rather a mystery about the complexity of creation. Relocating the
mystery of evil is, I believe, one of the most distinct features of the trinitarian warfare
“In a sense we must conclude that every single event in the cosmos is to some extent a
universally influenced, sociologically determined event. Every event within the whole is to some
extent influenced by the whole and in turn influences the whole.” Ibid., 213.
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theodicy.”398 This complexity means we can attain a general understanding of why evil
happens but there are so many variables at work that it is impossible for us to trace exactly
why God does or doesn’t act in respect to any particular situation. Life’s arbitrariness is only
apparent not real. “God seems arbitrary, not because he is arbitrary, but because the world he
interacts with is unfathomably complex.”399 This perception of arbitrariness is due to our
epistemological limitations not God’s unwillingness to act. “If we saw what God sees, we
would understand why God did what he did and we would see that he is always concerned
with maximizing goodness and minimizing evil.”400

Conclusion to Six Theses
With this Boyd rounds out his six theses. For Boyd at least, he has tamed the profound
risk which lies at the heart of his theodicy. If these theses are accepted, he contends that “we
can make sense out of the fact that a world created by an all-good and all-powerful God could
become a nightmarish war zone.”401 He also believes these theses can account for the epitome
of the problem of evil – Satan. “In short, these theses take us a long way in explaining Satan
and the problem of evil, for Satan represents the paradigmatic case of a free agent turned
bad.”402 Boyd then narrates Satan’s story through the lens of each thesis. It is worth quoting in
full:

Ibid., 215, 216. “the inscrutable mystery of the problem of evil is the mystery of a largely
unknowable creation, not the mystery of an unknowable God.” Boyd, 197. Boyd, Is God to Blame?,
79–106.
398

399
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God created Lucifer free, for he created him with the potential to love (TWT1). This
meant there was a risk involved in creating Lucifer (TWT2), as there is with every
free agent, for Satan’s potential to become evil and to harm others had to be
proportionate to his potential to become loving and to bless others (TWT3-4).
Unfortunately, Lucifer chose an evil course that God must tolerate (TWT5) until the
power of Satan’s influence is spent (TWT6). The incredible amount of destruction
Satan has brought about in God’s creation is a testimony to the vast amount of love
and benefit he could have brought had he chosen a different path. God could not have
hoped for the former, however, unless he was willing to risk the latter. 403

Cosmic Warfare and Natural Evil
Boyd’s six theses offer a significant extension of the free will defence within a cosmic
warfare theodicy and explicitly deal with the problem of moral evil. That extension does not
yet answer the formidable question of natural evil.404 (This is often seen as the ‘Achilles’
heel’ of the free will defence405). How can moral evil explain ‘evidential’ evils unrelated to
human choice (e.g., suffering due to earthquakes, genetic diseases, etc.)? At this very point
there is an apparent problem. One of the delimitations of this study involves restricting the
discussion to moral evil rather than natural evil. How can we ignore the Achilles’ heel?
Interestingly, it is Boyd’s approach to natural evil (which shares some similarities to the
Great Controversy) that justifies this delimitation. Boyd denies that natural evil is
“natural.”406 Instead he affirms the radical unnatural influence and input of non-divine moral
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The problem of “natural” evil is “arguably the most formidable objection that can be raised
against the belief in an all-powerful, all good God.” Gregory A. Boyd, “Satan and the Corruption of
Nature: Seven Arguments,” accessed April 11, 2014, http://reknew.org/2008/01/satan-and-thecorruption-of-nature-seven-arguments/.
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Nigel Warburton, Philosophy: The Basics, 5th ed. (NY: Routledge, 2013), 25. David Ray
Griffin, “Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will
Theism,” in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, ed.
John B. Cobb, Clark H. Pinnock, and David Ray Griffin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 16,17.
Augustine also denied the existence of “natural evil” but his meaning is different to
Boyd’s. Augustine’s privation theory means evil has no ‘substance’ therefore anything natural is
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agents, specifically Satan and demons, on nature.407 Rather than natural evil being the weak
link, in his adapted free will theodicy Boyd claims that failing to utilise Satan makes natural
evil unsolvable.408 Creation is not as God intended, just as humanity is not as God intended.409
God is not the only one at work in nature. Nature exhibits diabolical features because
diabolical agents are either directly or indirectly behind the ‘unnatural’ features of nature.410
“Arguably, nowhere is the distinctiveness of the Trinitarian warfare theodicy more apparent
than on this point.”411 With this move Boyd places the problem of natural evil as a
subcategory within moral evil. The problem of natural evil ultimately flows out of the
problem of moral evil. Therefore, when a cosmic warfare theodicy deals with moral evil it is
also dealing with natural evil. This studies concern is not to critique this view (or to chart all
of Boyd’s argument) but understand and recognise this. It is to find how the Great
Controversy as a (cosmic warfare) theodicy resolves the problem of evil. As will be shown
the Great Controversy shares a similar, although not identical approach, to Boyd. It too

“good.” Evil is a privation of the good. No ‘thing’ is intrinsically evil, see Griffin, God, Power and
Evil, 70,71.
Boyd advances seven arguments in favour of Satan’s corruption of nature being the
necessary explanation of natural evil in an essay on his website. For the arguments see Boyd, “Satan
and the Corruption of Nature: Seven Arguments.”
407

“I’m going to argue that we cannot adequately explain “natural” evil unless we accept that
Satan and other rebellious cosmic forces have had a corrupting influence on creation. This is not to
deny that there aren’t other important things to consider in explaining “natural” evil. But my
contention is that if we leave Satan and other nefarious spirit-agents out of the picture, no explanation
of “natural” evil can be adequate.” Boyd, "Seven Arguments".
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Plantinga, drawing from Augustine, mentions Satan as a possible explanation for natural
evil in his free will defence, see, Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 58,59. Plantinga presents this
merely as logically compatible with his free will defence. What is distinct with Boyd is his use of
moral evil (via Satan) in constructing a theodicy, not simply a defence, his rejection of natural evil as
a separate category, and his assertive claim that only by recognising the centrality of Satan is an
adequate explanation of natural evil possible.
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ultimately sees natural evil as arising due to moral evil. Explain moral evil and you have the
key element needed to account for natural evil.
In his discussion of ‘natural evil’ Boyd explores over seven different approaches to
natural evil412 (some of which he agrees with and others he does not) before offering his own
cosmic warfare account.413 The main difference between Boyd’s approach and the others is
that Boyd places the other explanations in a cosmic warfare perspective that recognises the
neglected agency and activity of Satan and the demonic.414 This crucial satanic/demonic
dimension transforms the previous explanations and their ability to account for natural evil.
Boyd argues that a neutral medium of relationally (the natural order) which is necessary if
free moral agents are to communicate and affect one another, is subject to either good or evil
influence from the same agents.415 Thus in a warfare context it is appropriate to speak of
nature’s potential use as a tool or weapon.416 Boyd summarises what he believes is pivotal,

The seven approaches are 1) Augustine’s “Natural evil” fulfils a “higher” purpose. 2)
‘Natural evil” is due to human sin. 3) Hick’s Soul-making theodicy. 4) Nature as kenotic process
(Boyd has in mind Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe:
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). 5) “Natural” evil exists
because God is inherently limited (Process theology). 6) “Natural” evil exists because there are
inherent limitations in creation – dual potentiality and randomness (drawing from Peterson, Evil and
the Christian God, 111). 7) Natural evil as Barth’s Nothingness (drawing from Karl Barth Church
Dogmatics, 3.3: 289-368). Boyd, Satan, 248–285.
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Boyd’s own account of natural evil combines features of all seven approaches. For his
position see, Boyd, Satan, 290–291.
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Ibid., 291, 293–318.

Ibid., 297. A stable shared common medium is where “(1) all parties can influence others
by influencing their environment, and (2) no party can exhaustively control others or their
environment.” This “shared medium must be pliable enough for us to influence it but resistant enough
that no one can exhaustively control it.” Boyd, Is God to Blame?, 113, 114. While God can still
intervene in this world, too much overriding of the order could compromise its stability. In “creating a
stable, non-chaotic world, God ruled out a world in which he could intervene any time, place or
manner he desires.” Ibid., 115.
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Boyd finds precedent for this in the early church fathers and modern theologians/
philosophers who believe Satan can use nature in such a way, Boyd, Satan, 294–301. This early
attributing of natural evil to Satan was eclipsed in the early church by the later Augustinian turn to a
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“The problem of evil is not a problem of occasional bad things happening on the otherwise
pristine stage of God’s creation, as is frequently portrayed. Rather, evil permeates the
structure of the stage itself, for the one given authority over the structure (Satan) has become
corrupt.”417 This view leans heavily on the assumption that Satan had an initial God-given
authority over matter or creation which was not revoked following rebellion. It is this
authority which allowed spiritual agents to effect structural change to creation. He
emphasises that this “insight lies at the heart of the Trinitarian warfare worldview.”418
One more element of Boyd’s view will prove significant to later discussions. This is
the issue of when Satan was able to effect structural change in the cosmos. In more recent
discussions Boyd has developed the idea that evolution itself is a “sort of warfare between the
life-affirming creativity of an all-good God, on the one hand, and the on-going corrupting
influence of malevolent cosmic forces, on the other.”419 Boyd even speculates when Satan
and his cosmic forces may have initially rebelled against God and started corrupting nature.
He suggests that the appearance of predatorial life forms during the Cambrian explosion half
a billion years ago might be the point in time.420 This is reinforced by other statements which

deterministic view of divine sovereignty. Later still enlightenment rationalism and naturalism made
belief in evil spirits even more problematic. Ibid., 295.
417

Ibid., 301.
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Ibid. What is this structural change? It appears to be the introduction of death and disorder
into the natural realm and its manipulation by the demonic so that nature manifests a pain-ridden,
blood-thirsty, hostile character.
Gregory A. Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare: A Biblical Perspective on Satan and
‘Natural Evil,’” in Creation Made Free: Open Theology Engaging Science, ed. Thomas Jay Oord
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009), 127. This is a shift of views for Boyd. Earlier he
advocated a “restorationist” or “gap” reading of Genesis 1:1,2. See Boyd, God at War, 103–113. In
this view verse 1 describes an initial ancient creation billions of years ago which ended with a war
between God and Satan, while verse 2 transitions to a recent creation. Boyd, Satan, 313–317. Now
Boyd advocates a warfare reading of evolution.
419
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Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare: A Biblical Perspective on Satan and ‘Natural Evil,’”

143, fn 38.
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speak of the “battle God has been waging for millions upon millions of years.”421 This
ongoing divine battle which had creation as the first stage, Jesus as the culmination, and is
now being carried on by the church, has been raging “for millions of years and, for all we
know, it may go on for a million more” but “cannot – go on forever.”422 Overall, one can see
the pivotal cosmic importance of Satan for subsuming natural evil into moral evil. Satan first
rebels then uses his original capacity, power and authority to introduce deep level structural
evil to the natural order (as well as ongoing specific evils). Denying Satan would mean
eliminating an adequate explanation for natural evil. But Boyd does affirm Satan as the cause
of natural evil and so God is not to blame. In this view, human evil is secondary to Satan’s.
Satan is on the level of a demonic demiurge. Boyd has clearly pushed Satan’s theodic
explanatory power to the maximum. One wonders if he has pushed it too far.

A Theology of Revolt as the Practical Side of Theodicy
Having outlined the way the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy theoretically handles the
problems of moral and natural evil it is time to look at the practical side of warfare theodicy.
One of the truly distinctive and appealing elements of Boyd’s warfare theodicy is the natural
way his theodicy becomes a practical response to evil rather than an intellectual one.
Traditional theodicies are marked by a philosophical and theoretical approach to evil often
with minimal practical relevance. Anti-theodicy opponents have even accused theoretical
theodicies as being a part of the problem of evil. In contrast Boyd’s theology of revolt helps
him avoid this major criticism. It could be argued that Boyd’s warfare approach is both a
theodicy and an anti-theodicy at the same time. The warfare worldview naturally and
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seamlessly integrates theodicy, atonement theory, practical action, mission, spiritual warfare
and ecclesiology. As God fights against evil, so does the church. The practical is not an addon to the theory; it is the theory in action. But before spelling out the practical ongoing
ecclesiastical-based revolt against evil there is need to look at the event which begins,
enables, models, empowers and grounds all revolt against evil – the saving work of Christ.

Christus Victor – Atonement as Warfare and Revolt
It is no surprise that for Boyd salvation is viewed through the warfare lens. A number
of different models of atonement have been developed in Christian theology.423 Boyd believes
that that the foundational atonement model is the Christus Victor view.424 Due to it being
more fundamental, the other models should be seen in the context of the Christus Victor
theory not vice versa.425 In the Christus Victor model Satan has profound power and authority
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There are many theories or models of atonement and ways of grouping them. John
McIntyre, for example, lists no less than 13 models: (1) ransom; 2) redemption; 3) salvation; 4)
sacrifice: 5) propitiation: 6) expiation; 7) atonement; 8) reconciliation; 9) victory; 10) punishment; 11)
satisfaction; 12) example; 13) liberation) John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the
Doctrine of the Death of Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992). However, these are synthesised into
more complex models, the most prominent of which are the Ransom or Christus Victor theories
(Ireneaus, Gustav Aulen), Satisfaction theory (Anselm), Moral Influence theory (Peter Abelard) and
the Penal Substitution theory (Calvin), See Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, eds., Recovering the
Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2000), 142–191. To these could be added the Governmental (Hugo Grotius),
Healing (Reichenbach), and modern non-violent theories (Rene Girard).
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Boyd rejects the patristic idea that God offered Jesus as payment to the devil in exchange
for humanity or that God used Jesus as bait (knowing that Satan would be unable to resist seizing
Christ but nor could he contain him) Gregory A. Boyd, “Christus Victor View,” in The Nature of the
Atonement: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 2006), 36. Boyd also differs from ancient models by declining to explain in detail exactly how
Jesus life and resurrection defeated the powers, only that he did so. Ancient advocates became
incredulous because they pressed details too far. Boyd, 37 fn 23. Lastly, Boyd sees Jesus victorious
death as an extension of his loving life and ministry, and that both Christ’s life and death are acts of
divine warfare against evil. Atonement is not limited to Christ’s death. Boyd, 38–42.
Boyd, “Christus Victor View,” 24. Boyd argues that the cosmic view is able to encompass
within its single framework all the other elements of truth expressed in other models of atonement. In
these he includes penal substitutionary views, recapitulation, healing model, moral governmental
model, exemplar models. Ibid., 42–45.
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over the fallen world and salvation consists in deliverance from the devil by Christ. The
plight of humanity is primarily defined as bondage to evil forces (rather than guilt, shame,
weakness, ignorance, disease) and thus the solution is freedom from evil powers. This
freedom is achieved by union, incorporation or participation in Christ’s victory.426 In this
model, in contrast to other views, the cosmic significance of Christ’s work is ontologically
more fundamental than its soteriological (individual) significance.427 Salvation is “a cosmic
reality before it is anthropological reality, and it is the latter because it is the former.”428 For
Boyd, the superiority of the Christus Victor view is evident in its ability to incorporate the
whole of Jesus life, his ministry, as part of salvation, and not just Christ’s death and
resurrection. The “other models tend to isolate the meaning of Jesus’ death from other aspects
of life,” whereas in Christus Victor every aspect of his life is “most fundamentally about one
thing: victoriously manifesting the loving kingdom of God over and against the destructive,
oppressive kingdom of Satan.”429 And all of this is a manifestation of cross-like love.

Christian life as Spiritual Warfare and Practical Revolt
What does a theology of revolt (practical ecclesiastical theodicy) look like in the life
of the church? It looks like Jesus’ kingdom. What does that look like? “The kingdom looks
like Jesus. It looks like Jesus' self-sacrificial love. It looks like Jesus being crucified for the

“All who trust in Christ are incorporated into him and therefore share in this cosmic
victory. This is the essential meaning of “salvation” in the New Testament” Boyd, “Christus Victor
View,” 33. The “concept of salvation is centered on our participation in Christ’s cosmic victory over
the powers” Ibid., 35.
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very people who crucified him.”430 Boyd describes it as ‘anti-political social activism.’431 It is
modelled on Jesus. For Boyd, Jesus engaged in political revolt.432 By this Boyd means that
Jesus rejected in his life the socio-political order of the world which demeaned women,
foreigners, outcasts, achieves and maintains power by violence, exalts nationalism, abuses the
poor, etc. Jesus also engaged in spiritual revolt.433 Here Boyd refers to Jesus’ revolt against
the spiritual principalities and powers by his exorcisms, healings, and self-sacrificing death
on the cross. This was a revolt against the cosmic powers which empower world evil. The
two (socio-political revolt and spiritual revolt) are intimately linked. To revolt against one
was to revolt against the other.434
The church is called to participate in this political-spiritual revolution. This means a
revolt against idolatry, judgment, religion, individualism, violence, social oppression, racism,
poverty and greed, abuse of creation, abuse of sex, and secularism, by means of non-violent

430

Gregory A. Boyd, “Advancing the Cruciform Revolution: A Kingdom Perspective on
Evangelism,” Word & World 29, no. 4 (2009): 415. “Jesus' life, his ministry and teachings, and
especially his death and resurrection manifest the kingdom of God. The kingdom always has a
cruciform character, a self-sacrificial character, a loving character. The kingdom always looks like
Jesus.” Ibid., 408.
Gregory A. Boyd, “The Kingdom as a Political-Spiritual Revolution,” Criswell
Theological Review 6 (2008): 23. Boyd also calls it being a “anti-political political activist.” Ibid., 25.
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Boyd, “The Kingdom as a Political-Spiritual Revolution,” 23–25.
Ibid., 25–27.

“Every act of revolt against oppressive, unjust, and dehumanizing socio-political and
religious systems was at the same time an act of revolt against the Powers that fuel these systems.
Jesus' solidarity with the poor, for example, was itself a revolt against the Powers that fuel greed and
poverty. In this sense, Jesus was a political and spiritual revolutionary, and he was the one because he
was the other. He was, in short, a political-spiritual revolutionary.” Ibid., 27.
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love.435 This is “displaying the reign of God in love”.”436 This is spiritual warfare and is the
ground level practical expression of cosmic warfare.437 “Jesus’ radically counter-cultural
ministry wasn’t first and foremost a form of social and political protest, though it certainly
was that. It was, rather, most fundamentally a form of spiritual warfare.”438 Boyd believes the
church is simply called to live out this radical social-spiritual revolution. That is participation
in cosmic warfare and part of God’s response to evil. This is part of theodicy. This approach
avoids the path of the Christian Left with its political activism or the paths of the Christian
Right’s conservative attempts to taking society back for God, or social retreat which only
focuses on saving souls.439 This Jesus revolution is both political and anti-political. It is
political in the sense that everything it does has political implications. It is anti-political in
that Jesus never showed any interest in the power politics of the world or setting up a
kingdom now amid the world’s political order.440 This is divine love fighting on its own
terms.
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See Gregory A. Boyd, The Myth of a Christian Religion: Losing Your Religion for the
Beauty of a Revolution (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009).
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See Gregory A. Boyd, “The Ground-Level Deliverance Model,” in Understanding
Spiritual Warfare: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2012), 129–57.
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“In Jesus, and in the movement he came to establish, the long expected apocalyptic battle
between God and the Powers was – and still is – being waged.” And Boyd clarifies that “when Jesus
refused to live in accordance with his culture’s assumptions, laws, and social taboos regarding
nationalism, race, gender, class, wealth, he wasn’t just waging a social protest; he was engaging in
warfare against the Powers that oppress people by empowering these things.” Boyd, The Myth of a
Christian Religion, 31.
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Eschatology – Final victory over Evil
In Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy eschatology is not an addition to soteriology
but an extension of it. The Christus Victor model is an expression of ‘inaugurated
eschatology’ which follows the widely held ‘already-but-not-yet’ dynamism of the New
Testament eschatology.441 Jesus in his life, ministry, death, and resurrection achieves victory
over Satan and evil. This means the eschaton has already been achieved in principle in Jesus
but is not yet fully manifested. Christ has set in motion forces which will eventually eliminate
Satan and evil and restore creation. Until the finalisation of Christ’s victory the cosmic war
continues and the church in its spiritual warfare is called to continue the same ministry of
Jesus and its revolt against evil. But in this section the questions is: What does the
consummated side of eschatology look like in Boyd’s theodicy?
Boyd has relatively little to say about the Second Coming of Jesus apart from
affirming that it will happen. Boyd sees most detailed eschatological discussions about the
order of events leading up to or surrounding Christ’s return as a waste of time.442 His
discussions are more concerned with heaven, hell and the afterlife. Boyd’s thinking is not
always clear in this area.443 He has held a number of different positions indicating that his
thinking has undergone significant change and may continue to undergo further change. In
Satan and the Problem of Evil Boyd tended toward a more traditional understanding of hell
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Boyd, God at War, 213.

See Gregory A. Boyd, “What’s Your View of the Tribulation Period and the Rapture?,”
December 29, 2007, accessed May 12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2007/12/when-will-jesus-return/. Boyd
leans toward preterism but is not completely convinced.
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Boyd confesses that “It’s admittedly hard to put together into a coherent scheme the
various things Scripture says about the afterlife.” Gregory A. Boyd, “What about the Thief on the
Cross?,” February 3, 2009, accessed May 12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2009/02/what-about-the-thiefon-the-cross/. We should note that most of this information about eschatology comes from Boyd’s
blog and may indicate the secondary status it holds in his overall thinking.
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as eternal punishment although significantly modified by Barth’s idea of nothingness. 444 At
the time he displayed some sympathy with annihilationist positions but without accepting
them. Since then, Boyd has continued to shift in his thinking and now leans toward the
annihilationist position.445 What can account for this change? Boyd indicates that the burden
of theodicy and his understanding of God’s love are motivators for these changes. Boyd
cannot reconcile the God who eternally inflicts suffering due to an insatiable vengeance and
the God of Calvary’s self-sacrificing love.446 Boyd appears to be bringing his eschatology in
line with his doctrine of God inspired by the concerns of theodicy.
Like most annihilationists Boyd now seems to affirm conditional immortality447 and
yet he also appears to affirm an ongoing intermediate state for the (believing) dead between
death and eternity.448 Into this state Boyd entertains the idea of some form of “purgatory”.
This is not a medieval-style purgatory (with indulgences etc.) but rather a post-mortem place
of refinement. What Boyd seems to have in mind is that after death the sanctification process
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Boyd, Satan, 319–357.

Boyd’s statements are slightly unclear for examples he states, “While I am not completely
convinced of this position, I think it is worthy of serious consideration.” Gregory A. Boyd, “The Case
for Annihilationism,” January 19, 2008, accessed May 12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2008/01/the-casefor-annihilationism/. Yet he also says “I’m strongly inclined toward the annihilationist position. The
reason is that it strikes me as the view that has the best biblical support.” Gregory A. Boyd, “Are You
an Annihilationist, and If So, Why?,” January 19, 2008, accessed May 12, 2014,
http://reknew.org/2008/01/are-you-an-annihilationist-and-if-so-why/.
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Boyd’s scattered thoughts on eschatology leave open many questions. His affirmations of
an intermediate state (implying anthropological dualism) appear to be in conflict with his conditional
immortality (implying anthropological monism/holism). Boyd is even open to the possibility of near
death experiences (although he is very cautious), see Gregory A. Boyd, “Review of Proof of Heaven
(Eben Alexander),” October 30, 2012, accessed May 12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2012/10/review-ofproof-of-heaven-eben-alexander/. This ambiguity and lack of clarity characterises his eschatology in
general and suggests a work in need of more progress. Boyd admits that it’s “hard to put together into
a coherent scheme the various things Scripture says about the afterlife.” Boyd, “What about the Thief
on the Cross?”
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continues for believers as they enter a place called “paradise” where, paradoxically, they
undergo a purifying (which involves pain and punishment) of their character in the presence
of the fire of God’s love. This is a place and state that precedes the coming of the Kingdom
and resurrection of bodies. Elsewhere, he refers to this refinement as happening at the
“judgment seat of Christ” (which is different to the Great White Throne judgment). Whether
this is the equivalent to paradise or at the end of paradise is not clear.449 On top of this, Boyd
has developed the idea of a post-mortem opportunity of salvation for babies who die without
having the chance to decide for or against Christ.450 Boyd reasons that as love must be freely
chosen, babies will be allowed to mature in the afterlife and then decide whether or not they
want to submit to Christ. Processes not completed in this life are completed in the next life.
This view later becomes a generalised post-mortem salvation as Boyd opens this possibility
up to all (not just babies) who have not solidified a decision for or against Christ.451 In all of
these changes to his eschatology we can see Boyd trying to work out in his theology his
commitments to his understandings of freedom, love and theodicy.

Conclusion
Boyd’s cosmic warfare theodicy resolves the problem of evil by an appeal to the
metaphysics of love. On one hand there is the contingent conditional love of the creature and
on the other hand the unconditional love of the creator. The possibility of contingent
creaturely love (reflecting the triune God of love) entails the necessity of a libertarian

See Gregory A. Boyd, “Purgatory and the Judgment Seat of Christ,” March 17, 2009,
accessed May 12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2009/03/purgatory-and-the-judgment-seat-of-christ/; Boyd,
“What about the Thief on the Cross?”
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Gregory A. Boyd, “What Happens to Babies That Die,” December 29, 2007, accessed May
12, 2014, http://reknew.org/2007/12/what-happens-to-babies-who-die/.
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freedom and with that the risk of its abuse leading to a cosmic war in which creation resists
its creator. Cosmic war and evil are not willed by God, instead God fights against it but
without revoking freedom itself. Unfortunately, in war gratuitous evil becomes normative.
Just such a war eventuated through the rebellion of a high-ranking angel, Satan, and those
who followed him. Satan is the originator of rebellion, its leader and therefore functions as
the paradigm of creaturely evil. To account for Satan is to account for all lesser rebels.
Satan’s profound original power, authority and potential help account for the pervasive
presence of suffering and corruption that exists in the natural world (‘natural evil’).
Nevertheless, divine love is the answer to the metaphysical risk inherent in creaturely
contingent love. Creaturely love needs freedom and freedom introduces risk. But divine love
redeems freedom and ends the risk. Thus the nature of love is the resolution to the problem of
evil in a dual and complementary sense. Firstly, contingent creaturely love resolves the
theoretical and metaphysical problem of how evil or war against God can arise and yet God
not be blameable for it. Secondly, love resolves the practical issue of evil because (divine)
love is the force and power which can and will redeem fallen creation from evil and end the
cosmic war. Boyd’s cosmic warfare theodicy is also a theodicy of practical response and not
simply theoretical explanation. Love in both its creaturely and divine forms, accounts for
evil’s origins and its end. Love forms an explanatory circle around the problem of evil
allowing for, without absolutizing, its occurrence, and tempering without trivialising, its
challenge.
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CHAPTER 3: INITIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A GREAT CONTROVERSY
THEODICY

This study now turns it focus to the cosmic warfare theodicy which is our focus,
Seventh-day Adventism’s idea of a ‘Great Controversy’ between Christ and Satan. 452 This
theodicy has a number of similarities to Boyd’s, as well as salient differences to Boyd and all
other theodicies. Until now it has charted its own course by not living within traditional
discussions that are so often closely tied to philosophy and metaphysics. The previous
analysis of Boyd revealed his warfare theodicy flows from a metaphysics of love, this
exploration of the Great Controversy will demonstrate that it is a theodicy grounded in a
metanarrative of love which offers some unique responses to the questions surrounding the
problem of evil. First the origin of evil within the Great Controversy theodicy through the
person of Lucifer/Satan, how he initiates a cosmic controversy with God and how such a
controversy is even possible will be examined. This will require an exploration of the Great
Controversy understanding of love, law and the ‘mystery of evil.’ This chapter concludes by
detailing the divine response of atonement. The conclusion outlines the analytical and
constructive findings.

Foundational Ideas
The Great Controversy is built on one primal assumption – God is love. Ellen White
begins her Conflict of the Ages series,453 in which is most fully developed her thinking, with
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This series is Ellen Whites narrative commentary on all of history and Scripture. It consists
of the books Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1890);
Prophets and Kings (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1917); The Desire of Ages (Mountain View,
117

the sentence “"God is love." (1 John 4:16). His nature, His law, is love. It ever has been; it
ever will be.”454 She ends the same series with phrase “God is love” thus forming a
conceptual envelope within which all cosmic conflict is to be understood. The opening
chapter is entitled “Why was Sin Permitted?” indicating from the outset a concern with
theodicy. Here she subsumes divine sovereignty and power within the idea of divine love.
“Every manifestation of creative power is an expression of infinite love. The sovereignty of
God involves fullness of blessing to all created beings.”455 She then immediately places the
primal truth about God (divine love) within a cosmic conflict setting. “The history of the
great conflict between good and evil, from the time it first began in heaven to the final
overthrow of rebellion and the total eradication of sin, is also a demonstration of God's
unchanging love.”456 Her next move is to introduce Christ, his divinity and oneness with the
Father, and his work in creating and ruling all things.457 This is important because the cosmic
conflict has a specifically personal element which focuses on Christ versus Satan. Finally, in
this important opening which sets the scene for everything else to follow, the importance of
God’s law of love and the idea of freedom of the will is introduced.458 The main ideas which
will prove foundational to the Great Controversy theodicy are present: God is love, creation
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and sovereignty defined by divine love, an ensuing great conflict between good and evil,
Christ’s supremacy, God’s law, and freedom of the will.

Creation and Conditions
To understand cosmic warfare as Great Controversy, it is necessary to understand
God’s original purpose in creating the universe and the conditions of that fulfilment. God
wanted a universe populated with creatures who were like him in character and capable of
entering into communion with him. In such a universe, creaturely existence would be a
ceaseless education or ‘school’ in which intelligent beings would constantly learn of, know,
and grow in a moral knowledge of God, by a collective exploration of God and his works.459
Communion with God and each other was both the goal and means to the goal.460 The
vastness and near infinity of the universe, is an indication of the eternal scope of the divine
plan and purpose for creation.461 In continually uncovering new depths to God’s wisdom,
power, love and goodness, creatures would more fully reflect God’s glory and in this process
experience their own holistic development.462 The cosmos was constructed infinitely deep
with a mutually beneficent character reflective of its creator.
Achieving such a goal required a particular universe populated with specific kinds of
beings. To become ‘like God’ in character required the possession of ‘God-like’ faculties.
“Every human being, created in the image of God, is endowed with a power akin to that of
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the Creator – individuality, power to think and to do.”463 Yet this individuality was no
autonomous individualism. Adam and Eve were to “have no interest independent of each
other; and yet each had an individuality in thinking and acting.”464 Individuality was in
service to wider, higher, deeper realities. Individual powers were given in order to enjoy
communion with God and others, explore the universe, and “comprehend moral
responsibilities and obligations” (i.e. God’s law).465 These powers enable and express free
will. Humans were created as free moral agents466 rather than mere ‘machines’ or
‘automatons.’467 God would not force the will or accept service unless willingly and
intelligently given, as “forced submission would prevent all real development of mind or
character; it would make man a mere automaton.”468 Yet freedom was subservient to the
higher moral and social principles of God’s law and government.469 We were made to love
God and each other. Contingent creaturely freedom and love is conditioned by moral
responsibility or law.470 That is, God’s love gives and also places conditions upon freedom.
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God’s love is a law. The Great Controversy theodicy mirrors the basic free will defence but
with its own emphasis on love and law.

Lucifer’s Struggle and Fall
This original created order is described as producing a universal harmony “so as long
as created beings acknowledged the allegiance of love.”471 The note of conditionality and
contingency which attends this unity is sounded again in the description of the social
dimensions of the allegiance of love (deliberately evocative of the two great commandments)
and by the use of the word ‘while.’ “And while love to God was supreme, love for one
another was confiding and unselfish.”472 This is a picture of a tightly integrated and perfectly
balanced social unity, built on a supreme love for God which secures every other resultant
love. Creation is morally and relationally centred and secured in an unselfish God whose
love-nature is reflected in his subjects. Creation possesses a moral fine-tuning necessary for
social life analogous to the physical fine-tuning of the universe that is essential to biological
life. Into this picture radical change took place. Discord first arose in the heart of an exalted
angel called Lucifer and later spread to other hearts. Utilising a free will styled defence White
states that there “was one who perverted the freedom that God had granted to His creatures.
Sin originated with him who, next to Christ, had been most honored of God and was highest
in power and glory among the inhabitants of heaven.”473
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The Great Controversy follows the early church tradition of seeing Satan’s fall in
Isaiah 14 and Ezekiel 28 but develops it in its own way.474 Satan was once a perfect angel, a
covering or anointed cherub475 who was created sinless, good and holy.476 Perfection means
faultlessness not impeccability (being incapable of sinning) or infallibility (since God alone is
infallible). He was the highest in glory, power, intellect, and wisdom among all the angels
and created beings.477 In terms of heaven’s government he was next after God and Christ in
position and honour.478 He was given the greatest talents and gifts a created being could
possess.479 In terms of goodness and beauty he was as near as possible to being like God
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himself.480 Accordingly he was greatly loved by the angelic host and had considerable
influence over them.481 He was foremost among created beings in revealing God's purposes to
the universe.482
The fall of Lucifer and his transformation into Satan is described in remarkable detail
by Ellen White in a number of places in her writings.483 The fall was a process that need not
have happened and could have been averted at a number of points if Lucifer had been willing
to listen to God. Lucifer’s fall is not a sudden event. It runs through two main stages. There is
an initial, private, inner struggle which continues to grow and becomes concurrent with a
second outward public revolt.

First Stage: Mysterious Origins, Covert Emergence & Private Struggle
The Great Controversy begins with a perfect and happy being, Lucifer. It then turns to
a strange unaccountable and subtle psychological, spiritual, mental, emotional shift within
him. Mysteriously, deep within the psyche of Lucifer, his thoughts began to turn toward
himself in such a way that his attitude toward God changed. The exact genesis of these
thoughts is impossible to fully trace. The process is briefly outlined as, “Little by little
Lucifer came to indulge a desire for self-exaltation.”484 This internal drift was known only to
Lucifer and God. At some point Lucifer began to accept these self-exalting thoughts. New
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unprecedented and questionable feelings toward God were toyed with and eventually
embraced as valid. This genuinely new and unprecedented thinking can be summarised as a
turn to the self as centre, or a turn to selfishness. It is characterised by an interrelated mix of
two attitudes: pride and envy. In White’s narration, the feelings of pride arouse from an
inordinate estimation of his own glory, perfection and importance, and this was symbiotically
related with feelings of envy and jealousy which centred around a comparison to Christ’s
position. Pride was the burgeoning attitude to himself and envy was the emerging attitude
toward Christ. Both are expressions of selfishness. Lucifer became self-referential.
Selfishness is the summary category and root attitude, while pride and envy are the specific
species and manifesting fruit of it.
Descriptions of Lucifer’s selfishness occur in a number of ways. His thoughts turned
toward himself in self-seeking,485 self-indulgence,486 and self-exaltation.487 He desired to live
for self. He developed a disposition to serve self instead of Creator.488 He wanted to “make
himself a center (sic) of influence”489 in opposition to the only ultimate centre – God. The
essence of Lucifer’s rebellion was a turn to self or selfishness. The most explicit statement of
selfishness as sins origin is this: “Sin originated in self-seeking.”490
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Lucifer’s pride is associated with his beauty and brilliance. Lucifer gloried in his
brightness and exaltation.491 Being highly honoured and admired by others Lucifer thought of
himself as the favourite among angels.492 He was taken in by his own glory.493 Pride in his
own glory could only happen as Lucifer started to think ‘selfishly’ or without reference to
God. How? In a crucial statement Ellen White relates how Satan had enjoyed serving God
“until he began to think that his wisdom was not derived from God, but was inherent in
himself and that he was as worthy as was God to receive honor and power.”494
An inflated sense of self explains pride but not envy. Comparisons with lesser beings
would reinforce pride but not generate envy. Envy requires a comparison with someone
perceived as greater in brilliance and position. In Lucifer’s case, it was Christ. Pride is
internally focused, envy is externally focused. Pride indulges. Envy covets. By observing the
place and position of Christ Lucifer developed “dissatisfaction with his position.”495 He
desired Christ’s power, position, authority and honour. Lucifer coveted the glory invested in
Christ and the homage that was due to him.496 He wanted the honour which the Father
bestowed upon the Son.497 Thus, he developed and nurtured an intense envy and jealousy
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toward Christ.498 To desire Christ’s unique position requires displacing him.499 This would
place himself above the entire created realm. He eventually wanted to “gain control of
heavenly beings, to draw them away from their Creator, and to win their homage to
himself.”500 Pride and envy combined to create an unholy ambition.501
Identifying pride and envy as the main descriptions of Lucifer’s fall has a long history
within theology. The majority view within the early Christian tradition saw Lucifer’s sin as
pride (Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Ambrose), usually working from Isaiah 14 and
Ezekiel 28, while the minority opinion emphasised envy (Irenaeus, Tertullian, Justin Martyr,
and Cyprian).502 Within the envy position it was commonly held that Lucifer was envious of
humanity whom God had created in his image.503 The Great Controversy follows the majority
view in seeing pride as central, but also accepts the importance of envy (pride providing a
foundation for envy). It rejects, however, the minority view that Lucifer was envious of
humanity. In contrast, Lucifer is pictured as specifically envious of Christ as supreme ruler
and creator of humanity. In the Great Controversy account, the context for Lucifer’s fall is
Christological not anthropological. Lucifer’s envy is particularly aroused by certain exclusive
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divine councils between the Father and Son. He is described as desiring to enter divine
councils and purposes504 and was curious to know what God had not designed he should
know.505 He developed a dissatisfaction at not knowing all of God's secrets.506 His exclusion
was taken as a personal slight and mistreatment. In his mind, he had closed the infinite gap
between himself and Christ. All of this subjective envy is unjustified, arbitrary, and without
cause. Thus, Lucifer’s rebellion is linked to an inordinate curiosity, a sense of entitlement to
know divine mysteries, a refusal to accept on trust that some things belong to God alone, a
confidence that he was capable of understanding and worthy to do so, and a resentment that
God had not considered this so. While pride was the internal incubator of his sin, it is envy of
Christ which proves the catalyst for outwardly questioning God. This perceived mistreatment
by God becomes delusional justifications for his envy and ‘evidence’ for others that his
feelings are legitimate. Personal selfishness, pride and envy will now manifest as public
disaffection.

Second Stage: Initial dissemination, Covert Dissatisfaction to Overt Questioning
With pride established and envy of Christ developed, Lucifer started to act on his
ambitious desire for supremacy. He is described as slowly and selectively voicing his
thoughts to others (initially to those directly under his command) in such a way that it was
not immediately clear what his purposes were.507 Lucifer was so highly exalted and
Satan “desired to enter into the divine counsels and purposes, from which he was excluded
by his own inability, as a created being, to comprehend the wisdom of the Infinite One. It was this
ambitious pride that led to his rebellion.” White, Testimonies 5:702. Italics mine.
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considered perfect that he had the natural trust of these angels and was able to illicit their
sympathies. These angels in turn began disseminating to others the thoughts that he had
implanted within them. This gave the appearance of a wider movement questioning the order
of things when in fact it was all traceable to Lucifer.508 He initially presented himself as a
victim of injustice and unfairness.509 This was all in relation to Christ. The request for
equality with Christ masked a desire for pre-eminence. While subtly engendering sympathy
for himself, Lucifer was challenging the order of heaven.
White indicates that God responded to Lucifers accusations with ways and means that
only divinity could develop to help all fully understand what was happening, its dangers, and
how to turn back.510 White indicates that this had an initial calming effect on all including
Lucifer. 511 But this did not last. As “again he [Lucifer] was filled with pride in his own glory.
His desire for supremacy returned, and envy of Christ was once more indulged.”512 At this
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point Lucifer deserted his place as covering cherub in the immediate presence of God.513
Renewing his work amid the angels, Lucifer began to repeat his basic arguments but now
with new additions while maintaining great care to disguise his deeper designs. His
accusation that Christ’s exaltation above him was an injustice was now presented as part of a
wider injustice facing all the angels. Here is a crucial turning point in his argument, although,
in reality it brings out what has been happening in clearer terms. Lucifer claims the essential
problem is with the order and law of God.514 In the Great Controversy, this questioning of
divine law and the lawgivers character will become his essential argument. God’s laws are,
like Christ’s exaltation over Lucifer, advanced as an arbitrary imposition reflecting an unjust
order. Lucifer argues that the angels are like God in nature and not capable of erring
(impeccable). Therefore, such law is unnecessary and onerous.515 Arbitrary divine law like
Christ’s unfair exaltation threatens everyone’s liberty and freedom. Lucifer offers a new
approach as a solution to this ‘problem.’ The solution consists in a change to the law and
order of God.516 Through this argument Lucifer was able to position himself as a loyalist and
reformer only aiming to improve the situation while still leaving the implication that the error
is with God and especially Christ. Strategically speaking, Lucifer’s rivalry with Christ was
personal and had limited appeal to other angels but the new emphasis on dissatisfaction with
divine law, which the angels were also under, had wider appeal. “Satan could establish
“Leaving his place in the immediate presence of the Father, Lucifer went forth to diffuse
the spirit of discontent among the angels.” Ibid.
513

514

“He worked with mysterious secrecy, and for a time concealed his real purpose under an

appearance of reverence for God. He began to insinuate doubts concerning the laws that governed
heavenly beings …” Ibid.
“He began … intimating that though laws might be necessary for the inhabitants of the
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pronounced enmity toward God only by bringing into contempt the laws of his
government.”517
Having rejected all divine outreach, Lucifer finally and fully hardened himself and
publicly completed his rejection of Christ.518 Discarding the pretence of loyalty to God he
openly and boldly asserted an alternative form of government.519 He now denounced loyal
angels as deluded slaves.520 Lucifer had now irreversibly become Satan. To strengthen and
secure his following and prevent any of his sympathisers from going back to God, Satan
added a new argument and deception. He now declared that they all had gone too far, God
would not show mercy nor would he forgive.521
As a result of this process all angels make their decisions and take sides. Divisions are
complete and solidified. An attempt is made by Satan and his allies to assert their new liberty
by use of force. God permitted Satan to develop his work until its rebellious aggressive nature
revealed itself. The final stage in the primordial rebellion is expulsion. Christ and his angels
cast Satan out from heaven. From here, however, he manages to take his rebellion to earth.
This raises the important question of why God expelled but did not destroy Satan (either as
soon as he sinned or after his opposition became open). Having seen the origin of sin which
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triggers cosmic war, the reasons why sin, suffering, and cosmic war have been allowed to
continue will be explored.

Satan’s Charges/Accusations: The Basis for the Great Controversy
The Great Controversy understands the problem of evil to arise out of something
subtler than even the description ‘cosmic war’ would warrant. Behind war is its catalyst. This
catalyst is a moral-spiritual-political-philosophical controversy. Controversy, not simply sin,
precipitates cosmic war. What in turn drives and sustains this “Great Controversy” and thus
explains why the cosmic war continues for a long time are the questions, accusations, lies or
charges raised by Satan against God.522 Hence, it is moral controversy and not metaphysical
explanation which ultimately accounts for the origin and continuation of evil (as well as its
end). These audacious satanic charges, along with God’s necessary response, together
constitute the core elements of the ‘controversy’ which lies beneath the cosmic war. The core
of the charges is that God, his character, his law and government, are the problem and Satan’s
rebellion is justified. An actual detailing of the charges reveals the breadth, daring, scope and
inner logic of the ideology driving the controversy which fuels the cosmic war. First an
overview of the charges will be given, and then an examination of how they work together.

The Claim that God Himself is the Problem
In the Great Controversy theodicy, Lucifer misrepresents God’s character. He
maintains that God desires his own self-exaltation,523 is severe and tyrannical,524 selfish, and
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oppressive, claiming all and giving nothing.525 God exacts self-denial from others but
practices no self-denial or self-sacrifice himself.526 Satan questioned whether the Father or
Son had sufficient love for man to exercise self-denial and sacrifice.527 He declared that God
knows nothing of self-denial, mercy, love but is stern, exacting and unforgiving528 Therefore,
Satan claims God is the ultimate author of sin, death and suffering. In effect, Satan attributes
to God his own satanic character. This is a very bold assertion and the complete reversal of
reality.

The Claim that God’s Law is the Problem529
Much of Satan’s accusations are ‘justified’ by attacks on God’s law. God is not just in
imposing law.530 This law is faulty,531 tyrannical,532 and cannot be obeyed.533 Adam’s sin (and
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practiced no self-denial and made no sacrifice.” White, The Great Controversy, 502.
526
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White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 69.

“Satan had declared that God knew nothing of self-denial, of mercy and love, but that He
was stern, exacting, and unforgiving. Satan never tested the forgiving love of God; for he never
exercised genuine repentance ... his representations of God were incorrect.” Ellen G. White, “Christ
Represents the Beneficence of the Law,” The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, March 9, 1897.
528
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“From the first the great controversy had been upon the law of God.” White, Patriarchs

and Prophets, 69.
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Ibid., 44.
White, Desire of Ages, 763.

532

Ellen G. White, 'Manuscript 1, 1902', Manuscript Releases, 21 vols. (Silver Springs, MD:
Ellen G. White Estate, 1981).
“He [Satan] declares that it is impossible for us to obey its precepts.” White, Desire of
Ages, 24, 761.
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human sin) is proof that God’s law is unjust and cannot be obeyed.534 God’s unjust
restrictions are the real cause of the fall.535 God’s law is a law of selfishness.536 Law is a
restriction on liberty,537 a yoke of bondage,538 and needs to be changed.539 God’s law is not
perfect or immutable, but defective and subject to change.540 If God’s law is changeless then
the penalty cannot be remitted,541 pardon for sin is impossible and must be punished. 542

The Claim that God’s Government is the Problem
Satan charges that God’s government is based on blind submission and unreasoning
control.543 Satan argues that God treated him unjustly in the beginning.544 God’s order is
unstable and Satan only wanted to improve the divine order and bring stability and

White, 117. Concerning the fall of Adam and Eve, “Satan declared that he would prove to
the worlds which God had created, and to the heavenly intelligences, that it was an impossibility to
keep the law of God.” Idem, “Obedience the Fruit of Union with Christ,” The Advent Review and
Sabbath Herald, September 3, 1901.
534

“[He] declared that God's unjust restrictions had led to man's fall, as they had led to his
own rebellion.” White, The Great Controversy, 500.
535
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“Satan represents God's law of love as a law of selfishness.” White, Desire of Ages, 24.
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“White, The Great Controversy, 499.
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Ibid., 504.
White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 69.

“Satan [said] … that His law was faulty, and that the good of the universe required it to be
changed ... In the controversy it was to be shown whether the divine statutes were defective and
subject to change, or perfect and immutable.” Ibid.
540

541

White, The Great Controversy, 502.
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White, Desire of Ages, 761.

543

White, Steps to Christ, 43,44.

In dialogue with other angels in pre-fall heaven Satan “represented that God had done him
injustice in preferring Christ to himself.” White, Testimonies, 5:291.
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harmony.545 If God hadn’t reproved Satan then he asserts he would not have rebelled.546 God,
who knew the consequences of sin, is unjust in having permitted man to transgress the law.547
Satan claims that due to the rebellion of humanity, the world now rightly belongs to him (his
government is legitimate).548 He asserts that God’s justice is severe and unforgiving.549
Ultimately, Satan claim God is responsible for the fall and is therefore the author of sin,
death, and suffering.550

The Claim that the Principles of God are Inconsistent and Contradictory
Working from these assertions, Satan maintains that the principles God claims to
operate on are inconsistent and contradictory opposites. God’s principles make forgiveness
impossible.551 Sin must be punished and it cannot or will not be forgiven or pardoned.552
God’s justice is inconsistent with mercy and as a result God cannot be just and show mercy at

“While claiming for himself perfect loyalty to God, he urged that changes in the order and
laws of heaven were necessary for the stability of the divine government… [he Incited rebellion and
discontent] … then claimed his purpose and way was restore harmony.” White, Patriarchs and
Prophets, 38.
545

546

White, The Great Controversy, 499–500.
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White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 331. This is a post-expulsion argument.
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White, Desire of Ages, 114, 115; Idem, Confrontation (Washington D.C.: Review and
Herald, 1970), 16.
549

White, Desire of Ages, 22.

“The fall of our first parents, with all the woe that has resulted, he charges upon the
Creator, leading men to look upon God as the author of sin, and suffering, and death.” Ibid., 24.
550

551

“He had declared that the principles of God's government make forgiveness impossible.

Had the world been destroyed, he would have claimed that his accusations were proved true. He was
ready to cast blame upon God, and to spread his rebellion to the worlds above.” Ibid., 37.
“When he tempted and overcame Adam and Eve … He claimed that it was impossible that
forgiveness should be granted to the sinner, and therefore the fallen race were his rightful subjects,
and the world was his.” White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 69.
552
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the same time.553 To this must be added the last but very crucial post-cross accusations. So
far, all of the accusations were originated before the coming of Christ and his redemptive
work. As will be shown Christ’s redemptive work answers these accusations. However, in
response to Christs redemptive work, Satan comes up with another accusation (while
strategically maintaining all previous ones). The last accusation is that mercy destroys justice.
If Christ’s sacrifice brings mercy then his death has abrogated the law. 554 Satan does not care
if abrogation is perceived as applying to all or only part of the law.555

The ‘Logic’ of the Accusations
These accusations should not be thought of as a random collection of charges. While
sometimes situational and opportunistic, they also form a cumulative argument. The case they
develop has its own progression. Each charge is meant to complicate any possible defence or
vindication of God and give the impression of being unanswerable. The charges suggest a
hopeless ‘Catch-22’ dilemma from which God cannot escape unless he concedes Satan’s
points. That would give Satan victory and legitimacy. John Woods summarises the structure
of Satan’s accusations as revolving around three clusters of ideas: 1) God is a harsh, unjust,
unfair tyrant. The basis for this is that God has arbitrarily imposed an absolute law which he
had no intrinsic right to do. 2) God cannot (or will not) forgive. Justice destroys mercy. God
is in a dilemma about what he will do with rebels. Justice and mercy are incompatible
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White, Desire of Ages, 761.
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“Another deception was now to be brought forward. Satan declared that mercy destroyed

justice, that the death of Christ abrogated the Father's law ... the very means by which Christ
established the law Satan represented as destroying it. Here will come the last conflict of the great
controversy between Christ and Satan.” Ibid., 762.
That the law of God is faulty and parts of it have been set aside is “the claim which Satan
now puts forward. It is the last great deception that he will bring upon the world. He needs not to
assail the whole law; if he can lead men to disregard one precept, his purpose is gained.” Ibid., 763.
555
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opposites. 3) With the first two arguments having collapsed at the cross Satan now argues
that mercy destroys justice and abrogates law.556 Norman Young presents the various
accusations in a basic sequence of five charges. Charge 1) God is a harsh dictator; Charge 2)
Holy creatures need no external restraint (Law); Charge 3) It is impossible to obey God’s
law; Charge 4) Justice excludes mercy; Charge 5) Mercy excludes justice (post-cross
claim).557 Below a fuller summation is offered in order to show the interrelated progression of
charges. Each charge is self-contained, yet together form part of a progressive argument. A
more detailed outline of the logic of Satan’s arguments is as follows:

1. Generic Accusation: God is the Problem.
God himself is arbitrary, harsh and unjust in his character, government, and law.
Therefore, there is a justification for the alternative Satan advocates.
2. Controlling Accusation: God’s Law is the Essence of God’s Problem.
God’s Law is prime evidence of the generic accusation.
God’s unjust law is an arbitrary, unnecessary restriction on creatures.
God’s law is for God’s own self-exaltation and control of others. It is selfish
Therefore, God’s law needs to be changed.
Satan only wants to improve things and bring liberty by a change in God’s
law.
3. Subordinate Accusation A: It is impossible to obey God’s unjust law.
Humanity’s fall (and continued sin) is evidence of this, Angelic rebellion is evidence
of this.
It is unfair to ask obedience to an unjust law.
Therefore, disobedience was/is justified and unavoidable (this is evidence for
the second accusation that the law needs to be changed).
4. Subordinate Accusation B: God’s justice/law cancels out mercy and the possibility of
forgiveness.
The three ideas are summarised in John W. Wood, “‘All Must Appear’: The Investigative
Judgment Theme in the Writings of Ellen G. White,” in The Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical,
Historical, and Theological Studies, ed. A.V. Wallenkampf and W.R. Lesher (Washington D.C.:
Review and Herald, 1981), 641. Wood also deals with the first two ideas in more detail in “The
Mighty Opposites: The Atonement of Christ in the Writings of Ellen G. White, Part 1,” in The
Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Studies, ed. A.V. Wallenkampf
and W.R. Lesher (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, n.d.), 694–709, and the third is dealt with in
“The Mighty Opposites: The Atonement of Christ in the Writings of Ellen G. White, Part 2,” in The
Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Studies, ed. A.V. Wallenkampf
and W.R. Lesher (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1981), 710–30.
556
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Norman H. Young, “Five Charges Against God,” Record, May 6, 2004, 11, 12.
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God will not forgive (he is cruel and unmerciful) because,
God cannot forgive and must punish (God’s unjust law requires it).
If/when God shows mercy/pardon he is unjust, inconsistently and untrue.
Therefore, the law can neither be obeyed yet nor can humanity be forgiven.
An impossible, unworkable, unjust situation (this confirms the first three
accusations).
5. Counter Accusation (Post-Cross): Mercy cancels out justice and abrogates law.
God can’t have it both ways – it is either justice or mercy.
God has compromised his justice by mercy.
Therefore, mercy abrogates law and shows that it should have been changed
originally as Satan said.

This is how Satan presents himself as a liberator and reformer instead of a rebel. His
broad claim is against God’s character, that he is an unjust selfish tyrant, but when examined
closely everything hinges on Satan’s attack on God’s law. Law is the prima facie evidence
for the claim that God is unjust. Most steps in some way work back to a challenge to God’s
law. Satan tries to place the divine administration on the horns of a dilemma. If God upholds
his law he is cruel, if he shows mercy he is inconsistent. Either way, Satan claims selfjustification and noble motives for his rebellion.

Why Satan, Suffering and Evil Continue
It is now possible to return to the important question of why God expelled Satan from
heaven but did not destroy him and thus why God has allowed evil and suffering to continue
for so long.

God’s Realm: Angels, Humans, Unfallen Worlds
The Great Controversy asserts that God’s government is not restricted to angels
(unfallen and fallen) and humanity (believing and non-believing). To this it adds the idea of
unfallen worlds. These are planets and societies of other intelligent, free beings comparable
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in some sense to angels and humans. It is implied that there are many of these.558 They
function as observers of the conflict between God and Satan.559 They are intellectual
participants capable of persuasion either way. Satan hoped to win them to his position and
has made his accusations against God before them.560 God and Satan act in reference to this
group and not just in reference to humanity. God acts in such a way to keep the hearts and
minds of this group (unfallen worlds, unfallen angels) on his side as well as win back the
hearts and minds of hostile fallen humanity.561
This means that God in his wisdom did not immediately destroy Satan but allowed his
activity to continue for a number of very important reasons. First, as will be discussed later,
evil is a mystery, especially its first appearance. Only God could fully understand evil. Even
the loyal angels could not discern the true nature of evil or see through Satan’s advocacy of
it.562 To undo evil, and the satanic deceptions, in such a way that it never can arise again,
requires a particular, complex and exceedingly difficult course of action. Evil must be
unmasked. Satan must be given enough time and opportunity to reveal himself. “His own
work must condemn him.”563 Second, questions asked cannot be unasked. Even loyal

“Unnumbered worlds” White, Christ Triumphant, 66; Idem, Christ’s Object Lessons
(Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1900), 190.
558
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White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 78; Idem, The Desire of Ages, 759.

560

White, The Great Controversy, 497.

In his saving work God has “carried the worlds unfallen and the heavenly universe with
Him, but at a terrible cost.” White, Manuscript Releases 18:362.
561

“Until fully developed, it could not be made to appear the evil thing it was; his disaffection
would not be seen to be rebellion. Even the loyal angels could not fully discern his character or see to
what his work was leading.” White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 41. “The inhabitants of heaven and of
the worlds, being unprepared to comprehend the nature or consequences of sin, could not then have
seen the justice of God in the destruction of Satan.” Ibid., 42. italics mine.
562

“Satan had made it appear that he himself was seeking to promote the good of the
universe. The true character of the usurper and his real object must be understood by all. He must
have time to manifest himself by his wicked works… [Satan declared all evil] to be the result of the
divine administration ... therefore God permitted him to demonstrate the nature of his claims, to show
563
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creatures cannot pretend otherwise. For the sake of both the faithful and the hostile, God
needs to provide answers. Furthermore, from the divine perspective, these answers must
comprehensively answer every dimension and facet of the challenge of evil and Satan. God,
his law, his character and government must “be forever placed beyond question.”564 Thirdly,
destroying Satan immediately would have appeared to confirm Satan’s charges. Satan would
have won a victory even in defeat. Creatures would no longer serve God due to love but
fear.565 The spirit of doubting and distrusting God would have remained alive amid intelligent
free beings and become the seedbed for repressed disaffection and potential future
rebellion(s).566

Creaturely Limitation
All of these reasons relate to a brute fact. If God wants to win the hearts and minds of
his finite creatures then he must act according to creaturely limitations. Created beings face
epistemological limitations that God must work within.567 Their knowledge, understanding,
and reasoning ability is finite and fallible (though not originally perverse). All creaturely

the working out of his proposed changes in the divine law… Satan had claimed from the first that he
was not in rebellion. The whole universe must see the deceiver unmasked.” White, Patriarchs and
Prophets, 42. italics mine.
“For the good of the entire universe through ceaseless ages, he must more fully develop his
principles, that his charges against the divine government might be seen in their true light by all
created beings, and that the justice and mercy of God and the immutability of His law might be
forever placed beyond all question.” Ibid.
564

565

“Had he [Satan] been immediately blotted out of existence, some would have served God

from fear rather than from love.” Ibid.
Had Satan been immediately eliminated “The influence of the deceiver would not have
been fully destroyed, nor would the spirit of rebellion have been utterly eradicated.” Ibid.
566
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“The entrance of sin into the world, the incarnation of Christ, regeneration, the

resurrection, and many other subjects presented in the Bible, are mysteries too deep for the human
mind to explain or even to fully comprehend.” White, Testimonies, 5:698–699.
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understanding is interpretative, however, the controverted points that God wishes to make
plain must be placed beyond a conflict of interpretations. God must enable answers to the
Great Controversy to emerge from a level of evidence so compelling that even Satan will
freely acknowledge the truth (even if he is no longer willing or able to embrace its
implications). Another part of this epistemological problem is an experience limitation. Many
truths cannot be known by abstraction or theorization. Morality and spirituality cannot be
learnt in the same manner as maths. Many things can only be known by experience.568 This
experience limitation does not necessitate evil for any individual creature, as shown by the
unfallen angels who avoided evil by trusting God and experiencing his trustworthiness. 569
But if any part of creation does embrace evil then creation can only know the answers to the
Great Controversy by experiencing (either by direct experience or observing the experience
of others) the fruit of evil or the fruit of grace. Related to this is the historical-temporal
limitation. Heavenly and earthly events take time.570 The development of ideas, the minds or
cultures that process them, the resulting historical impact, and the persons or societies which
preform them, take time. Time is needed for individual and collective decisions and actions to
manifest and work out as well as be evaluated. God cannot simply cut short history if history
is the domain of demonstration required to answer the issues in the Great Controversy.571

“The plan of redemption is so far-reaching that philosophy cannot explain it ... It will ever
remain a mystery that the most profound reasoning cannot fathom. The science of salvation cannot be
explained; but it can be known by experience.” White, Desire of Ages, 494–495.
568

569

For evil not to arise, unfallen beings must trust God in the face of any test, whether
benign/benevolent testing like the Tree of Good and Evil or sinister temptations like those of the
serpent.
570

The Great Controversy theodicy affirms that the foundational nature of reality is temporal
not timeless, see, Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness
as Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctrinal Dissertation Series 10
(Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987).
571

For an example of this see Ellen Whites discussion of God sparing Cain, White, Patriarchs
and Prophets, 78.
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Humans (and angels and unfallen beings) are complex socially located beings. It is not
possible to separate ideas, their development, and their demonstration from all these
complexities or the particularities of history itself. There is no creaturely context-free,
neutral, timeless view from nowhere. Creatures can only know anything from within history.
There is no way to rush history and no demonstrable answers (as opposed to claims whether
divine or satanic) without it. Sin can only be seen for what it really is if it can properly
express its horrible nature. If evil is gratuitous then this requires allowing evil to be seen for
what it is. Otherwise, God’s claims about sin could be controverted as exaggerations, or
without historically observed cause and effect, be blamed on God.

Complicated by Deception
All of these limitations are further complicated by the deceptive strategy of Satan.
“God could employ only such means as were consistent with truth and righteousness. Satan
could use what God could not — flattery and deceit.”572 Multiplying and changing deceptions
is a very effective tactic continually complicating any divine defence. Until God’s
demonstration of truth and error is fully complete, any divine action can be misused and
thrown back at him via deceptive means. God can be accused of being too slow too quick, too
harsh, too lenient, too absent, too present and so on. Only the full story independently
clarifies the truth. Thus, the history of the Great Controversy between God and Satan is itself
the answer to Satan’s charges and the problem of evil. This history functions as a “lesson”, a
“perpetual testimony”, a “history of this terrible experiment” 573 (the experiment is Satan’s
and ours not God’s. God does not experiment with his creation) for all creation and all time
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Ibid., 42.
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Ibid.
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which not only answers every question raised about God’s rule but, due to its comprehensive
nature, functions as a perpetual safeguard which ensures that evil will never arise again.574 At
the end of the Great Controversy God can eliminate sin with universal acknowledgement of
his justice whereas he couldn’t at the start. The intervening process means that creation has
been tested, proved, educated, and in humanities case, redeemed. This creation will never and
can never now turn from or doubt a God whose fathomless love and infinite wisdom have
been so fully revealed.575 The universe is eternally safe and secure from evil. God’s
foreknowledge allows him to know, not only how to do this, but that this undertaking will
succeed and one day all (loyal and disloyal) will freely understand and assent to God’s
righteousness and goodness.

Pain, Suffering and Natural Evil
The Great Controversy is clear that God is not the author of moral or natural evil (evil
not resulting from moral choices, i.e. earthquakes).576 Sin broke the original created order and
introduced the antagonistic principle of death into creation so that it now produces
suffering.577 Natural evil is not the inevitable by-product of having a lawful universe. Natural
evil results from disobedience to the laws of nature, not the laws themselves.578 Natural evil
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Ibid.
White, The Great Controversy, 504.

“God did not create evil, He only made the good, which was like Himself … Evil, sin, and
death were not created by God; they are the result of disobedience, which originated in Satan.” White,
Testimonies, 5:503.
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“God is the life-giver. From the beginning all His laws were ordained to life. But sin broke
in upon the order that God had established, and discord followed. So long as sin exists, suffering and
death are inevitable.” White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 522.
577

Duah, “A Study of Warfare Theodicy in the Writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A.
Boyd,” 225–226.
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arises due to moral evil. All natural evil is either directly or remotely due to disobedience to
God’s laws.579 Through Adam’s and Eve’s fall, Satan implanted the seeds of death within
nature which has corrupted and distorted it.580 Continued disobedience to moral and physical
laws produces ever increasing levels of suffering.581 The more evil escalates the more
suffering multiplies. Adams and Eve’s fall also gave Satan access to creation and allows him
to exercise a usurped and contested but real dominion on earth.582 This provides him with
opportunities to manipulate creation in a malevolent way as far as he can.583 God does not
cause pain and suffering.584 Instead God seeks to work amid pain and suffering and overrule it
for good.585 God permits pain and suffering to awake people to righteousness and
compassion.586 At other times God permits pain, suffering and evil to come upon people as
judgment. But this is often not the case. Much suffering indiscriminately affects the just and
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Ibid., 341.
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White claims that the seeds of death and even noxious, poisonous plants are in some way
Satan’s doing Ellen G. White, Selected Messages, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald,
1958), 288.
581

White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 461; Idem, Counsels on Health (Mountain View, CA:
Pacific Press, 1923), 19.
582

Creation is a finished work. Satan does not have authority over creation in terms of its
origins or formation. Sin is a foreign, anti-life, anti-god principle implanted in a completed and good
creation. This implantation of the death principle is by inducing the fall of Adam and Eve. It is not
due to any inherent power of Satan to change the fundamental laws of the universe, contra Boyd.
583

White suggests Satan has studied and experimented with nature and whenever it is
advantageous and possible seeks to bring about natural evil White, The Great Controversy, 589–590.
The exact way and degree to which this is possible is unclear.
“… it is not God who causes pain and suffering, but that man through his own ignorance
and sin has brought this condition upon himself.” White, Testimonies, 6:280.
584

“The history of Job had shown that suffering is inflicted by Satan, and is overruled by God
for purposes of mercy.” White, Desire of Ages, 471.
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“The Lord permits suffering and calamity to come upon men and women to call us out of

our selfishness, to awaken in us the attributes of His character - compassion, tenderness, and love.”
Ellen G. White, Counsels on Stewardship (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1940), 23.
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the unjust. Such is the confused, disordered fallen condition of the world.587 Amid all this
God is constantly restraining Satan and the full effects of sin and evil in the world. If God did
not do this then natural evil would be far greater.588

The Interconnections between Evil, Love and Law
In order to truly understand the inner logic of the Great Controversy as theodicy there
is a need to look at some of the distinctive ideas about love, law and evil. This requires
returning to and understanding the idea of the ‘mystery of iniquity’. It also requires
understanding love more deeply, especially the relationship between love and law (loves
immutable minimum). And understanding the unlimited depths of divine love revealed in
God’s saving ‘mystery of godliness’ (loves supererogatory maximum). Appreciating these
mysteries will help understand the idea that the Great Controversy resolves the theodicy
through a metanarrative of love. Love is the counterpoise to evil.

The Mystery of Iniquity (Mystery of Evil)
To understand the problem of evil properly within Adventism’s Great Controversy
metanarrative requires understanding the essential nature of evil. Now it is time to examine
the central Great Controversy idea of the logic defying irrationality of evil. Ellen White notes
that the “great perplexity” caused by evil and the inability to explain it leads many to the
wrong responses of scepticism, rejecting God via anti-theistic arguments from the problem of
evil, or traditionalism, which offers theological solutions that do not properly represent
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White is against viewing all great calamities as an index of crimes or sins. This is
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Adventist Bible Commentary, vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1954), 1140.
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God.589 White then makes the most important and defining statement on evil’s origin for the
Great Controversy theodicy. It is necessary to quote it in full:

It is impossible to explain the origin of sin so as to give a reason for its existence. Yet
enough may be understood concerning both the origin and the final disposition of sin
to make fully manifest the justice and benevolence of God in all His dealings with
evil. Nothing is more plainly taught in Scripture than that God was in no wise
responsible for the entrance of sin; that there was no arbitrary withdrawal of divine
grace, no deficiency in the divine government, that gave occasion for the uprising of
rebellion. Sin is an intruder, for whose presence no reason can be given. It is
mysterious, unaccountable; to excuse it is to defend it. Could excuse for it be found,
or cause be shown for its existence, it would cease to be sin. Our only definition of sin
is that given in the word of God; it is "the transgression of the law;" it is the
outworking of a principle at war with the great law of love which is the foundation of
the divine government.590

This statement suggests the possibility of a narrative account of evil’s origin and a
defence of God, but not an explanation of the first evil. In fact, explanation is unambiguously
rejected. Evil is inexplicable. This is the “Mystery of Evil.” Everything in the Great
Controversy theodicy hinges on it. No reason can be given because evil is in essence
irrational, absurd and unfounded. It is a “species of insanity.”591 Reason can be mounted to
justify God and his ways (“no arbitrary withdrawal of divine grace, no deficiency in the
divine government”) but not for evil itself. Evil is incomprehensible. In terms of its origin, it
is metaphysically, philosophically, ontologically and rationally without the possibility of
elucidation.592
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“All sin is selfishness. Satan's first sin was selfishness. He sought to grasp power, to exalt
self. A species of insanity led him to seek to supersede God.” Ellen G. White, The Ellen G. White
1888 Materials (Washington D.C.: Ellen G. White Estate, 1987), 1763.
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Adam’s sin is also called unexplainable, inexcusable and irrational. (Letter 191, 1899) in
White, “Ellen White Comments,” 1953, 1083. While both are equally unjustifiable, it is also true that
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Evil’s mystery is not like paradoxical theological truths (e.g. the Trinity or
Incarnation) which are rational even while going beyond reason. Neither is it a mystery so as
to avoid the problem of evil. It is not that this is a mystery beyond current human reason but,
nevertheless, still lies within the greater realm of reason (explainable perhaps in the hereafter
or known to God). It is rather that evil is inherently inexplicable. It doesn’t transcend reason,
it both lacks and overthrows reason. The mystery is that this self-destructive, irrational,
unjustifiable, maddening insanity called ‘evil’ was ever chosen. Evil is a mystery in its own
unique category. Evil defeats reasoning. It is its own black hole from which nothing coherent
escapes. And reason itself becomes perverted if this realisation is not understood. Reason can
be fooled (or fool itself) into imagining that there is some point to evil. But reason cannot
solve evil or save us from it. Reason needs something deeper and more profound to protect it
from evil (i.e. divine wisdom). Reason is vulnerable. Therefore, the problem of evil cannot be
resolved by an appeal to autonomous human reason (what antitheists demand in the logical or
evidential versions) or theological reason (as certain theodicies attempt). Any answers to evil,
practical or theoretical, can only come from God. But that does not involve God giving a
rational for evil.
This understanding has important practical implications. What the Great Controversy
theodicy claims is this: understanding evil as an inherently mysterious insanity incapable of
rational explanation is the only correct and proper logical stance that enables an account of
evil which itself does not try and rationalise the irrational or justify the unjustifiable. To do so
would itself be an evil (as per anti-theodicy). To ‘understand’ evil properly is to realise it
cannot be understood and to refuse to be seduced into attempting to do so.593 Evil must be

Satan sinned with full knowledge of God while Adam was deceived. Satan’s fall was incurable but
Adams was not, see White, Desire of Ages, 761–762.
593

The phenomenon of evil and its effects, however, can be studied. We can learn about evil,
discern patterns, and construct models. While evil is not rational, it does exist within rational beings
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opposed, exposed and overcome but not rationalised. However, doesn’t this essential insight
appear, at least on the surface, to be evasive even absurd? Such would be true if we were
dealing with rationally explicable phenomena. To designate something rational as irrational is
to misrepresent it. But it is equally wrong to provide a logical justification for an absurdity, to
arbitrarily turn nonsense into sense. The Great Controversy claims that evil is inherently
confounding.594 The only logical statement to make about evil’s origin is to affirm its
illogic.595
This is, of course, ‘circular reasoning’ or ‘begging the question’. How can one assume
a-priori evil’s absurdity when this is the point to be proven? This apparently intractable
objection actually helps get to the heart of the Great Controversy as theodicy. There is no
theoretical proof (independent of God declaration) that this characterisation of evil’s mystery
is correct. God’s law declares evil unjustified (with eternal death as evidence) but the key
point is that Satan has disputed this very divine declaration. The Great Controversy doesn’t
avoid this objection of circular reasoning but embraces it. It is precisely because God cannot
appeal to something beyond himself (beyond the divine character or law) to justify himself
(there is nothing more basic than God) that necessitates God reveal the truth about evil by
demonstration. In the Great Controversy theodicy demonstration, not explanation, lies at the
heart of the divine response to evil and Satan’s justification of evil. Demonstration is long,
slow, painful and complex, especially when it must exhaust the multiple lies of a deceptive

and a rational world. We can learn how evil corrupts the created order but no explanatory theory or
model can be made of evils origin or justification.
594

This aligns with the anti-theodicy views of Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 52,53.

595

On top of that inherent ontological confounding, Satan adds another mystifying layer of
confounding lies.
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adversary. This means creation must learn by painful experience the truth of what God has
said.
This point is too easy to miss as one point among many. But it is the lynch pin of any
correct response to the problem of evil. This is the starting point. Any view which fails to
build on this will go wrong. The Great Controversy claim may best be understood by saying
even God cannot explain or give a reason for evil, precisely because there is no reason to
explain.596 This is precisely why God opposes it. It can be explained why evil is a possibility,
why it is wrong and dangerous, why God allowed evil to occur, what God does in response,
but evil itself can never be explained.597 Once evil’s absurd nature is accepted and
understood, then and only then, can helpful insight be gained into evil’s origin without
mistaking for explanation. The Great Controversy theodicy can then attempt to throw light on
the mystery of how a perfect being could fall into sin, all the while adamant that such
elucidation never functions as a justification of the sin. The Great Controversy theodicy does
this by history/narrative. Evil’s insanity is ‘understood’ by observing the actions and thinking
of the originator of evil. Lost in the inner workings of Lucifer is the irrationality of the first
sin. But in his actions and words (and all who cooperate with him) it is possible to document,
describe, and delineate evil but not explain it. Another key conclusion to draw from evil’s
mystery and absurdity is to grasp that on this understanding sin is inherently gratuitous.
Gratuitous evil exists. The originating sin was completely pointless and gratuitous. It had no

“Does this position imply, then, that God doesn’t have an explanation for all evil? Yes. If
something is, by definition, inexplicable, then it can’t be explained, period.” Clifford Goldstein, “The
Inexplicable Unexplained: Another Look at Evil,” Ministry, 2005, 10. Coming from the different
perspective of Thomist natural theology, Neil Ormerod makes a strikingly similar claim “Not even
God understands evil, because in a real sense there is nothing there to be understood. The stance
refuses to put good and evil on the same ontological basis. They are not equiprimordial; rather, evil is
parasitic on the good.” Neil Ormerod, A Public God: Natural Theology Reconsidered (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress Press, 2015) 165.
597
“Theodicy means the justification of God, not the justification of evil, a crucial distinction.
Sin and evil won’t be justified; God will, and central to that understanding is the Cross.” Goldstein,
10.
596
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justification. The Great Controversy theodicy avoids the traditional Greater Good (and
meticulous providence) response which denies the reality of gratuitous evil.

Centrality of Love
The opposite of sin and evil is the law of love. The nature of love is central to the
Great Controversy. A denial of divine love set off the cosmic controversy.598 The vindication
of divine love will end it. This vindication is revealed by a metanarrative of love. The word
‘love’ has a notoriously wide range of meanings. Its basic generic meaning is the attraction
to, attachment to, affection toward someone or something. While acknowledging this, the
Great Controversy asserts that more must be said. Not all love is worthy. Love itself may be
good or evil. Ultimately, love can only be fully understood theologically, that is, in relation to
God. The link is intimate. “"God is love." (1 John 4:16) His nature, His law, is love. Ever has
been; ever will be.”599 God’s character or nature is unselfish. “It is His nature to give. His
very life is the outflow of unselfish love.”600 This theologically or God-derived conception of
love centres on divine “unselfishness”601 and “self-sacrificing love”, which is revealed in
divine actions and especially Jesus. God’s “law of self-renouncing love is the law of life.”602
This is a non-generic biblical and Christian ‘definition’ of love. It is based in a Trinitarian

“The great apostasy originally began as a denial of the love of God, as is plainly revealed
in the Word.” White, Manuscript Releases, Vol, 101.
598

599

White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 33.

600

Ellen G. White, Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press,

1896), 77.
601

602

White, Education, 154.
White, Desire of Ages, 19.
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conception of love which assumes relationally as native to divine nature.603 The Triune God is
the source of love itself. Creation is an expression of divine love. The Great Controversy
pictures the (pre-fall) creation as a “circuit of beneficence” built on the principle of selfgiving love which is the “law of life for the universe.” Love and life flow out from the Father,
the ‘great Giver’, to all through Christ (to whom the Father has given all things), and through
Christ love and life from all things freely “returns in praise, joyous service, and a tide of
love” back to God.604 The work of redemption stands above even this, for redemption is an
act of love to those who have rejected the very cycle of love itself. Ultimately, Jesus in his
saving work is the most perfect demonstration and revelation of love. Calvary is its highest
expression.605 Salvation reveals God’s supererogatory love.

Love and Law
While divine salvation reveals the heights of true love, the concrete principles of
God’s law express loves irreducible minimum. For the Great Controversy this tight
connection between God, love and law, is absolute and crucial. Everything hinges on this.
This study will term the Great Controversy understanding of law as ‘deep law.’ Deep refers
to the deepest level of the divine moral essence or character. “The law of God is as sacred as
God Himself. It is a revelation of His will, a transcript of His character, the expression of

Woodrow W. Whidden, “God Is Love - Trinitarian Love!” Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 17, no. 1 (2006): 98–124.
603

604

White, The Desire of Ages, 21.

“In the light from Calvary it will be seen that the law of self-renouncing love is the law of
life for earth and heaven; that the love which "seeketh not her own" has its source in the heart of
God.” Ibid., 19.
605
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divine love and wisdom.”606 God’s law, like God himself, is immutable607 and “holy, just and
good” (Rom 7:12). Moral law (especially the Decalogue) must be understood as God’s
essential essence communicated propositionally in commandments (or consciously as
cognitive moral intuitions written on the heart/conscience608). Understanding moral law as an
expression of ‘deep law’ clarifies that there is nothing arbitrary or voluntaristic about moral
law. Morality and moral epistemology emerge from divine ontology. Deep law gives rise to
moral law. The latter is an enunciation of the former and the former is the source and essence
of the latter. They are not two different laws. Moral law is an expression of deep law’s
minimum nonnegotiable immutable principles. Whatever love is, it can never be less than
these. God, of course, is constantly expressing his love beyond the minimum. Nowhere more
so than in the maximum expressions of the life of Jesus609 and especially the cross.610
Understanding this minimal-maximal spectrum of love is important for the Great Controversy
theodicy.611
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White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 52.

“It [God’s Law] is eternal, immutable as God Himself.” Manuscript 163, 1897 in “Ellen
White Comments,” in The Seventh-Day Adventist Bible Commentary, vol. 7A (Washington D.C.:
Review and Herald, 1970), 47.
607
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Romans 2:14,15

“The law, revealed in the character of Christ, was a perfect manifestation of the Father.”
Ellen G. White, “The Cost of Salvation,” The Bible Echo, November 20, 1899. The law reveals God’s
character as principles but Jesus reveals God’s law as a living person.
609

“This gift was given to man to convince him that God had left nothing undone that he
could do, that there is nothing held in reserve, but that all heaven has been poured out in one vast
gift ... Calvary represents his crowning work.” Ellen G. White, “Humanity the Lost Pearl,” The
Youth’s Instructor, October 17, 1895.
610

611

Depth is further illustrated in the Great Controversy narrative in other ways. First example,
“When Satan rebelled against the law of Jehovah, the thought that there was a law came to the angels
almost as an awakening to something unthought of. In their ministry the angels are not as servants, but
as sons.” White, The Mount of Blessing, 109. Law was a deep internalised disposition, the idea of
external propositions seemed strange. Law existed in created beings in a way analogous to how it is
God’s very nature. The second example, ‘deep law’ helps explain how moral law can exist in different
expressions while still being the same law. God’s law has been adapted and contextualised for angels
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God’s ‘Deep Law’ is the Basis of Resolving the Problem of Evil
The real problem of evil for the Great Controversy is that it seems to provoke God to
act simultaneously in opposite, contradictory ways. God needs to destroy sin yet save sinners,
to punish and not punish, to save and not save. This tension is what Satan uses against God.612
His charges suggest a hopeless contradiction within God’s government. The seeming
irreconcilable tension between justice and mercy in the face of sin confirms this. All this,
Satan claims, points to the need for his alternative. The Great Controversy maintains that this
confusion is not due to any contradiction within God. Evil and sin, not God, introduced an
unjustified conflict into existence and only God can remove it. If God’s government was
helplessly contradictory then he would have immediately destroyed all sinners (a harsh
justice but without mercy and the complete failure of the creation project) or offered mercy
arbitrarily and forgone his moral law (a capricious rather than gracious mercy from a God
who has denied his own character). The former option would have produced external
obedience due to suspicion and fear613 while the latter option would have only immortalised
and embodied sin.614 But the atoning sacrifice of the cross reveals that God resolves the

and fallen humans Idem, Selected Messages, 1958, 1:220; Idem, Spiritual Gifts, 3:295. It can be
expressed as the two great commandments (Love God/love your neighbour), the Decalogue, or further
more specific and detailed commandments. Idem, Patriarchs and Prophets, 305.
“The opposites, justice and mercy, are both moral qualities that exist in and proceed from
the infinite, intrinsic righteousness of God, but they seem irreconcilable. Ellen White presents these
two Satanic arguments [first is that God is an arbitrary tyrant with an arbitrary law, the second is that
this arbitrary law means that when justice and mercy are in tension and God will not forgive but will
opt for a harsh justice] as virtually unanswerable and a deep dilemma for the inexperienced, finite
creatures of the universe.” Wood, “The Mighty Opposites: The Atonement of Christ in the Writings of
Ellen G. White, Part 1,” 698.
612

“Had he [Satan] been immediately blotted from existence, they would have served God
from fear, rather than from love.” White, The Great Controversy, 499.
613

“There could have been no pardon for sin had this atonement not been made. Had God
pardoned Adam's sin without an atonement, sin would have been immortalized, and would have been
614
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problem of evil not by repudiating himself but by more fully expressing himself – his deep
self. Not by denying his law but by upholding his law. God upheld the law and executed
judgment most fully on humanity but this humanity, was Jesus — our representative and
substitute. Motivated by deep love the Father gave his Son and the Son gave himself for
sinners. The moral law is not sidestepped or ignored. It is upheld. Love is not withheld from
sinners and enemies but lavished on them. God resolves the self-destructive “mystery of
iniquity” by an even greater life-giving “mystery of godliness.”615 Evil’s gratuity is overcome
by a more wonderful divine gratuity. This divine gratuity, made possible by the mystery of
godliness, is summed up in the Great Controversy theodicy concept of atonement as the
practical answer to the problem of evil.

The Atonement
When evil is understood from the perspective of cosmic controversy and not simply
as the classic philosophical trilemma then the practical atoning or redemptive work of Christ
becomes the solution and not theoretical theodicy. The Great Controversy view involves a
very broad understanding of atonement.616 Most theologies view atonement as how God deals
with the human sin problem. The Great Controversy affirms this but also sees atonement as

perpetuated with a boldness that would have been without restraint” Ellen G. White, “The Great
Standard of Righteousness,” The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, April 23, 1901.
615

The mystery of godliness is the humiliation, condescension of God to give his Son to die
for a rebellious race, Ellen G. White, The Upward Look (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald,
1982), 90. Idem, The Sanctified Life (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1889), 75. Idem, “Ellen
White Comments,” 1956, 1133. It is God's love in giving Christ to be propitiation for men's sins,
Idem, Christ’s Object Lessons, 128–129. Christ’s incarnation is mystery of mysteries, Idem, 6 Bible
Commentary, 1082. It includes his birth, his life, sufferings and death. Jesus as God in flesh is a
mystery which increases when contemplated, Idem, Testimonies to Ministers and Gospel Workers
(Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1923), 371.
George Knight treats the atonement as “a process that began at the time sin entered the
universe and will continue until the close of the millennium.” George R. Knight, The Cross of Christ:
God’s Work for Us (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2008), 10.
616
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how God resolves the problem of evil as cosmic controversy.617 Atonement is understood as a
process and not as a particular model or even a collection of models.618 The various models of
atonement are placed within a larger category of atonement as process.619 There are several
ways to approach atonement. It is sometimes limited to a singular model, or, more
commonly, a particular model is seen as having priority and given a controlling foundational
role over other models.620 The mosaic or kaleidoscopic approach has more recently
acknowledged the need for multiple models but without any particular model being granted
priority or grounding status for the others.621 The Great Controversy understanding of
atonement shares some similarity to a mosaic approach but differs in that the multiple models
of atonement are seen as existing within a specific atonement process. This atonement
process is structured around the sanctuary system which is seen as typologically revealing a
comprehensive program of atonement.622 The context for the atonement process is the Great
“The real issue in the great struggle between good and evil is not the justification of
humanity, but the justification of God. Human justification is a by-product of God’s.” Knight, 10.
Norman Gulley contrasts the more limited Salvation Worldview with a broader Cosmic Controversy
Worldview. Systematic Theology: Prolegomena. (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press,
2003), 392, 416.
617

Norman Gulley states that “one theory of the atonement is inadequate to describe fully the
atonement.” See Systematic Theology: Creation, Christ, Salvation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Press, 2012), 599. “In Scripture atonement is looked at from a variety of perspectives that
are complementary.” Ibid., 602.
618

“The biblical view of atonement includes the incarnation, life, and death of Christ, and His
present ministry in heaven’s sanctuary, which embraces the final judgment and the eradication of sin
and sinners.” Gulley, Systematic Theology: Creation, Christ, Salvation, 605.
619
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Gregory Boyd (Christus Victor model), Thomas Schreiner (penal substitution model), and
Bruce Reichenbach (healing model) while acknowledging some value in other models and a variety of
metaphors all give one model priority, see, James K. Beilby and Paul R Eddy, eds., The Nature of the
Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006).
621

See Joel B. Green, Beilby and Eddy, 157-185.

“The intercession of Christ in man's behalf in the sanctuary above is as essential to the plan
of salvation as was His death upon the cross. By His death He began that work which after His
resurrection He ascended to complete in heaven ... there the light from the cross of Calvary is
reflected. There we may gain a clearer insight into the mysteries of redemption.--The Great
Controversy, p. 489. See also A.V. Wallenkampf and W.R. Lesher, eds., The Sanctuary and the
622
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Controversy metanarrative. This narratively situated and sanctuary structured atonement
process unifies the various models so that they don’t simply exist independent of each other
(as in a mosaic/kaleidoscopic approach). One model does not ground the others, instead, all
models are grounded in a higher-level explanation contained in the cosmically contextualised
atoning process. Christ the mediator (sanctuary) and protagonist (Great Controversy
narrative) is the unifying centre to atonement and theodicy.623
What does this process look like? It is a 3-staged atonement process624 preceded by a
preparatory, pre-emptive stage. This first stage will be called stage ‘0’ (zero) to distinguish it
from stages 1-3 in which the atonement is enacted and accomplished. Stage ‘0’ reaches right
back to the eternal nature and life of God as well as including all his activity before the
incarnation. The Great Controversy works with a high view of divine foreknowledge,

Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Studies (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald,
1981); Roy Adams, The Sanctuary: Understanding the Heart of Adventist Theology (Hagerstown:
Review and Herald, 1993); And especially, Richard M. Davidson, “Sanctuary Typology,” in
Symposium on Revelation--Book I: Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook, vol.
6, Daniel and Revelation Series (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1992).
623

Richard Davidson suggests the Great Controversy as the orientation point for Biblical
theology and the Sanctuary as the organising principle for systematic theology, see Davidson,
“Cosmic Metanarrative for the Coming Millennium,” 105..
624

These basic three stages correspond to other three-fold patterns that are not uniquely
Adventist, there is the older ubiquitous pattern of salvation as justification-sanctification-glorification
(although this tends to be individualistic). More recently is the “now, not yet” understanding of God’s
kingdom (the period between the ‘now/not yet’ makes for three stages) as an inaugurated kingdom
awaiting its future consummation, see George Eldon Ladd, The Presence of the Future: The
Eschatology of Biblical Realism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974). Adventist theology affirms this
pattern but they are given special unity as a process by the structure and content found in a typological
reading of the three phased/zoned pattern in the sanctuary (Courtyard or sacrifice/ Holy Place or
priestly intercession/ Most Holy Place or judgment). Holbrook describes these as atonement by
sacrifice, mediation and judgment. Frank B. Holbrook, The Atoning Priesthood of Jesus Christ
(Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1996), 50–52. Richard Davidson
argues that biblical typology parallels this threefold pattern. He terms the first stage ‘Christological’,
the second is the ‘Ecclesiological’ and the third is the ‘Eschatological’, see, Davidson, “Sanctuary
Typology,” 129,130. Christ’s atoning ministry fulfils the specific work associated with the three phase
of the sanctuary and happen in their order).
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particularly God’s knowledge of himself.625 God has always known of the fall and he has
always given himself for the redemption of creation. From all eternity God has had an
“eternal covenant” for the salvation of humanity. God has always been God for us.626 Because
of this, the prospect of evil did not prevent creations possibility, instead, the prospect of
salvation ensured creations actuality. God has always known and willingly embraced the
inherent risk involved in creating creatures with the freedom necessary for them to possess
the capacity to express God-like love.
The risk of contingent creatures requires that they be under probation and a period of
testing. This applies to all intelligent creatures.627 This testing is not to fail anyone, rather it is
to authenticate their fitness and substantiate and confirm them in righteousness. When Adam
and Eve failed their first probation, Jesus immediately pledged himself as the basis for a
second probation.628 “As soon as there was sin there was a saviour.”629 All this is rooted in the
eternal covenant. The rest of the Old Testament is also part of stage zero. During this stage,
the atonement is proleptically applied and portrayed in shadows and types. The pre-cross
work of God depends on stages 1-3 and foreshadows its completion. This is why it is here
termed ‘zero’ stage. Thus, the eternally pledged and future atoning work of Christ, secured
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Divine foreknowledge is crucial to the Great Controversy but the exact way God’s
foreknows is not clear. There is no definitive decision on the particular model of foreknowledge.
“The salvation of the human race has ever been the object of the councils of heaven. The
covenant of mercy was made before the foundation of the world. It has existed from all eternity, and
is called the everlasting covenant. So surely as there never was a time when God was not, so surely
there never was a moment when it was not the delight of the eternal mind to manifest His grace to
humanity.” Ellen G. White, “Spiritual Growth,” The Signs of the Times, June 12, 1901.
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White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 53.

“Adam's sin plunged the race into hopeless misery; but by the sacrifice of the Son of God,
a second probation was granted to man.” Ellen G. White, “Satan and Our Appetites,” The Signs of the
Times, August 10, 1915. Idem, “The Great Standard of Righteousness.”
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Ellen G. White, “Lessons from the Christ-Life,” The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald,
March 12, 1901.
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creation’s eventuality (even though it was vulnerable to Sin’s possibility) and ensured
creation’s continuance when it came under the power of sin and sentence of judgment until in
the future creation is irreversibly and permanently freed from sin.

Atonement Stage One
The first stage is the answer to evil which Christ accomplishes in himself. This is
Christ in his incarnation,630 life and sufferings, ministry, death and resurrection.631 Christ
personally engages, in his own incarnate human life, in the battle of the Great Controversy.632
The achievement of Christ in this stage is understood as infinite in consequence and content.
All eternity will be given over to exploring its meaning and effects.633 What follows is an
outline of the main achievements. Within the seemingly impossible disadvantage of a fully
fall-affected human nature (but never a fall-infected human mind or will),634 Jesus overcomes
“For her [Ellen White] the entire incarnation is one phase (among several) of atonement.”
Wood, “The Mighty Opposites, Part 1,” 701. “It was not alone His betrayal in the garden or His agony
upon the cross that constituted the atonement. The humiliation of which His poverty formed a part
was included in His great sacrifice. The whole series of sorrows which compassed humanity Christ
bore upon His divine soul (MS 12, 1900) in White, “Ellen White Comments,” 1956, 6:1103.
630

The temptations, Gethsemane, and the Cross, are seen as the peak ‘make or break’ battles
White, Prophets and Kings, 701. Concerning these John Woods notes “These events are each
moments when the destiny of the world hung in the balance.” Wood, “The Mighty Opposites: The
Atonement of Christ in the Writings of Ellen G. White, Part 1,” 702.
631

The incarnation was so “that He might work out in His own life the mysterious
controversy between Christ and Satan …” White, Fundamentals of Christian Education, 379.
632
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What a sacrifice is this! Who can fathom it! It will take the whole of eternity for man to
understand the plan of redemption.” Manuscript 21, 1895 in White, “Ellen White Comments,” 1970,
481. The incarnation and Christ’s atoning sacrifice “will be the employment of the powers of the
redeemed through the ceaseless ages of eternity.” Idem, Selected Messages, vol. 3 (Washington D.C.:
Review and Herald, 1958), 187.
The nature of Christ’s humanity is a long standing unresolved debate within Adventism. Is
Christ like Adam before the fall (unfallen nature) or after the fall (fallen nature)? Traditionally the
accent has been on the later position. Recent representative positions either follow the older view or
attempt to affirm a mediating position between the two. See, Seventh-Day Adventists Believe: An
Exposition of the Fundamental Beliefs of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 53–60; Raoul Dederen,
“Christ: His Person and Work,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen,
vol. 12, SDA Bible Commentary (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 164,165; Woodrow
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the power of sin, the flesh, the world and Satan.635 Jesus answers all of Satan’s accusations
against God and vindicates God’s character, law and government.636 He reveals the depths of
God’s love to all intelligent beings and secures beyond any possibility of doubt the allegiance
of unfallen worlds.637 Jesus offers himself as substitutionary atoning sacrifice for the sin of
the world, conquers death by resurrection, and achieves salvation for humanity.638 As our
representative, Christ recapitulates Adam and humanity’s journey but this time he reverses
the outcome. He also reveals a journey that is the polar opposite to Satan. Christ did not grasp
onto divine power and privilege but gave his life for the salvation of his enemies, while Satan
grasped after God’s power in order to rise above and rule all others, and in the end even
attempted to kill God.639 The all-powerful God paradoxically wins the Great Controversy as a
weak, vulnerable human being in an act of death and apparent failure. God defeats the

W. Whidden, Ellen White on the Humanity of Christ (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1997); J.
R. Zurcher, Touched with Our Feelings: A Historical Survey of Adventist Thought on the Human
Nature of Christ (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1999).
“This should be the Christian's consolation. Christ, as man's representative, has overcome
the world, the flesh and the devil.” Ellen G. White, “Last Talk with the Disciples,” The Signs of the
Times, January 24, 1878.
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Manuscript 128, 1897 in White, “Ellen White Comments,” 1970, 7a:470. Christ came to
“vindicate every precept of the holy law” Idem, “Christ’s Attitude to the Law,” The Advent Review
and Sabbath Herald, November 15, 1898. Idem, Testimonies, 8: 207–208.
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“Through Christ's redeeming work … Satan's charges are refuted, and his character
unveiled. Rebellion can never again arise. Sin can never again enter the universe. Through eternal
ages all are secure from apostasy. By love's self-sacrifice, the inhabitants of earth and heaven are
bound to their Creator in bonds of indissoluble union.” White, Desire of Ages, 26.
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“When He offered Himself on the cross, a perfect atonement was made for the sins of the
people.” Ellen G. White, “The Only True Mediator,” The Signs of the Times, June 28, 1899. “Justice
demands that sin be not merely pardoned, but the death penalty must be executed. God, in the gift of
His only begotten Son, met both these requirements. By dying in man's stead, Christ exhausted the
penalty and provided a pardon.” Manuscript 50, 1900 in Idem, “Ellen White Comments,” 1970, 470.
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“The holy angels were horror-stricken that one who had been of their number could fall so
far as to be capable of such cruelty. Every sentiment of sympathy or pity which they had ever felt for
Satan in his exile, was quenched in their hearts ... [Christ’s death] was such a heinous crime … [it]
severed forever the last tie of sympathy existing between Satan and the heavenly world.” White,
Spiritual Gifts, 3:183–184.
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mystery of evil by the far more profound and category breaking ‘mystery of godliness.’
Christ’s victory is perfect and everything thereafter builds on it. However, it is restricted to
Christ alone. In regards to everyone else, it is an ‘in principle’ victory. It is Christ’s
achievement but not our possession. This necessitates further work (stages) to realise evil’s
defeat within the wider cosmos.

Atonement Stage Two
The second stage is Christ working out his victory in humanity by the Spirit’s work
within the ministry of the church through the preaching of the gospel of the kingdom.640
Every person’s mind and heart is a battleground641 and conversion marks the dramatic
transition from one kingdom to another.642
Personal conversion (justification and the new birth) marks the point at which the
defeat of evil is inaugurated in an individual’s life even though it is not completed. While in
this stage, the emphasis may seem to have shifted to the Spirit and the Church. In reality, this
earthly work takes place under and within the ongoing priestly intercessory work of the

This includes Christ’s ascension, enthronement as High Priest, Pentecostal giving of the
Spirit, ongoing intercession, the work of the Spirit in convicting, converting, transforming believers,
and empowering the church for mission. “The church is to conduct an aggressive warfare, to make
conquests for Christ, to rescue souls from the power of the enemy. God and holy angels are engaged
in this warfare.” Ellen G. White, “Young Men as Missionary Workers,” The Advent Review and
Sabbath Herald, July 17, 1883.
640

“He should see how this controversy enters into every phase of human experience; how in
every act of life he himself reveals the one or the other of the two antagonistic motives; and how,
whether he will or not, he is even now deciding upon which side of the controversy he will be found.”
White, Education, 190.
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In conversion “the power of Satan is broken. Man is brought into sacred unity with Christ”
Ellen G. White, Our High Calling (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1961), 89.
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heavenly Christ.643 This stage is entirely built on the first stage of incarnation, cross and
resurrection. In this second stage people are by faith incorporated into Christ and his first
stage accomplishments. His substitutionary death frees sinners and his representative victory
is recapitulated in the lives of believers. This is spiritual warfare understood as new battles in
the ongoing Great Controversy in which the outcome of the War has now been decided by
Christ’s victory. It is fought in the ministry of the church.644 Everyone who receives and
reflects Christ disproves again Satan’s accusations and vindicates the character and ways of
God.645

Atonement Stage Three
The third stage is Christ consummating his work in all creation.646 This is the final
cosmic universalising of Christ’s previous work. This is still built on the incarnation, cross,
resurrection and intercessory work of Christ. To this, Christ now adds the work of final

“As our Mediator, Christ works incessantly ... striving by His Spirit to win them from
Satan's service.” White, “Lessons from the Christ-Life.” “Christ as high priest … immortalized
Calvary ...” White, Selected Messages, 1958, 1:343.
643

“Sin has extinguished the love that God placed in man's heart. The work of the church is to
rekindle this love. The church is to cooperate with God by uprooting selfishness from the human
heart, placing in its stead the benevolence that was in man's heart in his original state of perfection.”
Letter 134, 1902 in Ellen G. White, Welfare Ministry (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1952),
14. This work includes preaching the gospel, teaching, healing, prayer, relieving suffering, worship
and holy living.
644

“To disprove Satan's claim is the work of Christ and of all who bear His name. It was to
give in His own life an illustration of unselfishness that Jesus came in the form of humanity. And all
who accept this principle are to be workers together with Him in demonstrating it in practical life.”
White, Education, 154.
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This includes the pre-Advent judgment, the sealing of the saints, the close of probation, the
Second Advent, translation of the living, resurrection of the dead, glorification of the saints, the
Millennial Judgment, the final extermination of death, sin, sinners, the recreation of the physical
world and God coming to dwell permanently on earth.
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judgment and elimination of sin.647 This judgment work is very extensive and operates in
further stages. These are: 1) a pre-advent investigative judgment; 2) the Second Advent itself;
3) a post-advent judgment (millennial Judgment); and 4) a final execution of these judgments
in which sin, death, evil, sinners, fallen angels, and Satan himself are permanently
annihilated. The final judgment process works in a logical manner. The pre-Advent judgment
concerns the relationship of all professed followers of God. During this heavenly work Christ
completes the spread of the gospel on earth. This splits humanity into two camps who harden
in loyalty or opposition. Probation then closes for humanity. Christ returns to reward,
resurrect, and glorify his saints. This is then followed by the post-advent or millennial
judgment. This judgment concerns the wicked. While open to angels and unfallen worlds, it
is conducted by Christ and the saints. All of the history of sin, from its entrance to Christ’s
return, is examined. All questions are explored and answered.648
This final judgment process is crucial to the Great Controversy theodicy. Other
theological worldviews view judgment as primarily about human salvation or rewards and
punishment. For the Great Controversy, the judgment is essential to completely finalise
Christ’s victory and vindicate God. Throughout history, God’s dealings with humanity have
been characterised by numerous judgments or ‘mini-covenant lawsuits.’ 649 That is, open
judicial proceedings in which the facts about God and creature can be seen and understood

“Ellen White is careful not to replace intercession with judgment. The eschatological phase
of work is added to the prior phase.” Wood, “‘All Must Appear’,” 644.
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Eric Claude Webster, “The Millennium,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology,
ed. Raoul Dederen, vol. 12, SDA Bible Commentary (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000),
934–936.
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The ubiquitous presence and importance of the covenant lawsuit is traced in Richard M.
Davidson, “The Divine Covenant Lawsuit Motif in Canonical Perspective,” Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 21 (2010): 45–84. See also the many examples given in William H. Shea,
“Biblical Parallels for the Investigative Judgment,” in Selected Studies On Prophetic Interpretation,
vol. 1, Daniel and Revelation Series (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald, 1982), 1–30.
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prior to the subsequent salvation or punishment. The final judgment process is the last and
final divine covenant lawsuit in history to finalise the Great Controversy. In a sense, all of
history has been a vast cosmic lawsuit and not simply a cosmic war. History is a politicallegal-ideological battle between God and Satan over the deepest issues of divine
administration. It cannot be settled by theoretical claim and counter-claim but only by the
practical demonstration and accumulation of evidence from both sides in history. Satan via
his accusations has put God on trial and God has put sinners and their rebellion on trial. Such
a cosmic controversy and lawsuit must finish with a judgment. This judgment exposes and
brings to light every issue and every actor within the contest.
As with all judgment, it is not for the purposes of informing God. Instead it is the
divine means of informing and healing creation. If the origin and continuation of sin and
suffering was due to the mystery and wilful mystification that sin and Satan presents to the
created mind (not to mention the enslavement to those who embrace it), then only by a
thorough and meticulous unveiling, exposing of sin and Satan in the light of a contrasting
revelation of God’s righteousness, can sin and evil cease to present any risk to created
intelligences. Nothing is hidden. The entire history of the Great Controversy is open to view.
Everything vindicates God. The centre-piece is the incarnation, suffering, atoning death and
resurrection of Jesus. God could not have done any more than he did. It is confirmed by
evidence and demonstration that indeed sin was unjustifiable. This comprehensive, vast,
open, collectively engaged judgment, overcomes (and heals) the limitations and vulnerability
of a finite creation in a way that engages and respects the psychological and social needs of
creation. Creatures need time (a thousand years is given) to think, discuss, explore and
process. After this the universe is now completely informed and secure in truth. Sin will

162

never arise again. The judgment reveals the true results of the atoning sacrificial suffering
work of Jesus.650
The Millennium651 also gives the final conclusive reconfirmation that God is just and
right. After being bound to a lifeless earth for a thousand years Satan and his angels are
briefly released to work among the recently resurrected wicked. Instead of repentance Satan
immediately tries to organise the wicked into another rebellion. The wicked willingly cooperate.
At this time, God displays before all the wicked (human and angel) a panorama which
displays the main events in the Great Controversy including the fall of Satan and the selfless
suffering and sacrifice of Christ. Along with this, each individual in their own minds recalls
all the opportunities God gave them and how God tried to win them to the right. Satan views
all this vast history. The truth is so powerful that he can no longer deny it. He finally and
freely confesses the righteousness of God and the justness of his impending destruction.652
The wicked also confess with him. “With all the facts of the great controversy in view, the
whole universe, both loyal and rebellious, with one accord declare: "Just and true are Thy
ways, Thou King of saints."”653 This is very important. The problem of evil is universally
acknowledged to be resolved – by all parties! It is not by philosophy or theory or argument

“The angels ascribe honor and glory to Christ, for even they are not secure except by
looking to the sufferings of the Son of God. It is through the efficacy of the cross that the angels of
heaven are guarded from apostasy. Without the cross they would be no more secure against evil than
were the angels before the fall of Satan. Angelic perfection failed in heaven. Human perfection failed
in Eden, the paradise of bliss …The plan of salvation, making manifest the justice and love of God,
provides an eternal safeguard against defection in unfallen worlds, as well as among those who shall
be redeemed by the blood of the Lamb.” Ellen G. White, “What Was Secured by the Death of Christ,”
The Signs of the Times, December 30, 1889.
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For an overview of the Adventist view of the Millennium see Webster, “The Millennium.”
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White, The Great Controversy, 670.
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Ibid., 670–671.
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but by demonstration and history. This free confession of God’s goodness by creation, both
righteous and unrighteous, is based on the incontrovertible evidence. God has not resolved
the problem of evil by power or force. God has so conducted himself that he has enabled the
universe to freely come to the truth. 654 Amazingly, not long after this confession Satan
regathers himself and attempts one last frenzied attack on God.655 The wicked, however, turn
on him in hatred.656 This is the final and now redundant evidence God is in the right. Sin is
incurable. There is nothing God can do to help Satan or the wicked. The only remaining
option of eternal destruction is now seen to be just and even merciful. God then eliminates
sin, sinners, evil and suffering forever. Only one reminder of sin is left - the scars on Jesus - a
testament to God’s suffering, sacrificing, unselfish love.657 God is love.

Summary and Conclusion
This study is now in a position to summarise the way the Great Controversy processes
the emergence of evil as a problem by a progression through three stages and its resolution by
a threefold atoning process.

“Truth is omnipotent, but it does not work in the human agent in opposition to the human
will. Here is the turning point of freedom and responsibility.” Ellen G. White, “The Abiding Trust,”
The Gospel Herald, May 14, 1902.
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White, The Great Controversy, 671.

Satan “endeavours to inspire them [the wicked] with his own fury and arouse them to
instant battle. But … [none] acknowledge his supremacy. His power is at an end. The wicked are
filled with the same hatred of God that inspires Satan; but they see that their case is hopeless … their
rage is kindled against Satan” Ibid.
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The universe is not kept safe by the threat of an eternal hell. White, 674. Instead, the
permanent humanity of Jesus and his scars function as an eternal assurance to the once fallen human
race. See Ellen G. White, “The Treasure of Truth Rejected,” The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald,
April 3, 1894.
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The Mystery of Evil
The Great Controversy theodicy operates from the metaphysically necessary and
priori presupposition that evil is an inherently inexplicable mystery. God alone can truly
know and understand what evil or sin is. It is the unthinkable, irrational act of a finite
contingent free creature refusing to trust its own creator by instead turning inward towards
itself. It is selfishness in a cosmos designed for love. It is contingent creation seeking to
become morally autonomous and independent of its Creator. Evil is inexplicable, yet it arose.
Evil confounds human reason yet, precisely by separating from divine wisdom and Law, it is
also self-seducing and self-justifying. This first step involves the hard to understand and
irrational but deliberate act of self-deception and self-seduction by Satan which becomes the
launching pad for the deception and seduction of others.

The Mystification of Evil
Following on from this is the intentional mystification of evil by its first advocate
Lucifer/Satan. By giving himself over to self-seduction and wilful self-deception, Satan
mystifies the mystery of evil by presenting it as a ‘rational’ action, a superior philosophy, and
a necessary political alternative. Sin is presented as freedom. Its enslaving nature is denied.
Divine law and rule is presented as evil. This ‘freedom’ from God is acclaimed as a good that
is arbitrarily repressed. Satan obfuscates and denies the irrationality of the first level of evil.
He invents a concocted pretence of rational justification. Disturbingly, owing to the mystery
of evil it cannot be initially seen for what it is. These first two levels together make for the
doubly confounding nature of evil. First, evil’s origins are a confounding mystery. Second,
the resulting justification of evil by Satan’s deceptive arguments mystifies and further
confounds the truth. So an artificial level of ideological deception is overlaid on an
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intrinsically ontological mystery. This renders evil doubly difficult to adequately counter
simply by argument and reason.

The Multiplication of Evil
The first two stages develop into the third stage of the multiplication of evil. Evil
metastasises throughout creation. Evil can be multiplied and become a movement because it
has been mystified and presented as a form of liberation. As it multiplies it spreads to other
minds and becomes a movement. This spread gives the appearance of truth. In convincing
others, it ceases to appear to be the idiosyncratic idea of an individual. Those within it
become committed to it and enslaved to it.658 This moral evil brings creation under the curse
of death and decay and produces natural evil. The loss of human dominion to Satan means he
has direct access to the earthly physical realm.
The first level of evil is the inexplicable birth of sin. The second level of evil is its
articulation as an ideology and spread as a virus of the heart and mind. Without this second
level, sin never leaves the mind of the first apostate and cosmic war never develops. Here sin
is conceptually weaponised as deception. It becomes an ideology capable of spread. The third
level of evil is evil’s enmeshment as a constitutive element of the spiritual, mental,
psychological, social, political and even physical dimensions of reality. Moral evil becomes
natural evil and socially structural evil. All levels of earthly creation are thrown into conflict
with each other as well as with God. The first stage is the origin of Sin. The second stage is
the origin of the Great Controversy. The third stage is the origin of Cosmic War in a painfilled fallen creation. Sin and controversy ground warfare.
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These three levels are replicated and recapitulated in each sinner. We all choose to
unjustifiably sin. We all mystify and obfuscate our sin. We all spread sin and evil.
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The Story of Evil is the Story of Satan
In the Great Controversy theodicy, these stages are not theory. They are played out in
the personal experience and history of Satan. First, with the Mystery of Evil, Satan wilfully
deceives himself. Evil emerges existentially, concretely, personally, and practically in Satan
as he turns toward himself. Evil becomes larger than Satan alone but it cannot be understood
apart from him and it is forever linked to him. The architect of evil and evil co-arise in the
same event. Second, in the Mystification of Evil, Satan develops an intellectual ideology of
lawlessness largely through accusation and lies by which he justifies himself. This ideology
of transferable intellectual ideas enables his experience to spread and obscures what is really
happening. Over time this original ideology mutates into numerous conflicting variations as
seen in the almost endless philosophies and religions in the world. Third, there is the
Multiplication of Evil. By means of the mystification of sin, Satan is able to head a public,
cosmic, social, political movement amid both angelic and human community. Humans are
both willing co-participants and entrapped victims. He wields profound power and influence
over them but the multiplication of human evil is also self-chosen and self-perpetuating.

Atonement as the Reversal of Evil
Undoing Satan’s power involves rescuing sinners from the state of enslavement,
exposing Satan’s mystification of evil, and unveiling the inexplicable and unjustifiable nature
of evil itself. This requires a comprehensive atoning work which completely restores every
dimension of creation. All of this must be done without compromising God’s character, law
or creations free will structure, even though it was the location of evils emergence. God’s
atoning work undoes all three levels of evil. God counters and overcomes the mystery of evil
by a greater mystery of godliness. God does the inexplicable in giving himself for his
enemies at the cost of infinite suffering to himself. God counters Satan’s mystification of evil
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by giving a perfect revelation of himself in Christ. By means of his extensive atoning work
Christ rescues creation from the spread and enslavement of evil. The final judgment
completes the resolution of the Great Controversy, ends the cosmic war, eliminates sin and
sinners, and restores creation. A metanarrative of divine love resolves the problem of evil to
the universal admission of all creation.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BOYD’S TWT AND THE GREAT
CONTROVERSY THEODICY

It is now possible to examine the Great Controversy Theodicy in the light of Boyd’s
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy in order to more fully understand how the Great Controversy
works as a theodicy. This involves an internal comparison between related warfare theodicies
before an external comparison between them and the wider field of theodicy is made in
chapter five. An internal comparison between similar theories offers a closer analysis than is
possible when looking at unrelated theories. This study’s interest is in wrestling with issues
of inner coherence before engaging in an external evaluation. There is also the desire to
identify areas of weakness. This is not a general comparison, rather a focus on the specific
way cosmic warfare theodicies respond to the problem of evil. Our interest is in the inner
logic of cosmic warfare views. This will be shown to revolve around how both theodicies
deal with the question of risk.

Extending the Free Will Defence
The earlier examination in the first three chapters highlights that warfare theodicies
work by building on the basic free will defence and furthering it by the idea of cosmic war.
This furthering is to ameliorate the free will defence weaknesses by constructing an extended
free will theodicy that can deal with these limitations or criticisms. This extending of the free
will defence is to help it answer questions like Mark Scott’s five essential questions for a
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theodicy. 659 Warfare theodicies use the free will defence to explain Scott’s first question
about the origin of evil but go beyond it. Evil is not simply a generic metaphysical risk.
Cosmic warfare theodicies go further and name the specific originator of evil as
Lucifer/Satan and that recognising this is crucial for a proper understanding. The cosmic
figure of Lucifer is essential for a more expansive explanatory theodicy.660 Scott’s second
question concerns the nature or ontology of evil. Free will as a defence to the logical problem
of evil often ignores this question. Use is often made of the theory of privation to discuss
evil’s ontology. Evil is not a thing but a privation of the good: God only makes good. Cosmic
warfare theodicies accept this but want to emphasise other aspects of evil’s ontology, i.e. the
Great Controversy idea of ‘mystery of evil’. The third question about the kind of problem evil
poses cannot ignore the modern shift from logical to evidential problems of evil. The free will
defence is most successful against the deductive logical form. This success led antitheists to
formulate the evidential version. The free will defence struggles with the evidential version,
which accepts the fact that free will is a logical possibility, but asks instead what actual
reasons God could have for allowing the actual degree and amount of evil in the world, not
simply its possibility. The cosmic warfare theodicies acknowledge the problem the evidential
argument poses to the free will defence and is, at least in the case of Boyd, an attempt to offer
an extended free will theodicy commensurate to the evidential problem of evil. The cosmic
warfare theodicy response to the fourth question is linked to the third. Because the problem of
evil is the evidential argument, the reason for evil must be more than free will, even though it
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See the Introduction. The five questions concerning the 1) origin of evil; 2) the ontological
nature of evil; 3) the kind of problem evil poses; 4) the divine reason for evil; 5) the end of evil. Scott,
Pathways in Theodicy, 64.
Satan’s status as a cosmic and primordial figure gives his abuse of freedom cosmic and
primordial explanatory power. Satan also helps the cosmic warfare theodicy address the issue of
natural evil, long considered a major limitation of the free will defence.
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retains freedom as central. The cosmic warfare theodicy, in contrast to the minimising-ofevil-tendency within greater good theodicy, does not hold back. It recasts the problem of evil,
not as the abuse of free will which supposedly contributes to a greater good, but as the
emergence of a vast cosmic war. It accepts the factual premise of the evidential argument that
gratuitous evil is real. While theodicies often resist admitting to the ostensive gratuity and
pointlessness of so much evil, the cosmic warfare theodicy embraces it as exactly what would
be expected if cosmic war is actually what sin unleashes. The reasons given for God’s
permission are similar to the free will defence but they have been recast within a cosmic
framework. God had cosmic goals. Rejection of them leads to cosmic consequences. Finally,
the fifth question about the ‘end of evil’ is unclear in the free will defence. In the cosmic
warfare view it can be identified and named as the ability to win a cosmic war. The precise
details of the exact nature of the war and how it is ended differ but there is agreement on the
fact that war is what is happening and it must be dealt with.

The Role of ‘Risk’
Examining Scott’s five questions for theodicies reveals that the majority of the
questions (i.e., the first four) deal with framing and defining how evil’s permission and
emergence is understood. The other major issue is then how evil is eliminated and dealt with
(question five). Basically, this concerns evil’s conception and its committal, its beginning and
its end. Both possibility and elimination of evil can be helpfully, although not exclusively,
understood as the need to account for, and deal with ‘risk.’661 The centrality of the idea of
risk, the benefits it produces, the tensions it introduces, and the need to deal with these, all

“God is a risk-taker if he endows his creatures with libertarian freedom; otherwise not.”
William Hasker, “Does God Take Risks in Governing the World? God Takes Risks,” in
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L Peterson and Raymond J.
Vanarragon (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 219, see also Paul Helm, ibid., 229.
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profoundly shape cosmic warfare theodicies. The idea of risk is the very thing that enables a
these theodicies to initially deal with the problem of evil. God took a risk evil would
eventuate – and it did. Risk also places pressure on a cosmic warfare theodicy to deal with the
gravity of that risk. Why would God risk so much? Is it worth it? Can God contain the risk?
Free will can get a theodicy off the ground but it cannot land it.
This is most clearly seen when the questions Boyd’s six theses are designed to wrestle
with are examined. Boyd’s questions augment Scott’s third question on exactly how evil is a
problem to a free will based warfare theodicy, and his fifth question on how risk and evil are
overcome. The first two of Boyd’s theses, TWT 1 (love must be freely chosen) and TWT 2
(freedom implies risk), set up the free will defence by spelling out its key implication as risk.
The rest of the theses (TWT 3-6) are about detailing and dealing with the risk inherent in
contingent creaturely love. The main problems Boyd counters can be grouped together under
five questions, four of which are specifically aimed at the issue of risk. Behind all of these
questions is the foundational deeper question: Can we trust a risk-taking God, particularly his
wisdom, character and ability?662 In Boyd’s work, this macro-question is explored and given
definition in the following five questions.
The first set of questions can be described as the “win it” or “victory” questions. God
has undertaken a creation project with the risk of cosmic war, can he win the war if it
eventuates?663 Can God guarantee that he will finally win against evil? Will his victory be
permanent and eternal or will risk still be an ongoing part of the future? Will evil potentially
arise again after victory?664 In Boyd’s case these questions are intensified due to his Open
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Boyd, Satan, 158.

Boyd speaks of the need to “address the issue of how God can guarantee to win a war if he
can never be ensured of winning each or any particular battle?” Ibid., 145, 146. See also p 155.
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Ibid., 179, 191.
172

Theism. If God does not know the actual future, except as probabilities, how can he (and we!)
know that he will win? How can we know that he will achieve his aims to a degree that is
sufficient to justify the risk he has undertaken in creation?
Closely related is the second set of questions to do with “value” or the “is it worth it”
questions. Is the risk worth it? Is free will worth it? Is it worth all the pain and suffering? The
question is asked if God has miscalculated and wagered too much on love and freedom. 665
There is the third issue of “how long” or the “duration” question. Why must the risk
go for so long? How long is too long? This questions the wisdom of allowing a risk with
extreme duration.666
The fourth question is the “why others” or “influence” question. Why has God
allowed persons to have the power over other persons?667 Why is the risk not individual?
Why does someone’s wrong behaviour affect another? Why is one agent’s existence at the
mercy of another agent’s choice?
The fifth major question is not directly about risk but about how God currently deals
with evil. This is the issue of God’s intervention and its apparent arbitrariness. This is the
‘arbitrariness’ or “why help some and not others” question?668 God appears inconsistent.
Since God has power, why does he not use it more often and more consistently?
All of these issues stem from limitations or questions about the free will defence.
Allowing that the free will does appear to show there is no necessary contradiction between
the existence of God and evil, the questions have shifted to more evidential problem of evil-
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styled objections about the scale of the risk in the magnitude of suffering and evil. For both
Boyd’s warfare theodicy and the Great Controversy theodicy to be successful they must
establish their ability to deal with risk orientated objections to the free will defence. Dealing
with risk is therefore at the heart of understanding each cosmic warfare theodicy.669 Here their
distinctive defining arguments are displayed and here can be seen their points of weakness
and tension. By now it is apparent that while freedom and its risk is central to the cosmic
warfare task, the risk is not simple or singular. It involves a number of different elements.
The questions about risk concern three elements; its emergence, its continuance, and its
elimination (see Table 6). Each element has a different set of questions associated with it.
The discussion of risk around these three elements is diagrammed below. The questions are
particularly brought out by the evidential problem of evil. These elements will guide the
discussion. How do cosmic warfare theodicies deal with all three of the elements of risk? The
answer to this will reveal the heart of how the two theodicies work as a specific category and
reveal the different and distinctive approaches of each. It will also reveal weakness and areas
of problem. This will provide the basis for the final comparison in the next chapter of the
Great Controversy theodicy with the wider field of theodicies.
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For a discussion of risk and no risk versions of providence see Terence Tiessen,
Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the World?
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Table 6: Elements in the Problem of Risk-Associated Freedom
Emergence of Risk
(Origin/Permitting of Evil)

Continuance of Risk
(On-going Allowance of Evil)

Elimination of Risk
(Abolition of Evil)

Questions in the Elements of Risk

Why did God permit/allow evil?
Was evil a possibility or
necessity? (What probability?)

Is the value of the risk worth the
cost (scale of suffering and evil)?
Why does evil affect others
(esp. the innocent)?

Why did evil arise?
Why does evil continue so long?

How and when will evil end?
How is it that the redeemed will
no longer be able to sin?
How can we be sure that evil will
not arise again?

How could evil arise from good?
How could evil spread?

Why are Divine interventions so
arbitrary (or absent)?

A Sub-thesis: Cosmic Warfare with or without Cosmic Controversy
In exploring these elements of risk the central thesis for this chapter and thus an
important sub-thesis of this study will now become clear. War and conflict forms a crucially
important role in cosmic warfare theodicies but the exact nature of the conflict and how it is
conceptualised have profound implications for the entire theodicy. In broad terms cosmic
warfare theodicies tell us that an exalted being, Lucifer/Satan, through an abuse of freedom is
at war with God and has drawn angels, humanity, and in some respects nature itself, into this
rebellion. Both Boyd’s TWT and Seventh-day Adventism’s Great Controversy theodicy see
the necessity of invoking cosmic war by a cosmic being, not simply free will, to answer the
evidential argument from evil. Evil, pain and suffering exist because this life is a cosmic
warzone. Freedom abused escalates to war and stopping short of this by only detailing an
abuse of human free will is incomplete. There is a great deal of overlap in how the two
warfare models describe cosmic war but key differences emerge between the two when a
comparison is made of how this war is understood or what the nature of the conflict is.
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The first difference is in the preferred mode of analysis and explanation: Boyd’s
theodicy relies on a particular metaphysics of love while the Great Controversy theodicy
relies on a specific metanarrative of love. The second difference arises out of the first.
Boyd’s theodicy, based in a metaphysics of love, centres on the ability of the metaphysics of
love and freedom to account for cosmic war. Whereas, Adventism’s Great Controversy
theodicy, based in a metanarrative of love, works on the ability of a politicised cosmic moral
controversy involving love, law and freedom to account for cosmic war.
This second difference is between a ‘bifocal’ (love and freedom) and a ‘trifocal’
(love, freedom and law) framing of the cosmic war. The third difference naturally flows from
this and concerns the levels or layers of explanation that arise from the different modes of
analysis/explanation. Boyd’s metaphysical approach gives rise to a free will defence within a
cosmic warfare theodicy. This generates two distinct explanatory levels. The Great
Controversy metanarrative approach yields a free will defence within a cosmic warfare
theodicy which is itself within a broader cosmic controversy theodicy.670 This generates three
levels of explanation. The presence or absence of a defining role for controversy over divine
law accounts for the difference between Boyd’s bifocal theodicy and the Great Controversy
trifocal theodicy. This difference in levels of explanation can be pictured thus:

Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy
FWD

TWT

Adventism’s Great Controversy Theodicy
FWD

CWT

670

GCT

Our later conclusion will modify and sharpen the exact relationship between free will,
cosmic warfare and Great Controversy.
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The Great Controversy incorporates within itself both free will and cosmic warfare.
This means it has three layers to its explanation. Boyd’s theodicy only has two layers. The
free will defence by itself is a singular layer of explanation. Certain implications would seem
to follow. Having fewer levels within a theodicy places a greater the burden to explain
challenges using only those levels. However, having a greater number of levels, and
especially if the levels are of differing but complementary kinds (i.e. metaphysical vs
metanarrative), would theoretically mean a richer explanatory potential. It should be noted
that it is not simply a matter of adding justificatory patterns as explanations but of adding
explanatory levels.671 Of course each level must be logically and coherently interrelated, as
merely adding levels carries the risk of increasing the potential for contradiction between
levels. But if additional levels are integrated and correspond to each other, then a deeper level
of response (and potentially resolution) to the problem of evil and more explanatory power is
possible. This does not adjudicate which warfare theodicy is optimal but it does encourage us
to see if the Great Controversy theodicy might possess additional options of response in some
areas. That remains to be demonstrated or discounted. At this point it will help to summarise
the difference between the two theodicies as a critical sub-thesis. The crucial difference in
theodicies is that Boyd’s theodicy is a cosmic warfare without a controversy while the Great
Controversy theodicy is a cosmic warfare based in a specific controversy. How significant
this sub-thesis is and to what degree it effects how the question of risk is dealt with will
occupy much of this chapter. This will prepare for the final chapter in which it is detailed
how the Great Controversy resolves the problem of evil amid the wider context of other
theodicies.

671

For example, we could add the natural law pattern to the free will pattern to enhance its
explanatory power. However, if we placed natural law and free will within a process context or a
cosmic war context we would be changing the levels of explanation, not merely adding a justificatory
pattern.
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Metaphysics versus Metanarrative
The first key difference concerns the preferred mode of analysis and explanation.
Both cosmic warfare positions contain metaphysics and have a metanarrative (Boyd’s
metanarrative does not have the idea of cosmic controversy) but they predominantly rely on
one or the other of these in order to construct their theodicy. Boyd mines his worldview in
order to give explicit and detailed metaphysical answers. The narrative element plays a lesser
subsidiary role in his theodicy.672 It is at the level of metaphysics that the theodicy is dealt
with. In contrast, the metaphysics of the Great Controversy are latent, implicit, and often
undeveloped. Its metanarrative is richly developed and drawn upon in order to deal with the
problem of evil, often bypassing or replacing metaphysical explanations with alternative or
complementary narrative ones. Metaphysics at times plays a preliminary and preparatory role
for the real level of explanation which is the narrative.673
Boyd’s theodicy arises out of his bifocal analysis of the metaphysics of libertarian
freedom and contingent love. This is most clearly in his six theses. He then applies these
theses to the biblical claims about Satan. Satan serves as the exemplar or paradigm of the risk
of contingent freedom giving rise to sin and cosmic warfare.674 In the Great Controversy a
metanarrative detailing the trifocal abuse of freedom, controverting of divine love, and
rejection of divine law, forms the matrix out of which arises its theodicy. Satan abuses
This is highlighted by Pyne and Piske’s telling criticism. “Readers who choose this book
by title may be disappointed by Boyd’s limited discussion of Satan.” Robert A. Pyne and David Piske,
review of Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, by Gregory
A. Boyd, Bibliotheca Sacra 161, no. January-March (2004): 113. Satan is more a paradigm exemplar
than a narrative character.
672
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Cosmic warfare theodicies may benefit from each other, see Richard M. Davidson,
“Cosmic Metanarrative for the Coming Millennium,” JETS 11 (2000): 102–19) for Adventist
openness to Boyd’s work.
674

See again especially the summary in Boyd, Satan, 205.
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freedom, controverts and rejects divine law and love, offers an aggressive alternative, and
initiates cosmic warfare and controversy. While Boyd’s metaphysics are primarily concerned
with the mechanics of creaturely freedom/love, the Great Controversy as a theodicy combines
that concern for creaturely freedom/love with an emphasis on a public contesting of divine
love and law (also interchangeably understood as divine character and government).
Accordingly, Boyd’s metaphysics of freedom and love account for the possibilities of cosmic
war while the Great Controversy’s metanarrative of freedom, love and law account for
cosmic war and cosmic controversy. In Boyd’s theodicy, freedom and love alone account for
war. In the Great Controversy theodicy, freedom, love and law together account for the
controversy.675 The presence or absence of a central role for law is a distinguishing feature. In
order to aid this discussion, a comparative summary of the two cosmic warfare responses to
risk will be shown in the following two diagrams. Table 7 outlines how Boyd’s Trinitarian
Warfare theodicy deals with risk.

This illustrates the ‘levels of explanatory layers’ argument made earlier. Boyd is focused
on the contingency of creaturely love, whereas, the Great Controversy theodicy assumes this (one
layer) and takes that same contingency as controverting the propriety of divine love/law (extra layer).
675
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Table 7: Boyd’s TWT Resolution of Risk and the Problem of Evil676

Elements in the Problem of Risk-Associated Freedom

Emergence of Risk
(Origin/Permitting of Evil)

Continuance of Risk
(On-going Allowance of Evil)

Elimination of Risk
(Abolition of Evil)

Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy uses a “Metaphysics of Love” to deal with these Risk Elements
(key features outlined below)

TWT 3 Risk entails moral
responsibility
TWT 1 Love entails freedom
TWT 2 Freedom entails risk

TWT 4 Moral responsibility is
proportionate to the power to
influence

TWT 6 Power to influence is finite

TWT 5 The power to influence is
irrevocable

Cosmic War Begins

Cosmic War is Contested

Free Will Defence

Spiritual Warfare / Atonement via Christus Victor

Libertarian freedom

Compatibilist freedom

(Covenant of
non-coercion)

(Divine Intervention
permissible on spent freedom)

Boyd’s six theses roughly correspond to the three areas of risk (emergence,
continuance, elimination). A libertarian free will defence explains evils emergence but
recourse is then made to compatibilist freedom to account for evils elimination.
Below is Table 8 which summarises how Seventh-day Adventism’s Great
Controversy theodicy deals with risk.

676

For specific details of Boyd’s view outlined in this diagram see chapter 2.
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Table 8: The Great Controversy Theodicy Resolution of Risk and the Problem of Evil677

Elements in the Problem of Risk-Associated Freedom

Emergence of Risk
(Origin/Permitting of Evil)

Continuance of Risk
(On-going Allowance of Evil)

Elimination of Risk
(Abolition of Evil)

The Great Controversy Theodicy uses a “Metanarrative of Love” to deal with these Risk Elements
(key features outlined below)

The
Mystery
Of Evil

The
Mystification
of Evil

The
Multiplication
of Evil

The
Mystery, Mystification,
& Multiplication of Evil
are Ended & Exposed
via the Great Controversy
(esp. Mystery of Godliness)

Satan Begins Cosmic War

Cosmic War is Contested and Won by Christ

Free Will Defence PLUS
Great Controversy/Cosmic
Politics

Cosmic War PLUS Great Controversy/Cosmic Politics,
and an Atonement Process (incl. multiple-atonement models)

Consistent singular form of libertarian freedom*
(*Note this study argues that the standard Great Controversy Theodicy requires its understanding of
libertarian freedom to be modified to Soft or Virtue Libertarianism)678

While chapters 2 and 3 of our study were largely analytical and descriptive, this
chapter is critical and evaluative. This study so far has largely been summative: in order for
cosmic warfare theodicies to work, they must simultaneously balance the need for risk-

For specific details of Adventism’s Great Controversy Theodicy outlined in this diagram
see chapter 3
677

678

This addition/refinement of freedom is discussed later in the chapter.
181

associated-freedom in order to account for evil, with the requirement to manage and
eventually eliminate the risks associated with freedom (either by a metaphysics of love or a
metanarrative of love). This study now moves to a critical evaluation of how this risk
balancing act puts tension on cosmic warfare explanations. In each of the three stages
(emergence, continuation, elimination) evil’s riskiness threatens to escalate into a recalcitrant
and uncontainable element. Most of this is traceable to particular concepts of freedom.

Problems with Risk and Libertarian Freedom
The free will defence assumes a libertarian understanding of free will. Both Boyd and
the Great Controversy assume standard libertarian understandings of freedom. While this
understanding may be adequate for a defence against the logical problem of evil, is it
adequate for the needs of a theodicy in which the explanatory demands are higher? We will
look at critiques of Boyd’s work that suggest it is not. This then has implications for the Great
Controversy view for two reasons. First, the Great Controversy theodicy shares structural
similarities to Boyd’s theodicy on this very issue. Second, at this metaphysical level the Great
Controversy theodicy reveals its underdevelopment and a lack of philosophical reflection.
Thus, as will be shown, at this most foundational level both cosmic warfare theodicies face
issues of adequacy and coherence unless their account of freedom is clarified.
Libertarian freedom stands in contrast to compatibilist freedom. Compatibilist
freedom is so-called because it affirms the compatibility of human freedom and divine
determinism. In compatibilism, all that is required for freedom is that someone does
something voluntarily (unforced); that is, they do what they want or desire to do.679 What they
want or desire, however, is not determined by them but by other secondary factors or causes.

“Freedom of inclination” according to Bruce A. Ware, God’s Greater Glory (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway Books, 2004), 80.
679
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God may therefore determine certain outcomes by the use of or control of secondary causes.
In this understanding, it is the person who performs the actual action, not God, even though,
given the chain of causation or providential circumstances, they could not do otherwise. In
contrast libertarian freedom, is usually understood as possessing either one or both of the
following characteristics. First, agents possess the power of self-determination as opposed to
determination by external or secondary factors (be it natural processes, divine control or
otherwise). External factors may influence but not determine. This means the ultimate and
final explanation for the choice is with the agent.680 The second characteristic is the ‘power to
do otherwise’ also known as the power of contrary choice or alternative possibilities. When
facing alternative possibilities a person who choses A rather than B, could, nevertheless,
under the same causes and circumstances, have chosen B if they so willed.681 Plantinga’s free
will defence affirms both elements but emphasises the second element, ‘the power to do
otherwise.’ When confronted by a moral situation in which one course of action is right and
the other is wrong, the person can choose either. He terms this morally significant freedom.682
In Plantinga’s account it is the power to have done morally otherwise which gives freedom its
particular moral significance and distinguishes these choices from free choices which have no

Also called the “sourcehood approach”, that is, the agent is the source of their own actions
not some other cause or agent, Kevin Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology (London:
Bloomsbury, 2013), 8. See also Kevin Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and It’s Alternatives (London:
Bloomsbury, 2012).
680

Also called the “alternative possibilities approach.” Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical
Theology, 8.
681

682

Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 166. Idem, God, Freedom and Evil, 29,30.
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moral significance.683 Of these two definitions for libertarian freedom the second one (‘power
to do otherwise’) is the dominant one.684
Advocates of a Great Controversy theodicy affirm either one or both understandings
of libertarian freedom. Asscherick opts for the definition of ‘self-determination.’ 685 John
Peckham speaks of the ‘power to do otherwise.’686 Unhelpfully, many other Great
Controversy advocates often fail to define freedom any further than simple expressions such
as ‘free choice’ or ‘free moral agency.’687 It is assumed that such terms will be understood by
all and there is little discussion or awareness of the range of options. Context and wider
theological commitments indicate that the freedom is, nevertheless, libertarian and not
compatibilist. Gregory Boyd also accepts the two commonly expressed understandings of
libertarian freedom. Boyd states that “we must possess the power to do otherwise” and “we
must be able to determine ourselves” in relation to God and morally responsible actions.688
Having established that the two cosmic warfare theodicies use standard concepts of
libertarian freedom there is need to ask the question ‘what then is the issue’? What is the
problem? The problem lies in a tension that exists between the two components that make up

683

For example, a trivial non-moral alternative possibility would be whether to eat with chop
sticks or with knives and forks.
684

Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology, 8.

685

David Asscherick, God in Pain: Another Look at Evil, Suffering and the Cross (Berrien
Springs, MI: Pan De Vida Productions, 2009), 144. By “by freedom we here mean the power of selfdetermination … the self is the ultimate cause of its own choices.”
686

John C Peckham, The Love of God: A Canonical Model (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 2015), 112-114.
See Aecio E. Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist
Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen, vol. 12, SDA Bible Commentary 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and
Herald, 2000), 208,209; John M. Fowler, “Sin,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology,
232,242.
687
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Boyd, Satan, 56,57.
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libertarian freedom. Simply put, if freedom is the ‘power to do otherwise’ then the possibility
of evil seems to be an eternal possibility.689 After all, if creatures are only free if they have the
power to do otherwise, then they must eternally possess this power to potentially do evil,
otherwise they would not be ‘free.’ This would mean that God’s creation is always at risk and
there is an eternal question mark over God’s solution to the problem of evil. The potential for
another cosmic war would seem to be open-ended and thus God’s victory is always
provisional. Both Boyd and the Great Controversy are aware of this and seek to assure that
sin will not arise again.690 The Great Controversy is aware of the need for sin not to arise
again but seems largely unconscious of the logical tension between the differing conceptions
of libertarian freedom. This reveals its lack of philosophical awareness and precision. Boyd is
aware but his answer appears confused and confusing. This suggests that an uncritical use of
the free will defence by warfare theodicies may conceal a major theory-threatening
contradiction. The free will defence, as normally understood, poses problems for cosmic
warfare theodicies, unless it can be redefined adequately.

Issues in Boyd’s Discussion of Freedom
What is confusing in Boyd’s discussion is that he begins his six theses with libertarian
freedom but ends them with the opposite compatibilist understanding. An overstated but
helpful way of saying this is that Boyd begins an Arminian but ends a Calvinist. In his first

John S. Feinberg, “God Limits His Power (Bruce Reichenbach): John Feinberg’s
Response,” in Predestination and Free Will, ed. Basinger, David and Randall Basinger (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 125. Add Open Theism and the problem is compounded, see,
Bruce A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory (Leicester: Apollos, 2000), 159.
689

“TWT 6 also provides a plausible explanation of how it is that the possibility of love
entails risk without holding that heaven will be eternally risky.” Boyd, Satan, 191. “Never will evil
again be manifest ... A tested and proved creation will never again be turned from allegiance to Him
whose character has been fully manifested before them as fathomless love and infinite wisdom.”
White, The Great Controversy, 504.
690
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two theses he uses libertarian freedom (‘power to do otherwise’ and ‘power of selfdetermination’) to show why evil is an unavoidable risk if God chooses to create truly free
creatures capable of love (classic free will defence). As freedom is needed for love, so God
makes a covenant of non-coercion with creation. This means evil cannot be unilaterally
eliminated without eliminating the existence of free creatures. How then to tame the risk of
evil? This is the importance of Boyd’s final thesis which closes down the danger of risk by
arguing that freedom is finite (TWT6). Due to the process of character solidification human
freedom eventually becomes morally fixed. Boyd asserts that such morally fixed freedom is
now to be understood as compatibilist freedom (the exact opposite understanding of his
original understanding of freedom).691 The reason he does this is so that God can intervene on
a person’s compatibilist freedom in a way that he couldn’t if the freedom was libertarian.692
God is free to violate (or is no longer bound by) the covenant of non-coercion when a
creature acquires compatibilist freedom. God is not limited to non-coercive activity, he can
intervene if needed. This is how Boyd argues that God can ensure evil’s defeat and be certain
about the future.693

Paul Helseth’s Criticism’s
More than anyone else, Boyd’s most tenacious critic Paul Helseth has seized upon this
tension to argue that Boyd’s position is untenable and contradictory, and that the God of

“Our libertarian freedom is the probationary means by which we acquire compatibilistic
freedom either for or against God.” Boyd, Satan, 189.
691

“After God’s irrevocable gift of self-determination to an agent is ‘spent,’ as it were, God is
under no obligation to refrain from intervening on the agent’s freedom.” Ibid., 191.
692

“TWT 6 is crucial … because it alone allows us to render coherent … that the war that God
fights in this present age is not an eternal war.” Ibid., 190.
693
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Open Theism is an ambivalent, arbitrary694 and “capricious being.”695 Helseth makes the
following claims. First, the entire coherence of the openness program (and its response to the
problem of evil) is jettisoned because God cannot accomplish his goal without violating an
essential component of that program, namely, self-determining freedom.696 Second, if God
can sometimes work in a coercive fashion it makes it much more difficult for Boyd to
maintain that the ultimate explanation for evil is free will agents (human or angelic) rather
than God.697 Third, following on from this, this willingness to use coercion “makes it more
difficult to rescue God from being tarnished by the problem of evil.”698 This is because if God
can actually use coercion then why does he not intervene more often to stop evil and
suffering? God’s neglect, especially in view of him having no blueprint, appears completely
arbitrary with “no rhyme or reason for to his unilateral activity.”699 How decisive is Helseth’s
critique? It does appear that Helseth pinpoints problems with Boyd’s TWT but it remains
open as to whether they are fatal or not.
Much of the problem is that Boyd’s account of freedom is not consistent and Helseth
has focused on this inconsistency. This is because when Boyd seeks to find biblical support

Paul Kjoss Helseth, “On Divine Ambivalence: Open Theism and the Problem of Particular
Evils,” JETS 44, no. 3 (2001): 509.
694

Paul Kjoss Helseth, “God Causes All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed.
Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010), 45.
695

The willingness of God to violate free agents self-determining freedom “jettisons the
coherence of the openness program, then, for it establishes that God cannot accomplish his ultimate
purpose without violating a significant component of that purpose,” in Paul Kjoss Helseth, “The
Trustworthiness of God and the Foundations of Hope,” in Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the
Understanding of Biblical Christianity, ed. Piper John, Taylor Justin, and Paul Kjoss Helseth
(Wheaton, Il: Crossway Books, 2003), 293.
696
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Ibid., 295.
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Ibid., 297.
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Ibid., 305.
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for his case for God’s willingness and ability to intervene on human freedom, he chooses the
example of Peter’s denial of Christ.700 Before looking at this, it must be pointed out that this
inconsistency problem is directly linked to Boyd’s open theistic denial of exhaustive
definitive divine foreknowledge.701 This is a crucial point to understand. Boyd’s need to
maintain his Open Theism creates tension in his theodicy. The application of open theist
assumptions would lead to the conclusion that God cannot definitively foreknow that Peter
will deny Jesus and yet Scripture seems to indicate that Jesus knew exactly what would
happen.702 Boyd escapes this conclusion by saying that God knew Peter’s character
tendencies and orchestrated a lesson in order to teach the apostle about love and servant
leadership.703 In other words, God knew that Peter would deny Jesus because God arranged
the events so that things happened exactly as God said. God escapes the general openness of
the future by deliberately determining a particular future in this case. This sounds like Boyd’s
earlier explanation of what happens after a libertarian free agent becomes a compatibilist free
agent and thus God can freely use ‘coercion’ and intervene on the person’s freedom without
violating the no-longer-binding covenant of non-coercion. But this cannot be. The problem is
that Peter still possesses libertarian freedom.704 He has not solidified his character so that it is
compatible with divine determination. Proof of this is that Peter eventually changes to a
confessor instead of a denier. Theoretically, the covenant of non-coercion should still apply
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See the discussions in Boyd, God of the Possible, 35–37. Boyd, Satan, 130–133.

Boyd notes that “it is difficult to account for fulfilled prophecy unless we assume that the
Lord can at times intervene to ensure that particular acts would occur.” Boyd, Satan, 184.
701

702

Matt 26:34; Mark 14:30; Luke 22:34. Jesus statement reveals knowledge of what Peter will
do, how many times he will deny, and the activities of a rooster. This doesn’t seem like a likely
statement based on Peter’s general character tendencies but a foreknowledge of future events.
703

Boyd, God of the Possible, 35–37.
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Helseth, “The Trustworthiness of God and the Foundations of Hope,” 295.
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to Peter. This appears to imply, for Helseth, that either all freedom is actually compatible
with divine determinism or that God is actually an untrustworthy covenant breaker.705 Either
option is anathema for Boyd. It is this contradictory conclusion that stems from Boyd’s use of
(a still libertarian freedom possessing) Peter as an illustration, upon which Helseth’s critique
rests. Helseth suggests that the only way out for Boyd is that either God can foreknow the
future contingents (thus denying his Open Theism) or that God knew he would remove
Peter’s self-determining freedom and ensure he denied Jesus (thus denying God’s
commitment to loving non-coercion).706 In other words Boyd can escape by the Arminian
path of full foreknowledge or a Calvinistic-style path of consistent divine determination but
he can’t keep his Open Theism.
What is to be made of Helseth’s criticisms? 707 Helseth implies that Boyd is employing
a hard ‘coercive’ form of compatibilism708 but Boyd is clear that God does not directly coerce
the will.709 Any failure to intervene is due to God respecting the metaphysical limits free will
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Ibid., 295.
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Ibid., 297. Boyd must either concede God can know the future or that God knew he would
“orchestrate circumstances that would compel Peter to betray Jesus, in which case God forced Peter to
sin.” Ibid., 295,296. Italics mine.
Helseth also claims Boyd’s God is arbitrary because he has no singular blueprint for each
evil or each divine intervention. However, Boyd’s neo-molinism allows him to say that God already
has set responses to every contingency that might arise, see, Gregory Boyd, “Response to Paul Kjoss
Helseth,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
2010), 70. In effect, God has multiple blueprints, but he does yet know which one to use.
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Helseth, “The Trustworthiness of God and the Foundations of Hope,” 293, 297. “Soft”
coercion is working compatibilistically with agents who have established their own characters. “Hard”
coercion is compelling agents to do what they possibility would not do if the power to do otherwise
was still true of them.
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“God cannot meticulously control the free will of agents” nor can he “revoke” it.” Gregory
Boyd, “God Limits His Control,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis W. Jowers (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010), 191. “One thing God cannot do, by definition, is meticulously control
or unilaterally revoke a free will once given.” Ibid., 192.
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places on him.710 Boyd is clear that Peter freely acted out of his then current freely formed
character.711 Peter wasn’t forced to deny Jesus. The circumstances were the context not the
cause. When he invokes it, Boyd’s compatibilism is ‘soft’ like Helseth’s own Calvinism.
Additionally, for Boyd, God may or may not have even orchestrated the situation. Boyd
appears to equivocate on this point. At times, he seems to imply that God did orchestrate
events,712 and at other times he states that we don’t know if God needed to, implying that he
may not have.713 However, it should be noted that the principle of orchestrating the situation
is never rejected.714 Thus, while it is difficult to make a hard version of Helseth’s critique
stick, a soft version seems to remain. It appears on one side of Boyd’s equivocation that
somewhat fortuitously events happened as God surmised, and he did not orchestrate anything.
Here Helseth is wrong in this specific case. God determined nothing except to ‘predict’ and
redemptively work with Peter after the denials. Events opportunely happened as surmised.
But on the other side of the equivocating, God needed to intervene and orchestrate to ensure
that a pressure situation developed in order to make certain Peter denied Jesus (in keeping
with the earlier prediction and for the purposes of humbling discipline of the apostle). Things
didn’t happen as God hoped and so he had to make things happen. Here Helseth’s criticism
holds some weight. The problem is that even in the first version of events the principle of
orchestration is not rejected, it just didn’t need to be acted on. Ultimately, Peter could not
“When God fails to intervene, it is precisely because “the self-determining freedom of
wicked moral agents is irrevocable,” and “To the extent that God gives humans and angels say-so, he
by definitions limits his own unilateral say-so.” Boyd, “Response to Paul Kjoss Helseth,” 70.
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Boyd, God of the Possible, 36.

Interestingly, his latest version of Peter’s denial has no mention of orchestrating or
squeezing. Just an affirmation that it is not hard to imagine a God with perfect knowledge being able
to know what Peter would do in such a situation. Boyd, “God Limits His Control,” 194.
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have done otherwise. Either he fortuitously and freely did so as ‘foreseen’ or God ensured the
situation was such that Peter would deny. This seems to be an elimination of libertarian
freedom’s ‘irrevocability.’ The whole point of the criticism is that Peter’s freedom was still
libertarian and thus off limits for any determination. Boyd can argue that Peter’s character
was solidified enough (i.e. compatible enough) for God to foreknow and ensure this. True.
But then isn’t everyone’s character solidified enough in this sense for God to foreknow and
even determine everyone? What then of Open Theism? We are back to the start.
It is not that Boyd’s model can’t work in all cases. Boyd gives examples such as God
ending someone’s freedom by terminating their life, examples include, Ananias and Sapphira
(Acts 5:1-11), King Herod (Acts 12:20-23), the Canaanites, due to the Flood.715 The problem
is that these interventions are fatal for the agents. None of these examples help explain God’s
ability to predict the behaviour of non-executed agents (like Peter). As it stands, Peter
threatens to be the exception that would bring down the rule. It may be too absolute a claim
to say, as Helseth does, that this problem is completely fatal for Boyd. But we can say that
this part of Boyd’s theory is too ill-defined and has too many unanswered questions, and
inconsistencies, to carry the weight it does. Either God foreknew Peter’s actions, contra Open
Theism, or God determined someone’s actions, contra libertarian self-determinism and the
power to do otherwise. The coherence of Boyd’s account of taming risk is thereby called into
question. Can risk-elimination be achieved while postulating a contradictory theory or
violating a foundational assumption? This area needs to be revisited by Boyd. Risk theodicies
are risky.716
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Boyd, Satan, 185.

In contrast to Boyd, Ellen White affirms that Jesus foreknew Peter’s denial, even down to
his thoughts, but also that it could have been otherwise! She even describes what would have
happened if Peter accepted the predicted warning, see, “Peter’s Fall” ST Nov 4, 1897.
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Satan as Exemplar or Contradiction?
This is not the only point of tension in Boyd’s formulation of his six theses and the
rest of his theodicy. Boyd claims that Satan is the paradigm for his six theses. Satan bridges
theoretical propositions and actual reality by functioning as the exemplar of the theses. 717 The
problem is that Satan’s ongoing existence appears to be a counter-example or another
exception to the way Boyd formulates parts of the six theses. How so? In Boyd’s explanation
of the six theses, an agent’s libertarian freedom is only for a probationary period of time until
the agent’s character is morally settled in a particular direction. Once this time is up God may
intervene on the now compatibilist agent (although not on the individual’s will) and by
providential means determine the individual’s actions if he desires.718 The problem here is
that Satan has obviously settled his moral character long ago on the side of evil and rebellion.
This should mean that God is free to intervene on Satan and apparently determine him as he
sees fit or even to stop him. The covenant of non-coercion no longer applies to Satan. So why
does God tolerate Satan? Why doesn’t God exert compatibilist control over Satan, for
example, to guarantee Satan only does evils that work for the greater good? God could
theoretically eliminate gratuitous evil in Satan’s case. In fact, wouldn’t God have a duty, let
alone a motive, to constrain Satan?
Boyd does have a way to escape this conclusion. He argues that part of the balance
between the irrevocability (TWT 5) and finitude (TWT 6) of a free agent’s moral and social
influence is their ‘quality of freedom.’ An agent’s quality of freedom is the scope of their
influence (ability and potential for good or ill) and the temporal duration of that influence.
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Boyd, Satan, 205,206.
Ibid., 185. Boyd even speaks of “coercive power.”
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This quality is dynamic and conditioned by at least five factors: 1) The ongoing influence of
God; 2) Our original constitution; 3) Our previous decisions; 4) Other agents and their
decisions; and 5) Prayer.719 The first factor of God’s ongoing influence doesn’t help as Satan
is no longer open to the saving influence of God (the third factor, Satan’s previous decisions,
reinforces this point). There is no reason for God to tolerate his continuance. The fifth
condition of prayer doesn’t help explain Satan’s ongoing existence. Believers pray for his
defeat. This leaves the second (original constitution) and fourth (other agents) factors. The
original constitution refers to the agent’s created nature, its temporal potential, their mental
and physical capabilities, and potential roles intended by God. All of this accounts for the
agent’s moral and social ability to make an impact on the flow of history for good or evil.
Boyd suggests that if Satan has the “capacity to corrupt the cosmos for billions of years” it is
because he had the same temporal capacity to bless it.720
This argument implies that while Satan’s character is morally settled and spent, the
temporal potential of his freedom has not yet been spent, and this is why God cannot or will
not intervene to stop Satan. This does not seem satisfactory. After all, many humans of great
influence and ability suddenly die and clearly do not exercise their full temporal capacity.
Why is Satan’s temporal capacity so inviolable? It could be explained that the curse of death
means our physical potential (which is underneath any temporal endurance) is vulnerable to
mortality in a way Satan’s is not.721 Even if this way out is acceptable, why should temporal
capacity for influence continue when the moral character is clearly settled for evil? Is God

719

Ibid., 191–205..

720

Ibid., 182.

721

Other human agents (the fourth factor) can cut short other human potential by their actions
(e.g. murder etc.). But of course, humans can’t kill Satan. But God cuts short human’s potential – why
not end Satan’s? Surely, it would help reduce evil and suffering.
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held hostage to a measurable duration of time linked to Satan’s temporal capacity, regardless
of how vast his moral evil is, before he can end Satan’s reign of terror? Is God left watching
the clock tick down? Irrevocable temporal potential, even though not eternal, strikes one as
an arbitrary metaphysical constraint when removed from character and morality. God
naturally must allow creatures to possess temporal existence but it makes more sense as a
dynamic potential rather than a set capacity that God must wait to expire. God’s acts of
judgments seem to support this as they are linked to morality rather than to metaphysics.
Boyd’s mention of “billions of years” – a figure well beyond any of the Bible’s own – seems
to exacerbate the sense of divine miscalculation and the enormity of the risk. It also makes
for dismal eschatological prospects. God can’t end things until Satan has exhausted his
apparently massive temporality. Of course, the situation becomes utterly farcical if Satan has
immortality. God would be waiting forever! Help is at hand as God could confine Satan to
hell. But this only reintroduces the problem in a different guise. Now the question becomes:
Why hasn’t God already put Satan in hell?722 My sense is that Boyd has not thought through
the interrelationship of all these things and would likely need to make significant adjustments
to his theory were he to do so. What they would be is hard to tell.723 There is one other
possible alternative for Boyd. This is the fourth factor where quality of freedom is affected by
other agent’s influence and actions. Boyd uses this factor to illustrate how one agent can
diminish another agent’s freedom by a negative, destructive influence or conversely, one
agent can enhance another agent’s freedom by positive influence. How this might add
duration to Satan is not clear. Do evildoers enhance and believers diminish Satan’s physical
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durability? This seems unlikely. This is really another variation of one’s constitution. I doubt
Boyd would take this approach. It makes more sense to understand that other agent’s
cooperative actions can enhance or extend the influence of Satan across communities and
over time but not his own physical duration. This concept of influence is more in line with
cosmic controversy, to which this study now turns.
This discussion highlights the plausibility of the sub-thesis for this chapter. The
concept of cosmic warfare benefits from having cosmic controversy as an additional layer of
explanation. In contrast to Boyd’s Satan, the Great Controversy theodicy, drawing on the
explanatory level of metanarrative and controversy rather than the metaphysics of war, offers
a different kind of answer. Satan has raised accusations against God that will not go away
with his destruction. These accusations go to the heart and foundation of God’s rule and
concern his character, law and government. Destroying Satan does not eliminate the
deceptive power of his lies, for these have spread to other agents. Considering Satan’s claim
that God’s justice eliminates mercy, destroying Satan could appear to reinforce rather than
disprove this claim. Additionally, God does not want the universe serving him from fear.
Premature destruction could bring about that very state of affairs. Therefore, the timing of the
elimination of Satan is linked to the exposure of his lies and a comprehendible vindication of
God.724 Such lies can be completely discredited only when it is shown that all advocates, and
especially the chief advocate and epitome of the ideology of lawlessness, are without excuse
or justification. Divine wisdom holds off until the great controversy can be resolved without
possible doubt or prevarication. With the cosmic controversy settled, the cosmic war is
ended. Here the reasons for God permitting evil and cosmic war to continue are different to
and uncontemplated by Boyd. The Great Controversy theodicy reflects the complexity of
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politics more than the mechanics of metaphysics. There is a powerful analogical this-worldly
plausibility to this argument. Numerous political, philosophical, ideological claims make for
appealing ideas that are only realised as bankrupt once they have been demonstrated as
failures in practice.725 The temporal capacity to influence is directly linked to the perception
of plausibility. Once an idea is discredited, it loses viability and existence. God does not need
to abide by a temporal measure of time (although God is constrained by the conceptual limits
of his creatures and the slow-moving contingencies of history). What God needs to do is
expose and discredit all elements of Satan’s alternative in a way that creation can grasp and
accept. Only then will evil’s temporal potential evaporate. Satan’s temporal capacity is linked
to his (multiplication of) lies, not to the natural longevity inherent in his nature or to the
simple baseline talent he was originally gifted with (although that talent has greatly
contributed to the complexity and time needed in exposing him).

Complicated by Angels
Boyd’s position on Satan, freedom and risk is further complicated by his thoughts
about angels. Boyd suggests that there is even now a “certain class of angels whose destiny is
not yet resolved for or against God.”726 He implies that angels, who have been given charge
over human beings and nations, can still become evil or irresponsible and that this accounts
for a lot of suffering and evil.727 To put this into perspective, Boyd appears to have Satan
falling at least 500 million years ago,728 and yet 500 million years later Boyd implies that
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some angels are still vulnerable to rebellion. The questions multiply once more, each with the
effect of undermining his theodicy project by amplifying the sense of risk gone wrong. How
long does it take for an angel to settle their character? If angelic character is not settled after
millions of years what hope is it that it ever will be? Why is it that God can still lose angels
after such a long period? Has God not been able to counter Satan effectively – even postincarnation and cross?729 One wonders how often different groups of angels have fallen and
rebelled? And more worryingly, if there have been multiple falls then how many more will
there be? Can God ever get things under control if he has not been able to after 500 million
years? These issues are well beyond the issue of the free will defence and are directly related
to particulars of Boyd’s theodicy.730 Add to this Boyd’s comments (or are these merely
rhetorical?) that a cosmic war that has gone on for millions of years so far could potentially
go for millions more, one could be forgiven for wondering whether things seem out of God’s
control or at least that God has seriously miscalculated the cost of freedom. Can we really
imagine millions more years of the current evil? All of this raises again the size, significance
and problem of the risk in Boyd’s theodicy, the very questions an evidential problem of evilstyle approach raises. Boyd’s Open Theism adds to this concern. Is God’s lack of exhaustive
foreknowledge one of the reasons for the length of time?
In contrast, the Great Controversy account offers a significantly different explanation.
It argues that God let the angelic rebellion fully develop until all angels made a decision and
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settled their characters for or against God.731 There was only one angelic fall. At the same
time it does acknowledge that even loyal angels, along with unfallen beings, do not
immediately have all of their doubts and questions answered. They are still concerned about
Satan’s charges against God. God does not ignore creaturely concerns. These unfallen beings
are still loyal, and over time have had their loyalty more than confirmed by God’s actions in
the incarnation, cross, and power of the gospel. The fall of Adam expanded the war to earth
where God now deals with the controversy and rebellion. The controversy will continue for a
comparatively short period of time (thousands of years rather than millions). God allows
things to go on as long as is needed to comprehensively answer all questions in the great
controversy in such a way that evil and war will never rise again; that, and no more. God acts
to bring agents to a decision either for or against him and thus establishes clear time
parameters for probationary time.732 God’s three-phased plan of salvation includes a clear
eschatological mission for the church in which all of the world is brought to a decision for or
against God and takes a side on the Great Controversy.733 This is one of the ways God keeps
moving things forward, ensuring that evil is ended and Satan’s ideology is defeated. All of
this is based on God’s wisdom and foreknowledge. This clear eschatology stands in contrast
to Boyd’s open-ended and uncertain eschatology in two ways. One is in regard to length of
time and the other regarding how God moves the world to its end. In the Great Controversy
theodicy risk is foreseen, embraced, planned for, dealt with, and overcome.
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Christology and Risk
The need to reduce risk spills over into Boyd’s Christology in an interesting way. The
metaphysics of Boyd’s cosmic war are so risky that Boyd cannot allow Jesus to be subject to
them as creatures are. Boyd makes Jesus an exemplar of some parts of his six theses but
exempts him from other elements. In a 2002 article Bruce Ware argued that consistent Open
Theism would mean that since Jesus possessed libertarian freedom he might not have gone
through with the cross and, consequentially, God could not have truly foreknown (on Boyd’s
Open Theism understanding of freedom) if Jesus would complete the atonement at the
cross.734 The implication is that God ‘got lucky’ and before the events took place, salvation
and the cross were all matters of uncertainty. Boyd’s answer is interesting. In order to deny
vulnerability to this claim he argues that “Jesus possessed compatibilistic freedom”,735 not
libertarian freedom, which is merely the means to the compatiblistic end. As such, “Christ
was humanity eschatologically defined”736 or what humanity is supposed to become. Jesus is
the end product of eschatology, but he does not undergo the process to get there. In this way
Boyd can argue that “Jesus, being God, was never on probation and hence did not possess
libertarian free will (with regard to his openness to God).”737 Thus, Boyd eliminates the risk
of Jesus failing and explains how an Open Theist God could foreknow that Jesus would
succeed.
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Resolving the foreknowledge problem in this manner opens up new questions and
problems for Boyd’s Christology and theodicy.738 Sceptics could ask: If Jesus could come
into this world with compatibilist freedom then why can’t we all? If Boyd answers it is
because Jesus is God (and possesses compatibilist freedom739) then doubts are raised about
whether Jesus’ humanity is really like ours.740 These nagging questions about the legitimacy
of the incarnation go deeper and also call into question Christ’s victory in the cosmic war.
Scripture implies that Jesus had to be made like his brothers in every respect and that he had
to be able to be tempted like us in every respect.741 Boyd’s position is hard to harmonise with
this scriptural testimony. If Jesus did not have libertarian freedom then he is unlike Adam (as
originally created) or current fallen humanity. Possessing a compatibilist will that was
obviously settled in moral righteousness would mean that Jesus did not face temptation at all,
or as any human has. He would have been impeccable from birth. He could never do
otherwise. This would mean that, having undergone no real battle, he has no real subsequent
victory to pass on to humanity. In a cosmic warfare theodicy, this absence of personal
warfare and internal struggle with temptation and weakness (which is arguably the most
significant and intense element of the war for us) in the experience of the saviour is
devastating. Jesus in his own humanity never personally engages in the same warfare. His
‘victory’ (or more accurately ‘invulnerability’) is purely a result of his metaphysical being
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Clark H. Pinnock, John Sanders, and Gregory A. Boyd,” JETS 45 (2002): 255.
738

739

This seems to imply God is not free.

740

This compatibilism would presumably be due to a set character. Was Jesus then born with
a fully formed character? If so, it could only be his divine character not a humanly developed one.
How then is Jesus truly ‘man’? No human has ever had or could have this. It would make Boyd’s
Christ analogous to the Jesus of early apocryphal stories who was able to speak from birth. Naturally,
all children must learn to speak, and likewise, all children must acquire character. Exempting Jesus
from this is exempting him from basic humanity.
741

Hebrews 2:14-18; 4:14-16.
200

(ontological) and not his own historical, existential overcoming. Jesus is from birth the ‘end’
God is aiming for but he never goes through the ‘means’ to the end. He is not the means to
the divine end. What then is? Our effort? How coherent is it for someone to be the end-goal
of a process but who has himself never experienced or undergone that process? How helpful
is a Jesus who keeps himself at arm’s length from the warfare creatures cannot escape?
Wasn’t the incarnation so he could for fight for us as one of us? This Jesus is untouchable due
to his divinity. His humanity – one can smell the scent of Docetism – is in danger of being an
external shell. This is atonement by nature, not by submission, faith, grace and redemptive
achievement.
Here the difference between Boyd and the Great Controversy theodicy is most clearly
seen. In stark contrast, the Great Controversy asserts that Jesus assumed a genuine
humanity742 including the risk of failure and eternal loss.743 It affirms that Jesus was on
probation.744 And that Jesus’ temptations were a genuine and frightful reality.745 This means
that Jesus engages in genuine struggle with temptation and fights Satan in our vulnerable
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flesh without compatibilistic invulnerability.746 This means that Jesus’ victory over Satan is
complete, total (and extraordinary) and transferrable by him to humanity.747 Jesus can
recapitulate his victory in his people by means of his grace both forensically and effectively.
It also means that he has effectively, within himself, answered every question in the Great
Controversy. It is the enormity of this risk and the magnitude of the victory that make for an
eternity of praise, study, wonder and exploration. This conflict is not the clash of power (i.e.,
Jesus’ inherently invulnerable will-power versus satanic power as in Boyd’s Christology) but
the clash of character developed over time, vindicated truth, demonstrated love and merited
grace against evil, lies, temptations, deceptions, hostility and selfishness. At the central point
of Jesus our two warfare theodicies take dramatically different turns. Boyd closes off all risk
from the person of Jesus, whereas the Great Controversy theodicy affirms the most extreme
risk in Christ’s overcoming of evil. The reason behind these differences lies in the
presence/absence of the idea of cosmic controversy and in different views of foreknowledge.
Christ cannot win a controversy or war he himself will not enter. Error can only be overcome
by truth, not power. In the Great Controversy theodicy God undertakes a foreknown risk. He
sees it ahead in his foreknowledge, and then he accomplishes it through an actual history. It is
an accomplishment Jesus must achieve, even if God initially knows he will succeed.748 In
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Boyd’s theodicy the profound risk of freedom is experienced by creation but God removes
himself from ever experiencing it when he becomes a creature (incarnation). God is an
outsider to a risk that he himself allows for others. Such a God could not truly feel the
suffering of humanity in the experience of temptation for himself or with humanity.749 In the
Great Controversy, God is the resolver, embracer and sharer of the risk of creaturely freedom
and the suffering that it brings to creatures. God feels most deeply in his divine nature and
through Christ’s divine-human experience the suffering of temptation and risk. This is a
powerful element of theodicy. 750 Here in the issue of Boyd’s Christology we see most starkly
the combined influence of Open Theism, a predominantly metaphysical account, and warfare
without controversy. The Great Controversy theodicy has a controversy which necessitates
Jesus undergoing the radical risks inherent in the incarnation in order to answer Satan’s
accusations and vindicate God. In Boyd’s cosmic war, God must primarily negotiate
metaphysical risk and does so by removing himself (in Jesus’ humanity) from the danger by
means of the power of an invulnerable will. God has set up a state of affairs in creation that
he himself cannot or will not assent to. This seems out of character with the way Boyd
understands God but seems necessitated by his Open Theism.

eternal.” White, Desire of Ages, 753. Christ’s psychological experience overwhelmed any
foreknowledge. Jesus was literally willing to die eternally for humanity.
This weakens Boyd’s use of cruciform theodicy. Boyd’s Jesus is genuinely vulnerable to
physical pain and suffering, however, he is not vulnerable to the pain and struggle involved in
resisting temptation.
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Reinventing Libertarian Freedom
This study must wrestle with the tension between the libertarian principle of the
power to do otherwise and the need for evil to end. If agents always have the power to choose
otherwise then how can their moral state ever solidify? Boyd’s response to risk highlights the
problem.751 In order to show how evil will end Boyd switches between models of freedom,
from a hard libertarianism to compatibilism. 752 The Great Controversy theodicy also needs to
deal with this tension but cannot look to Boyd’s failed solution. Unfortunately, the Great
Controversy hasn’t faced the complexities involved and has no consistent theory of freedom
to ground its explanation for why God’s historical resolution of the Great Controversy will
prevent sin from arising ever again. It is philosophically and theoretically undeveloped.
Having a practical workable theory is vital for the plausibility and rational coherence of the
Great Controversy theodicy. The next section explores models of libertarian freedom that
offer the Great Controversy theodicy a way forward.

Soft Libertarianism
Fortunately, there are versions of libertarian freedom which overcome these
deficiencies and can enable the Great Controversy theodicy to work in a coherent, consistent
and rational manner. These versions are the ‘soft libertarianism’ of Kenneth Keathley and the
‘virtue libertarianism’ of Dean Zimmerman and Kevin Timpe. Kenneth Keathley753 offers the
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following description of soft libertarianism which stands between compatibilism (soft
determinism) and hard libertarianism. On Keathley’s account, soft libertarianism has five
tenets.754 1) Ultimate Responsibility. This tenet argues that ultimate responsibility is more
important for freedom than alternative possibilities. Moral responsibility lies with who or
what is the ultimate cause of our choices (in this case the agent and not secondary causes,
physical causation or God’s all-determining will). What this means is that agents are
responsible for a choice they make if it comes from either conscious deliberation or from
undeliberated, automatic or even determined responses which are due to one’s character,
where that character is a product of previous freely made decisions. If our self-chosen
character determines our response then, because that character has been freely self-chosen by
the agent (and not due to another agent or impersonal forces), that determined choice is one
we are responsible for. 2) Agent Causation. This is implied in the first tenet. The agent is the
cause of their own choices. This is in contrast to event causation in which a choice is the
result of a previous chain of events or causes (secondary or primary). Agents can “create new
thoughts and actions that have no determinative cause outside of the self”, in other words,
agents created in the image of God possess “a little citadel of creativity ex nihilo.”755 3) The
Principles of Alternative Possibilities. Freedom does require that there is, at least some of the
time, the power ‘to otherwise’. Very importantly this principle is only affirmed once the first
two are established and also must be understood in the light of tenets 4 and 5. 4) The Reality
of Will-setting Moments. It is not always necessary for someone to have the power to do
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otherwise but it is necessary for that power to be present during choices that shape and form
the moral character of the person. These happen at critical junctures in our lives. Will-setting
and self-forming situations, choices and actions shape who we are. Who we are then shapes
what choices we make. This means “the relationship between free choices and character is a
two-way street.”756 5) The Distinction between Freedom of Responsibility and Freedom of
Integrity. The freedom of responsibility refers to the ability to be faced with choices (and
understand them) and be responsible and accountable to respond. The freedom of integrity
refers to the ability to do what is right. This is freedom properly functioning and capable. A
person may be free in that they have responsibility to do what is right but not be free in that
they have lost the ability (or integrity) to do what is right. For example, a drug addict may
lose their integrity to resist their addiction but they are still responsible for their actions.
Likewise, fallen human beings still possess moral responsibly but lack in themselves the
power to fully obey God’s law. Together these five tenets make up soft libertarianism. This
view affirms the power to do otherwise but only within the larger framework of character
setting. Keathley’s view maintains that “character determines the range of choices rather than
a specific choice itself.”757 A fully developed moral character may ‘determine’ that someone
always chooses what is morally right while not specifying which right choice they must
choose. The person’s freely chosen character is determining the choice and not another agent
(God) or a chain of causal events. This is not compatibilism and theological determinism.
Soft libertarianism says that a character could have developed otherwise at least in its initial
stages during key will-setting moments. The resultant character may initially influence and
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eventually determine the way a person chooses but the person is still morally responsible
because they freely chose that character over time.

Virtue Libertarianism
A strikingly similar view which also accomplishes what the Great Controversy
theodicy needs is the “virtue libertarianism” of Dean Zimmerman758 and Kevin Timpe.759
Virtue libertarianism recognises the two major understandings of libertarian freedom (the
‘power of self-determination’, termed ‘sourcehood’ by Timpe, and the ‘power to do
otherwise’ or ’alternative possibilities’) but also recognises that they possess an asymmetrical
and dynamic relationship. Neither on their own suffices as an adequate definition of
libertarian freedom. Most important is the recognition that the ‘power to do otherwise’ must
not be absolutized. Virtue Libertarianism argues that freedom is intimately connected to
character. Freedom has the goal of moral character (virtue). It is not endless moral
indeterminism. Created beings, of necessity, possess morally unformed characters, and,
therefore, must initially possess morally significant freedom or the power to choose morally
otherwise. However, all their choices register, shape and form their character. This stillforming-in-process character then begins to shape their choices. Eventually, a final settled
moral character is formed. Freedom attains a fixed particular virtuous (or vicious) character.
This fixed character still possesses morally relevant freedom (the ability to choose between
choices which are in-line with one’s settled moral character) even if they can no longer
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exercise morally significant chooses against their character.760 This does not mean that
freedom changes from libertarian to compatibilist (with its theological determinism). It is still
libertarian with regards to the ‘power of self-determination.’ But neither is the freedom, once
its character is finally formed and fixed, capable of changing to the opposite moral state. The
reason is that the ‘self’ that chooses is now a morally settled or morally self-determinedself.761 The difference to compatibilism is that this ‘determination’ is freely acquired as a
result of the free-choices the agent made and not due to another determining agent or the
determining of someone’s internal state by secondary causes. The self (not nature or God) has
freely determined its character762 and that character now determines the moral quality of the
choices of the self. This means a choice, where a person cannot do otherwise due to the
settled state of their character, is still morally responsible because their history of free choices
is what formed their character. Moral responsibility, a crucial component and argument in
favour of libertarian freedom, extends to both free choices and freely chosen character.
Character is an acquired state and requires freedom. This means that creatures must initially
possess but do not need to permanently possess what Plantingia called ‘morally significant
freedom’ (i.e. a permanent power to morally do otherwise) which would be tantamount to
saying that it is impossible to permanently fix moral character. This may sound to some like
compromising the free will defence and saying that moral choices have disappeared for those

“We define a morally relevant choice as follows: a choice is morally relevant if the person
is free to choose among at least two options, and at least two of the options, say, A and B, are related
such that either A is better than B or B is better than A.” Kevin Timpe and Timothy Pawl,
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 414.
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Theologically, we would add that it is only through the enabling grace of God that a truly
morally virtuous character can be formed.
An Arminian theology would want to affirm that this ‘determination’ only concerns the
will’s freedom to receive divine grace rather than its ability to produce moral power. The will’s ability
is totally dependent on divine grace not self. Divine power is necessary, unmerited, but not
irresistible.
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who possess morally settled characters. It is not. This actually rescues the free will defence
from its own limitations. Agents with fully formed virtuous libertarian freedom still possess
‘morally relevant freedom’ even though they have moved beyond the initially formative stage
of ‘morally significant freedom.’ 763 This means an agent with a freely self-chosen and settled
character (e.g. a perfected righteous saint), can face real moral situations but be incapable of
choosing evil. They do not want or wish to do evil. This ‘inability’ is not due to a lack of
freedom but to freedom reaching its God ordained goal. Such people are not robots but
matured saints.
The difference between the Virtue/Soft Libertarianism advocated here and Boyd’s
switching between types of freedom, is that the ‘ability to do otherwise’ remains a constant in
Virtue/Soft libertarianism and is not lost or replaced with compatibilist freedom. Even when
the redeemed are morally perfect (or the reprobate are morally irredeemable), their moral
choices will not be compatible with God determining their choices. The redeemed will not
desire to choose evil but they will freely, by enabling grace, make their own choices. Of
course, with characters formed after God’s own, and perfected and sustained by grace, there
is no need for determinism or coercive interventions. This is just as God would have it.
Creatures that are truly like him.

Risk and the Great Controversy Theodicy
This discussion of how cosmic warfare theodicies deal with risk has focused on
Boyd’s view and its comparison to the Great Controversy theodicy. It will now shift to the
elements of risk more closely related to the Great Controversy theodicy itself. Most of these
are connected to the issue of the plausibility of risk-based explanations. The first four
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Morally significant freedom is a subset of morally relevant freedom. Timpe and Pawl, 414.
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questions are about the emergence of risk. The fifth is about the elimination of risk. The
objections are 1) the plausibility of creatures rationally evaluating God, 2) the plausibility of
creatures morally evaluating God, 3) the plausibility of finite power contesting divine power,
then two related objections, 4) the plausible risk of a good perfect creature (Lucifer) choosing
to sin, and, 5) the plausibility of a ‘risky’ genuinely free universe never again falling into sin.

Plausibility of Rationally Evaluating God
The first objection, voiced by Richard Rice, is a philosophical one and concerns the
structure of rationality and mental independence. There “is something odd,” writes Richard
Rice, “about the notion of weighing evidence when it comes to God. How could God be the
object of impartial enquiry?”764 Specifically, how would creatures, “whose minds God has
made and upholds, know that God hasn’t tampered with their minds?”765 The problem seems
trapped in inescapable circularity, because to “determine if God is trustworthy, therefore, we
must assume that God is trustworthy.”766 In other words we, “must have confidence in the
structure of reality and in our cognitive processes.”767 While theoretically valid, on a practical
level (and the Great Controversy is a practical-historical response) it could be responded that
this objection suffers its own plausibility problem. Did such questions occur or occupy
angels? Do they trouble humans? Apparently not. Unless one is consumed by the
philosophical and paralysed into inaction, it is hard to see this presenting a practical problem
to the Great Controversy theodicy. An urgent moral and practical crisis trumps fine-grained
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Rice, Suffering and the Search for Meaning, 85.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., 86.
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Rice, “The Great Controversy and the Problem of Evil,” 53.
210

epistemological speculations. We could enquire if it was raised by angels but we could never
know. Regardless of this the Great Controversy theodicy suggests Satan’s claims and
accusations, and the debates that accompanied it, were primarily personal, political, moral
and concrete rather than philosophical, metaphysical and abstract. This objection is about
esoteric philosophical discussions that might forestall but hardly eliminate the more tangible
passionate all-or-nothing issues raised in the Great Controversy.

Plausibility of Morally Evaluating God
The second objection is similar but concerned with moral epistemology. It is Rice’s
query about the idea of creatures morally evaluating God. This is a difficult concept, for “it
clearly presupposes some independent standard of goodness by which God is judged, and
people will question this for a number of familiar reasons.”768 Rice doesn’t develop this
thought any further except to indicate in a footnote that he is making reference to what is
known as the Euthyphro dilemma.769 Rice then asserts “If God is goodness itself, the idea of
evaluating God’s behaviour against some other standard of behaviour makes no sense.”770
This philosophical objection is partially accounted for by the previous answer (it is not
possible to know if it was argued). But there are other limitations to this objection. While it is
true that God is goodness itself – cannot this be questioned? And that is precisely what the
Great Controversy claims has happened. The whole point of the Great Controversy is that
Satan is denying God’s law and character (as the standard of goodness) and is advocating an
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Ibid., 53.

Rice doesn’t name it as the Euthyphro dilemma but his statement, “Is something good
because God says it is, or does God say it is good because it is?”, is a classic formulation of the
dilemma.
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Rice, “The Great Controversy and the Problem of Evil,” Fn 32. p 55.
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alternative standard. This objection actually tends to support the Great Controversy theodicy
and goes to its very heart. When the ground of goodness is called into question then there is
no deeper reality to appeal to. This is also why theoretical or philosophical answers won’t
resolve the issue. When competing a priori presuppositions are at issue, there are no deeper
premises to adjudicate between them. There is no neutral place to stand. God knows that only
actual experience and demonstration will enable creatures to ‘know’ that his contested truth is
the actual truth. The dispute must be tested and settled in the arena of history and not simply
in the realm of ideas. According to the Great Controversy even Satan will admit, although,
reluctantly and non-repentantly, that he was wrong and God was right. An actual definitive
moral answer to all the questions will be achieved.

Plausibility of Finite vs Infinite Power
The third objection raised by Rice concerns the plausibility of a finite creature
effectively contesting (and doing so with significant success) its own infinite Creator, “The
idea of a superhuman agent whose revolt engulfs the entire universe and poses a genuine
threat to God’s government seems incoherent in light of traditional concepts of divine power
and sovereignty.”771 He asks how could a “creature pose a serious challenge to God?”772
Couldn’t God easily defeat opposition? And conversely, wouldn’t any rational and intelligent
creature (i.e. Lucifer) clearly understand that it is pointless to stand against God?773 Who
would be so foolish? The Great Controversy theodicy would respond by pointing out that
Lucifer’s revolt is not based in a clash of power but in in clash of ideas. God’s infinite power
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Rice, Suffering and the Search for Meaning, 84.
Ibid.

What could any creature hope to gain from contesting God’s supremacy – if they know
God can annihilate them? Ibid., 85.
773

212

doesn’t settle or address these issues. If anything, divine control and determinism are more
likely to confirm Lucifer’s claim. 774 A fuller answer becomes more apparent in the response
to the next objection.

Plausibility around the Origin of Lucifer’s Sin
The fourth objection775 raises the crucial question of how it is that a perfect being in a
perfect habitation could sin in the first place. Is this risk plausible? John Hick maintains it is a
“sheer self-contradiction” that perfect creatures would “inexplicably and inexcusably” rebel
against God.776 To imagine otherwise is to “postulate the self-creation of evil ex nihilo.”777
Scott even claims that this is “the Achilles’ heel” of the free will defence.778 This is not the
generic problem of evil’s origin but the concrete problem of Lucifer. The problem can be
expressed in the dilemma that if the reason for sin arising is due to a flaw in Lucifer (his
nature, intellect, circumstances, or his faculty of the will – rather than his exercise of it) then
either he or his environment was not perfect and ultimately God is to blame. If sin is not due
to any such antecedent reasons, conditions or causes, then it is without cause and is irrational.
How could it rationally eventuate?779
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The concepts of free will and divine self-limitation further help explain the greater
potential of finite power.
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Rice actually presents the fourth and fifth objection as one objection. I am splitting them
up because the fourth objection stands alone in its own right.
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This is a very old theological discussion and not unique to cosmic warfare theodicies,
although it is more pressing for them considering how much is built on a Luciferian rebellion.
Early Church Fathers and Medieval scholars tried to resolve this dilemma. Augustine probed
the fall of Lucifer at length. In the end he could not settle on a full solution. Peter King
summarises Augustine’s reflections, “Why did Lucifer turn his will away from God? There is
no cause; he had his reasons, namely, his love of himself, but in the end that is just to say that
he turned his voluntas to himself rather than God. Primal sin is precisely as explicable as any
other action – and precisely as inexplicable as well.”780 As such we must stop with the willed
choice and not try and follow an infinite regress of explanations.781 It remains a mystery.782
Augustine does not address the issue of whether Lucifer’s motives were rational or not and,
therefore, whether his account of Lucifer’s fall is rationally plausible. After all, only a
rational creature could be culpable.783 This is something that Anselm (1033-1109)
understands and pursues. “Anselm wants to show that Lucifer was fully qualified as a moral
agent and, therefore, could be held responsible for his primal sin – and justly punished for
it.”784 The ensuing medieval discussions tended to argue along either intellectual or volitional
explanations. They hoped to clarify the relationship between intellect and knowledge, on the
one hand, and will and desire on the other, and whether sin arose in one or the other.
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The later more explicitly deterministic Augustine speculated that God gave some angels
confirming grace and withheld it from others. This simply puts the blame back on God. See Russell,
Satan: The Early Christian Tradition, 213. Hick mistakenly thinks this later Augustinian view is part
Luciferian accounts of the fall. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 250.
“Augustine had sidestepped the issue of Lucifer’s rationality.” See King, “Augustine and
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Lucifer’s primal sin was “the supreme test case for whether intellectualism implies
intellectual determinism and whether voluntarism implies irrationality.”785 Anselm, Aquinas,
Scotus and many other medieval greats weighed in trying to explain the first sin. Hoffman’s
conclusion is telling, “voluntarists and intellectualists inevitably arrive at the same
conclusion ... one cannot explain why he sinned rather than not, or why he sinned but the
archangels Gabriel and Michael did not.”786 The mystery of iniquity or evil remains unsolved.
Kevin Timpe traces the intellectualist-voluntarist divide in more recent thinkers and comes to
the same conclusion, “It looks then as if a Christian account of primal sin cannot avoid all
arbitrariness.”787 Timpe suggests that most libertarian-inclined Christians will find this
arbitrariness unsatisfactory but leaves it open “whether or not this amounts to an
insurmountable objection to the philosophical respectability of Christian accounts of free will
and sin.”788
Chapter three showed that the Great Controversy theodicy response is, rather
strangely, to welcome all this as the central affirmation about evil. The general idea of evil’s
mystery is not unique to the Great Controversy789 but what is unique is the welcome embrace
and the use it is put to. It functions as the presupposition necessary to help prevent evil’s
subversion and confounding of reason. Why the self-creation of evil ex nihilo is impossible is
never truly substantiated by Hick. It is simply asserted. In fact, the very claim of the Great

Tobias Hoffman, “Theories of Angelic Sin from Aquinas to Ockham,” in A Companion to
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Controversy is exactly what horrifies Hick. Evil was ex nihilo.790 Not abstractly, but in the
specific person of Lucifer. The Great Controversy theodicy meets Hick’s assertion with an
equal counter-assertion. This may be philosophically confronting and controversial but it
alone shifts the discussion to solid ground.791
Contrary to Hick’s and others, the Great Controversy theodicy maintains that it is
foolish to think that the problem of evil can be understood ahistorically or without Satan, as if
reason (religious or secular), philosophy or abstraction were a more direct route to the issue.
False conclusions will inevitably come from sceptics or theodicts who ignore this. The only
way to avoid saying irrational things about evil is to accept its irrationality as well as its
historicity. Analysis of the phenomena of evil is not excluded, just prevented from a kind of
self-sabotage. Some evils (pl.) are explainable as events in a history, even if ‘evil’ itself
(sing.) is inexplicable. Therefore, narrative and history is a richer way of approaching the
problem of evil. Gordon Graham argues against ‘strategies’ that speak of evil as costs versus
benefits (greater goods). “What is actually required is an account of evil that acknowledges
its ineliminably evil character, and at the same time shows how it can be overcome.” He then
states, “The elements of this idea lie in the structure of narrative, and it is the power of
narrative form … that illuminates the deficiencies of the alternative we have been
considering.”792 World War I or II are not fruitfully explained via metaphysics or deduction.
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This is not the creation of evil as a thing (ontology) but the choice that gives it historical
existence (volition).
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Boyd sees evil as mysterious because we cannot epistemologically trace all the factors that
go into an evil event due to the complexity of creation. “Relocating the mystery of evil is, I believe
one of the most distinct features of the trinitarian warfare theodicy.” Boyd, Satan, 216. He also points
out that “Evil is a mystery, but it is not a mystery concerning Yahweh’s character.” Boyd, God at
War, 149.
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Gordon Graham, Evil and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 171. Narrative is “central to many areas of thought and reflection,
notably the legal and the moral. In fact … narrative can determine moral meaning.” Ibid., 175. (The
Great Controversy theodicy is a moral-legal controversy). Narrative transforms how we understand
evil. Instead of denying evil, ameliorating it, or counter-balancing it as in a cost-benefit framework
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Why think the problem of evil is different? History, narrative, and politics are a much more
appropriate and fruitful means, especially if evil is warfare, even cosmic warfare. The Great
Controversy theodicy turns this objection on its head.

The Plausibility of the End of Evil’s Risk
The fifth objection is similar to the fourth only it concerns not the origin but the end
of evil.793 The Great Controversy theodicy claims that evil’s risk will be eternally eliminated
because so much evidence will amass of God’s love and evil’s absurdity that it can never
arise again. Knowledge removes ignorance. Rice raises the objection that “this account seems
to shift the premise of rebellion from perversity to ignorance.”794 Here is how Rice frames the
dilemma, “If sin is a matter of ignorance, we have a basis for confidence in the ultimate
security of the universe, but we cannot explain Lucifer’s heavenly revolt. On the other hand,
if sin is essentially an act of perversity, then we can identify Lucifer’s rebellion, but we have
no guarantee that some other being will not make an irrational, wholly unjustified, decision to
rebel against God in the future.”795 What makes this difficult is that Lucifer rebelled in the
very presence of God with a full knowledge of God’s character.796 He seemed to have the

(the outcome of greater good approaches like Hick’s), evil is seen as “horrible acts in the final raging
struggle of an evil intelligence that knows itself to be defeated.” See Ibid., 179.
“A further question about the coherence of this luciferous theodicy concerns its concept of
a morally secure universe.” Rice, “The Great Controversy and the Problem of Evil,” 53.
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“Now, if Lucifer could rebel against God with all that he knew of God’s character, how
can we be sure that in the future ages no other being will do the same? On the other hand, if enough
evidence could prevent someone from sinning why was it Lucifer, of all creatures, who started it?”
Ibid.
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Ibid. Rice’s framing echoes the intellectual versus voluntarist debate, with ignorance
versus perversity substituting as the polarities.
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Ibid. Earlier Rice noted that the Great Controversy maintains that Satan and his angels
could not be offered salvation because unlike Adam and Eve they rebelled while having a full
(obviously not exhaustively) knowledge of God’s love and goodness. They were not ignorant. Adam
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conditions needed to be morally secure. The interesting twist Rice introduces is to frame the
end of evil as the mirror of its beginning. Whatever explanation is offered for the beginning
will be in tension with what can be claimed at the end. Put in terms of this discussion this is
suggesting either evil’s ‘risk’ is rational or its ‘elimination’ is, but not both. Is the Great
Controversy idea of the mystery of evil too robust a concept? Is it a risk that cannot be
eliminated?
A full discussion is beyond this scope of this thesis. A few brief points will have to
suffice. First, suggesting that ignorance makes sin more explicable faces its own problems. It
is true that originally no unfallen creature would know what evil is. All were ‘ignorant.’ But
finite creatures are ignorant of many things. That is definitional. If being a creature means
limited knowledge then trust in God in all such areas is axiomatic. Failure to trust God’s truth
itself is ‘perverse.’ Such ignorance can be wilful. Intellect and will are hard to separate.
Ignorance does not make evil more explicable. And it is unlikely that a perverse will has no
‘reasons’ (regardless of their truthfulness). Original evil is not the mind then will falling prey
to a deception or seduction. Evil is self-deception and self-seduction. It is the mind-willing
and the willed-thinking of an agent. The horns of the dilemma are vulnerable. Rice’s division
between ignorance/intellect and perversity/will is too tidy. Second, the emphasis of the Great
Controversy lands on the relationship (between God and creation) and especially character
(the moral state of creation) not on mind or will.797 Character includes both the mental and
moral but is not reducible to one or the other. It is too weak a description to say that
knowledge or removal of ignorance is what makes the universe safe. The Great Controversy

and Eve did not know God in the same way. They had the hope of a full revelation winning them
back. Ibid., 49.
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Hence the need for a clearer conception of libertarian freedom, namely, some form of soft
libertarianism or virtue libertarianism.
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provides knowledge and wisdom based in experience, demonstration, and history. Against the
danger of ‘perversity’, creatures individually and collectively, will have freely developed,
matured, settled and perfected characters. Central to the overcoming of the mystery of evil is
the mystery of godliness as ‘incarnation’ (God uniting himself to creation) and ‘Christ in us’
(creation being united to God), as revelation to the angelic and unfallen universe. This is not
simply ‘knowledge’, this is a structural change in the divine-creature relationship. More than
removal of ignorance lies behind the Great Controversy theodicy solution to evil’s mystery.
Third, it is not merely the mystery of evil but the mystification of evil (which enables the
spread of rebellion) which produced cosmic war. In the end of the Great Controversy all
elements of the mystification are disproven. A mystification could never gain traction again.
Hypothetically, even if an individual fall ‘could’ take place again, no cosmic war would
eventuate. These reflections do not completely remove the dilemma. But the dilemma is not
fatal. At worst, God is free to eliminate a truly recalcitrant creature should one arise. The
entire universe knows what evil means. As God justly annihilates sinners at the end of the
Great Controversy so he could do so again if needed.798
Even if these answers don’t fully suffice, the Great Controversy theodicy can fall back
on divine foreknowledge. God foreknew that the Great Controversy will be eternally
successful. It is likely that no-one can totally eliminate theoretical dilemmas connected to
evil’s origins or its end. This mystery is the strange, illusive challenge to creation which can

Unsurprisingly, the shift to character as an answer raises a new issue. Why didn’t Lucifer
form a settled mind/character (as the redeemed will)? It could be that, ironically or paradoxically, in
so perfect an environment as heaven, where good character is ubiquitous and externally
reinforcement, and thus so little tested, that the process of internally setting character is extremely
slow. The will thus retained its morally open significant potential for a lot longer than in our current
hothouse environment in which moral options are constantly pressing upon us and compelling swift
character formation. In this case Lucifer’s character formation was still not settled enough to
completely and absolutely preclude the, as yet, unencountered possibility of the mystery of evil.
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be hedged against but not completely prevented because it must (and can) be cured against
only upon its emergence.

Conclusion
By undertaking an internal comparison between Boyd’s theodicy and the Great
Controversy theodicy we found that cosmic warfare theodicies explain evil as the risk based
in free will. Risk accounts for the possibility and continuity of evil, however, it is the size,
scope and ability to end risk that is the crux of a viable cosmic warfare explanation. Cosmic
warfare theodicies resolve the problem of evil by how they deal with risk. Boyd offers a
bifocal explanation using libertarian freedom (free will defence) within a cosmic war model
to deal with risk. Evil is a power conflict arising from and operating within the metaphysical
structures of love and freedom. The Great Controversy theodicy has a trifocal explanation for
risk, using libertarian freedom (free will defence) within a cosmic war which operates within
an additional new layer of cosmic controversy. Evil is a political-ideological conflict made
possible because of freedom and love but revolving around God’s law. These approaches
handle the perils of risk differently. Boyd’s libertarian metaphysics (and Open Theist denial
of exhaustive definitive foreknowledge) require him to equivocate between models of
freedom and he ends up relying on (the incompatible model of) compatibilist freedom to
resolve libertarian risk. This is one of a number of other serious internal tensions in Boyd’s
attempt to resolve the issue of risk. The Great Controversy theodicy relies on metanarrative
instead of metaphysics to resolve the hazards of risk. Victory in a cosmic controversy is not
based in metaphysical constraints but winning the controversy. Nevertheless, the Great
Controversy theodicy needs a metaphysical model of freedom that is in harmony with its
metanarrative and avoids the equivocation between incompatible models of freedom as seen
in Boyd’s approach.
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This chapter identified Soft or Virtue Libertarianism as models of freedom that the
Great Controversy metanarrative could utilise to round out its theodicy. This chapter also
looked at objections to the Great Controversy theodicy based in questions about the
plausibility of its account of the emergence of evil. It was found that these objections failed to
consider elements of the Great Controversy which offer adequate responses so that none of
these objections prove fatal.
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CHAPTER 5: MODELLING THE GREAT CONTROVERSY AS A THEODICY

In this chapter, how the Great Controversy theodicy resolves the problem of evil and
an outline of the Great Controversy metanarrative as a working theodicy in response to the
evidential problem of evil will be put together. How the Great Controversy progressively
resolves the wider theodicy issues at issue will be outlined. In so doing, a pattern emerges
where solutions to problems are often partial or unsuccessful and uncover new problems
which, in turn, require more comprehensive and fuller solutions to arrive at an adequate
solution

Problem 1 > solution 1 = problem 2 > solution 2 = problem 3 > solution 3

The process is not necessarily endless. The endpoint is not a perfect theodicy that can
answer all issues and faces no more challenges (impossible when dealing with the vast
problem evil presents to us) but to reach a point where solutions stop generating new theorydefeating problems. In dealing with the final problem (problem 3), we will present two
different ‘modellings’ of the Great Controversy which show how it can successfully deal with
major problems for theodicy. The various modellings presuppose (and hopefully
demonstrate) the unity and coherence of the underlying metanarrative. The structure of the
argument for chapter 5 is outlined in Table 9:
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Table 9: Structure of Argument in Chapter 5
PROBLEM 1

Evidential
Problem of
Evil

PROBLEM 2A
& 2B

Traditional
Theodicy

SOLUTION 1

2A) Evidential
Evasion &
2B) Ethical
Contradiction

PROBLEM 3A
& 3B

Free Will
Defence:
Partial Greater
Good Defence

SOLUTION 2

3A) Ethical
Impermissibility
& 3B) Free will
Equivocation

The
Great
Controversy
Theodicy

SOLUTION 3

For context, it is helpful to briefly re-cap the initiating challenge of the Evidential
Problem of Evil (problem 1), and the response of traditional theodicy (solution 1). The
traditional greater good defence is found to be a false start and fails as a solution in two major
ways. One is its questionable denial of the reality of gratuitous evil. This external evidential
or factual problem of the denial of gratuitous evil will be called the problem of “evidential
evasion” (problem 2A). The other more important failure is the fatal ethical contradiction and
incoherence in traditional theodicy. Traditional theodicies rely on consequentialist ethics
even though theism is ethically deontological. This internal theoretical contradiction between
theological and theodicy ethics will be called the “ethical contradiction” problem (problem
2B). Among the most pointed criticisms of traditional theodicies ethical inconsistencies are
those made by Anti-theodicy. In response to these criticisms, a free will defence, understood
as a ‘Petersonian’ partial greater good defence, offers a promising initial cosmic-warfarefriendly response to the evidential problem (solution 2). This free will response is
foundational for the Great Controversy Theodicy, although the Great Controversy goes
beyond it. This ‘solution 2’ is partially successful but incomplete, and eventually falls short in
the face of new objections (problem 3A and 3B). There is a new external evidential problem.
While Solution 2 shows that evil can be gratuitous, on its own it struggles to ethically account
for the amount and scale of gratuitous evil. The question then becomes: Are creation and free
will really worth all the evil? This is a version of Boyd’s “worth it” question. This will be
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called the “ethical impermissibility” problem (problem 3A). The other problem is a new
internal theoretical problem. The idea of libertarian freedom can account for the “fact of evil”
in terms of its origins and initial permission but not for the continuation of evil mentioned
above (i.e. scale of evil) nor more importantly for the end of evil. This is a version of Boyd’s
“win it” question. Boyd attempted to resolve this problem by equivocating between different
models of freedom, one model of freedom to explain the origin of evil and a different one to
explain its end. This internal theoretical problem will be called the “Free will equivocation”
problem (problem 3B). It involves arbitrarily switching between models of freedom in order
to answer the “win it” question. The Great Controversy theodicy (solution 3) will be shown to
resolve problems 3A/3B.

Problem 1 (Evidential Problem of Evil) and Solution 1 (Traditional Theodicy)
In Chapter One it was shown how the evidential argument frames the problem of evil
trilemma in such a way that theists are faced with the hard choice between a strongly
‘evident’ factual premise (gratuitous evil exists) or the widely held theological premise (an
omni-God only providentially permits evil for a greater good). One can affirm either reality
but one cannot affirm both. What gives this argument power is that both premises seem
obvious to the theist and sceptic. Theists have typically accepted the way antitheists have
framed the evidential argument and offer a range of greater goods (free will, soul-making,
higher harmony, natural order, divine glory etc.) as explanations for evil.

Formulating Theodicies: The Full Greater Good Defence (Solution 1)
These various greater goods detail the parts of a traditional theodicy and what makes
them work. But this study is interested to see how they work. To do this theodicies will be
formularised below. All of these greater goods are expressions of the full greater good
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defence.799 This means the greater goods are subsequent to the evil (GGSUB), that is, the evil is
necessary to achieving the greater goods. The evil is the means to the good.

Evil/Suffering (NECESSARY)
or

Evil (NEC)

Greater Good SUBSEQUENT

GGSUB

A good example is John Hick’s soul-making theodicy. His entire theodicy is
teleological in structure. The greater good end is what justifies the evils in the oftenharrowing soul-making process. Evil and suffering are the means to the end but they are
outweighed by the good of the end.

Evil/Suffering (NECESSARY)
or

Evil (NEC)

GGSUBSEQUENT (E.G. SOUL-MAKING)

GGSUB (S-M)

However, in view of dysteleological evils (evil or suffering that is soul-crushing) this
theodicy, as it stands, does not work. Evil is clearly not outweighed in many cases. To rescue
the justificatory pattern of soul-making, Hick needs to add another eschatological element –
an afterlife with further opportunity in the form of the doctrine of ‘universalism.’ This
ensures that everyone eventually perfects their soul and any evil experienced along the way is
finally outweighed and compensated. Thus, Hick’s theodicy works as follows:

Evil (NEC)

799

GGSUB (S-M) + Universalism

See chapter one for a comparison between full and partial greater good defences.
225

Felix Culpa is another classic greater good defence.800 Plantinga’s felix culpa was
examined earlier. In Plantinga’s version libertarian free will provides the occasion for the fall.
However, it is the fall into evil itself and not free will that brings about and necessitates the
greater good of incarnation and atonement.801 Free will could have continued without sin and
thus without atonement. That is why free will is not included in the formulation. Free will is
present, along with many other factors (e.g. Molinism, allusions to Satan, Natural Order), in
Plantinga’s description. For felix culpa to work one could even utilise a compatibilist account
of freedom to account for the evil. Indeed, the Calvinist versions of Jonathan Edwards and
Paul Helm’s do exactly that. Plantinga’s version looks like this:

Evil/Felix Culpa (NECESSARY)
or

Evil/FC (NEC)

GGSUBSEQUENT (E.G. INCARNATION/ATONEMENT)

GGSUB (INC/AT)

Calvin and Edwards versions of felix culpa keep the same basic greater good structure
but also differ to versions like Plantinga’s and Milton’s.802 The greater good is defined more
broadly as the divine glory revealed and manifested to creation. This goes beyond the
incarnation and atonement to include the necessity of a display of justice, wrath, and eternal
punishment in hell. The (Calvinistic/Edwardian) divine glory defence (DGD), in effect an
expanded felix culpa, looks like this:
800

Felix culpa advocates include John Milton, Gottfried Leibnitz, John Hick, and Paul Helm.
Kevin Diller, “Are Sin and Evil Necessary for a Really Good World? Questions for Alvin Plantinga’s
Felix Culpa Theodicy,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008): 87, 88.
“This theodicy, then, like all greater good theodicies, purports to show why all evils are
necessary to a greater good that God aims to achieve.” Peterson, “Christian Theism and the Evidential
Argument from Evil,” 184. Peterson points out that sin/evil is not necessary to the great good of
incarnation but only to that of atonement. Ibid., 184, 185.
801

802

With free will Plantinga and Milton are libertarians while Edwards and Helm are
compatibilist.
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Evil (NECESSARY)
or

Evil (NEC)

GGSUBSEQUENT (E.G. FULL DISPLAY OF GOD’S ATTRIBUTES)
GGSUB (DGD)

Common to all these full greater good theodicies is the necessitating of evil. Evil and
suffering have instrumental value and purpose in being the necessary means to the greater
good. Evil is never gratuitous. God’s meticulous providence ensures all evils serve a good
purpose. What ultimately justifies everything is the outcome. The greater good outweighs
evil. These are all teleological in shape. 803

The Problems of Evidential Evasion (Problem 2A) and Ethical Contradiction (Problem
2B)
These traditional greater good theodicy solutions (solution 1) have two major
problems (problem 2A & B). These are the external problem of “evidential evasion”
(problem 2A), and the internal problem of “ethical contradiction” (problem 2B). The first
problem is a non-fatal but very unsatisfying response while the second is more serious and
reveals a fatal contradiction. Problem 2A of ‘evidential evasion’ will first be considered. This
evidential evasion is the observation that greater good attempts to explain evil end up
‘evading’ the reality of gratuitous evil. The evidence for gratuitous evil appears axiomatic,
while the evidence that all evils (including gratuitous evils) work to a greater good is elusive
and lacking. Theism admits as much by appealing to sceptical theism and claiming that while
it cannot show a greater good for such evils, nevertheless no-one can claim that there are not

803

Some modern theists add sceptical theism to their greater good theodicies. Evil is
necessary for general and specific greater good but what the actual specific greater good is that
justifies a particular evil, is unknown to us. And, being limited finite beings, we have no reason to
think that we can necessarily know what it may be.
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other unknown/unknowable greater goods which could explain this. At best this creates a
frustrating intellectual deadlock in which theism is unable to show from reality that the
evidence supports its position but it is still able to insulate this failure from acting as a
decisive disproof or disconfirmation of its position by means of sceptical theism. The debate
ends up inconclusive but weighted in the sceptic’s favour. Considering the evidential problem
of evil is an inductive argument from evidence in terms of plausibility and probability, and
not about proof, this is a telling undermining of the theist position.804 The evidential problem
of evil appears to be sustained to the degree that the factual affirmation of gratuitous evil is
more likely than not to be true.805 The restricted theism of the evidential problem of evil
seems to fail the correspondence test806 only to escape or ‘evade’ this total theory failure via
unknown/unknowable greater goods of sceptical theism. This is a pyrrhic kind of victory.807

804

William Rowe highlights the strain sceptical theism puts on the credibility of theism. He
notes that if “human and animal life on earth were nothing more than a series of agonizing moments
from birth to death, my friends’ [Daniel Howard-Synder and Michael Bergmann] position would still
require them to say that we cannot reasonably infer that it is even likely that God does not exist …
[but] surely there must be some point at which the appalling agony of human and animal existence on
earth would render it unlikely that God exists.” William L. Rowe, “Is Evil Evidence against Belief in
God?” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L Peterson and Raymond J.
Vanarragon (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 26. Rowe believes the current amount of evil is at that point.
Hence some theists engage in the “Moore Switch.” This strategy admits evil invalidate
belief in God but other Christian evidences turn the argument back in favour of belief. Johnson,
“Calvinism and the Problem of Evil: A Map of the Territory,” 51. Here theism survives despite its
theodicy! A theodicy able to affirm the evidence for gratuitous evil is preferable.
805

On the ‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’ see, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland,
Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003),
135–142.
806

807

Michael Peterson objects to the apparent moral implications of sceptical theism where we
“literally have no idea whatsoever whether the life of Mother Teresa was better or worse on the
whole, and made a better or worse contribution to the goodness of the world overall, than the life of
Saddam Hussein.” See, Peterson, “Christian Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil,” 186.
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Formulating the Partial-Greater Good Defence (Solution 2A)
Theism requires a different approach. Help comes by recalling the distinction already
made between two different versions of the greater good approach in chapter one. Traditional
theodicies, outlined above, use the full-greater good defence. This is what most people think
of when they use the term greater good. Following Michael Petersons work the alternative
partial-greater good defence was identified. This approach marks a genuine break with
traditional theodicies. These two approaches are opposites. In the full-greater good defence
the greater good is subsequent to evil (GGSUB). In the partial-greater good defence, the
greater good is antecedent to the evil (GGANTE). As such, this good is good, in and of itself,
and does not require the evil. Its connection to evil is indirect, it only gives rise to the
possibility of evil or arises simultaneously with the evil, without causing or necessitating the
evil. Evil may, therefore, be gratuitous. The reality and substantial evidence for gratuitous
evil is not denied. There is no need for evil to be explained by reference to God’s ordaining,
willing or necessitating it. The partial-greater good defence understanding of free will
(solution 2A), is what the Great Controversy presupposes, and resolves problem 2A. 808 There
is a risk that comes with free will and that risk is the possibility of evil, including gratuitous
evil.809 This can be formulated as:

Not all uses of free will in theodicy are partial-greater good defences. Plantinga’s felix
culpa theodicy uses free will but in a full greater good defence. This is in contrast to his free will
defence. Diller therefore asks which Plantinga is right? “In a free will theodicy it is the permission of
evil that is essential to the greater good that God intends, in the felix culpa theodicy it is the evil itself
that is essential to the greater good. Evil is made reasonable as a functional good.” Diller, “Are Sin
and Evil Necessary for a Really Good World?” 95, 96.
808

809

While free will is a clear example of a partial-greater good, there are few other contenders
for this category of partial-greater goods. Other possible contenders are John Feinberg’s “Integrity of
Humans Defence.” See chapter 6 of Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil. Another is Richard A. Shenk,
The Wonder of the Cross: The God Who Uses Evil and Suffering to Destroy Evil and Suffering
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013). Interestingly, both are theologically deterministic.
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GGANTECEDENT (E.G. FREE WILL)
or

GGANTE (FW)

Evil (RISK)

Evil (RISK)

A Petersonian partial-greater good defence version of the free will defence (solution
2A) thus successfully deals with the problem of ‘evidential evasion’ (problem 2A).
Gratuitous evil is part of the risk that attends the greater good of creatures who have free will.
There is no need to evade the evidence for gratuitous evil because the factual premise of the
evidential argument from evil is not denied. In fact, if evil arises, gratuity is to be expected.
This is accomplished by modifying the theological premise of the evidential argument, from a
God of the absolute exercise of omnipotence in meticulous providence and control of all
events, to that of a self-limited omnipotence engaging in general providence.810

Anti-theodicy and the Problem of Ethical Contradiction (Problem 2B)
More challenging than the issue of evidential evasion is the problem of ethical
contradiction (problem 2B). Anti-theodicy brings out this problem. Toby Betenson outlines
six major moral objections anti-theodicy has with traditional theodicies.811 They are that 1)
“Theodicy demonstrates a stark moral insensitivity” 812; 2) “Theodicy adopts too detached a

810

Peterson has long argued that the strength of the factual premise should motivate
theologians to revisit the theological Premise of meticulous providence.” The reason being is that
“[A]s long as the principle of Meticulous Providence is accepted, responses to the evidential argument
will be driven in the predictable directions of either Skeptial Theist Defense [sic] or Greater Good
Theodicy, neither of which are prepared to admit that the world would have been better without the
evil in question.” Peterson, “Christian Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil,” 187.
Betenson’s claims should not go unchallenged. Some of his points are overstated or do not
apply universally to all theodicies, even traditional ones. We addressed some responses to antitheodicy in the first chapter and found that anti-theodicy is not always entirely convincing and has its
own limitations.
811

812

The moral insensitivity is in how it downplays horrific suffering and evil as something that
can be outweighed by a greater good or when explaining its necessity it is compared to minor
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perspective”813; 3) “Theodicy exhibits an irremissible moral blindness”814; 4) “Theodicy uses
the wrong moral theory”; 5) “Theodicy treats people as mere means, not ends in themselves”;
and 6) “Theodicy adds to the evils of the world.”815 This studies chief interest is in the fact
that all of these objections share a basic foundational objection that cannot be ignored and
which this analysis reveals is a problem endemic to traditional theodicy. The root objection
that drives anti-theodicy and calls greater good theodicies into question is revealed in
objections 4 and 5. It is the problem of ethics for theodicy. Betenson’s fourth objection is that
“Theodicy uses the wrong moral theory.” Theodicy seems to work off an ‘unrestricted
utilitarianism’816 and instrumentalist approach to evil.817 Evil is the instrumental means to
achieving the good. What matters is the outcome or consequence. This violates the
deontological principle in Romans 3:8 of not doing evil so that good may come. When this
moral theory is applied to people it becomes the fifth objection where ‘theodicy treats people
as mere means, not ends in themselves.’ This is violating a basic principle that people have

suffering (like going to the Dentist). In this way evil/suffering is trivialised. Toby Betenson, “AntiTheodicy,” Philosophical Compass 11 (2016): 57.
“There is something monstrous about an utterly objective and impersonal moral machine,
calculating the costs of innocent suffering against the benefits of greater goods.” Ibid., 58. The purely
dispassionate/abstract theorising of theodicies is troubling.
813

Anti-theodicy objects to the idea that we should be “open-minded about the possibility that
horrendous evils, such as the holocaust, could be justified by appeals to greater goods” because to do
so is to fail to acknowledge the reality of suffering and evil and to fail to lend a voice to the cries of
the innocent sufferers (hence “irremissible moral blindness”). Betenson quotes Surin (who is
paraphrasing Adorno) to be “open-minded when confronted with these morally surd realities is to
have lost any possible accordance with the truth.” Ibid., 59.
814

815

Betenson argues that the previous five points reveal morally bad practice, and in so doing
they add to the evil in the world. Additionally, theoretical detachment may render one oblivious to the
constant need to counteract evil. Ibid., 62. And, if everything serves a good end then why intervene to
stop evil?
816

Ibid., 60.

817

Ibid., 61.
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value in and of themselves and should not be used to another’s ends.818 Building on the
problem that theodicy uses the wrong moral theory, Betenson outlines a dilemma that gets to
the heart of the problems for traditional theodicy. He formulates the following argument
(Betenson uses Hick’s Soul-making theodicy as his example):

1. If traditional theistic ethics is true, then consequentialism is false.
2. If traditional theodicies (such as the ‘Soul-Making Theodicy’) are true, then
consequentialism is true.
3. Therefore, either the traditional theistic ethics is false, or traditional theodicies are
false.819

Theology and theodicy are in ethical conflict. This is the problem of “ethical
contradiction” (problem 2B). Christian theism is ethically non-consequentialist or
deontological. 820 Theodicy is consequentialist. Betenson states that “My dilemma forces
these theists to resolve this inconsistency; either abandon consequentialist theodicies, or

818

This problem was more evident in theodicies of the past. Betenson notes the more recent
‘patient-centered’ approaches of Eleonore Stump and Marilyn Adams in which any goods that justify
suffering must be a benefit for the sufferer. Ibid., 61. Even so, Betenson faults them for retaining a
“consequentialist justification via compensation.” Ibid.
Toby G. Betenson, “The Problem of Evil as a Moral Objection to Theism” (Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Birmingham, 2014), 71.
819

820

For evidence that Christian theistic ethics are non-consequentialist and deontological, see,
David McNaughton, “Is God (almost) a Consequentialist? Swinburne’s Moral Theory,” Religious
Studies 38, no. 2 (2002); 265–81; T. D. J. Chappell, “Why God Is Not a Consequentialist,” Religious
Studies, 29, no. 2 (1993), 239-243. See also Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a
Christian Worldview, 446–459, Christian ethics are either deontological or virtue ethics, ibid., 458.
Shenk argues that Boyd’s warfare theodicy is deontological, see The Wonder of the Cross, 105.
Adventism is deontological, see, Miroslav M. Kis, “Christian Lifestyle and Behavior,” in Handbook
of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen, vol. 12, SDA Bible Commentary
(Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 675.
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abandon non-consequentialist ethics, you cannot have both.”821 Which way should the theist
go? What this dilemma does do is undermine the option of sceptical theism. Even if there is
an outweighing greater good that requires evil, this would not be permissible because the
ethical reasoning behind the theodicy is theologically suspect. There is nothing for sceptical
theism to rescue. “Clearly, there are two very obvious ways we can resolve this dilemma:
reject consequentialist theodicies, or reject traditional theistic ethics.”822 His closing
comments in his Philosophical Compass article are damning. Theodicies must make it that
evil is not fundamentally at odds with belief in God. “Yet, in responding to the problem of
evil by constructing a justification of God’s permission of terrible evil, theodicies think the
morally unthinkable, they sanction the unsanctionable, they justify the unjustifiable;
theodicies render ‘ok’ what should not be rendered ‘ok.’ In short ‘Theodicies mediate a
praxis that sanctions evil.”823 Betenson makes a good point but illogically overstates things
while doing it. The problem with the ethical contradiction between theism and traditional
theodicy is not that evil is fundamentally at odds with belief in God, as if all belief in God
and all theodicies are vulnerable to his analysis and succumb to the problem he highlights.
The problem is that the existence of evil is fundamentally at odds with particular theodicies
and particular beliefs about God, specifically those in which God’s action of permission is
based on requiring and necessitating evil to produce good. It is those specific theodicies
which justify the unjustifiable. Free will theodicies and cosmic warfare theodicies, for
example, possess a different belief about God and his permission of evil and thus a different

821

Betenson, “The Problem of Evil as a Moral Objection to Theism,” 71.

Ibid., 83. Betenson ventures that “I suspect the former is the better option, but I will not
argue for this here.” He then adds that “This is the response of the ‘moral anti-theodicists.’” The Great
Controversy theodicy would agree with anti-theodists.
822

Betenson, “Anti-Theodicy,” 64. The last quote is taken from Nick Trakakis, The End of
Philosophy of Religion (London: Continuum, 2008), 28–29.
823
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theodicy which may not be vulnerable to this problem.824 What is clear, is that a new solution
is needed that that avoids the fatal ‘cold’ of the evidential problem of evil or the fatal ‘cure’
of consequentialism theodicies.

Resolving Ethical Contradiction through the Doctrine of Double Effect (Solution 2B)
Deontological theism needs a theodicy that is ethically consistent to avoid the ethical
contradiction. The partial-greater good defence version of the free will defence resolves the
problem of evidential evasion and also goes a long way to resolving this problem of ethical
contradiction (Problem 2B). To demonstrate this, use will be made of the ethical concept of
the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ (DDE). This will prove important for articulating the way the
Great Controversy theodicy resolves the problem of evil.825 The DDE refers to a form of
deontological ethical reasoning undertaken by a moral agent when faced with a moral
dilemma. The doctrine or principle aims to show that “it is permissible to cause a harm as a
side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be
permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.”826 DDE is
a valuable instrument and principle of moral reasoning that is common in discussions of

Diller notes the comparison between free will and felix culpa defences. “Unlike a free will
theodicy, in a Felix Culpa theodicy God desires evil as a means to his good purposes. This move has a
dangerously distorting moral and theological impact.” Diller, “Are Sin and Evil Necessary for a
Really Good World?” 96. The moral distortion is implying that God is functionally equivalent to a
utilitarian or moral consequentialist. Diller also asks, “Moreover, should we not resist a theodicy
which would attempt to explain the source of the evil in a way that would make the emergence of evil
rational or sensible.” Ibid.
824

825

Maintaining deontologically consistent reasoning is crucial to the success and viability of
the Great Controversy theodicy.
Alison McIntyre, “Doctrine of Double Effect,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, Accessed on Jan 14, 2016,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/double-effect/.
826
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medical and military ethics but also applies in other areas. 827 The principle is not
uncontroversial but enjoys widespread appeal and use.828 It should be noted that the
assumption in this discussion is not that God is subject to the DDE in a way that creatures
are, but that as a deontological principle, DDE is consistent with the God who is the source of
right and wrong.829 The DDE serves to show God’s moral and rational consistency and this
vindicates his actions. His actions align with the best moral reasoning which itself aligns with
God’s character. The Great Controversy theodicy (a partial-greater good defence)
demonstrates this truth. The DDE is not so much a singular principle as a series of moral
conditions that must be upheld in a moral dilemma where harm or evil may result from our
actions. The four conditions are:

The first clear explicit appearance of DDE is in Thomas Aquinas’ discussion about selfdefence in which he says that it is permissible to harm a person in self-defence because harming the
person is not the goal, it is a side-effect of the effort to protect oneself. Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu.
64, Art.7)
827

David Oderberg notes that the DDE is, despite criticisms and difficulties, “a keystone of
sound moral thinking” without which much ethical reasoning “would remain nothing but a high ideal
with little consistent applicability.” David S. Oderberg, “The Doctrine of Double Effect,” in A
Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. T. O’Connor and C. Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010), 324. Everyday examples include whether to drive a car knowing it causes pollution or should a
doctor give an antibiotic knowing that it will cause a rash, etc.
828

829

We are not arguing that God has moral obligations to something outside himself. God is
simply true to himself. For a discussion of various issues such as the ethics of Divine obligation, the
Euthyphro Dilemma, etc, see, Evans, The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian
Beliefs, 133–196.
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1. The act itself must be morally good (or at least indifferent).
2. The agent must not positively intend the bad effect.830
3. The good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect (the
evil must not be the means of the good).831
4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the bad effect.832
These will be referred to as DDE 1 or ‘Lawful condition’, DDE 2 or ‘Intention
condition’, DDE 3 or ‘Means/Ends condition’, and DDE 4 or the ‘Proportionate condition’.
There are a number of well-known scenarios in the literature illustrating the exercise of the
DDE. A doctor who opposes abortion may, nevertheless, believe it permissible to allow an
abortion to occur in the case of a pregnant women who needs to have a hysterectomy in order
to remove an immediate life-threatening cancer.833 The goal is not the abortion, although it
will occur due to pursuing the intended goal of saving the mother’s life. Another common
scenario is that of administering pain relief drugs to terminally ill patients which may have
the side-effect of hastening death. One does not intend the hastening of death rather only the
relief of pain. Many other examples are drawn from medical and military situations.834 Other

“If ‘avoiding evil’ means anything, it means, first and foremost, that one may never intend
evil, whether as means or as end. One may, however, permit or tolerate it.” Oderberg, “The Doctrine
of Double Effect,” 326, 327.
830

The conditions, DDE 2 and DDE 3, rule out evil as means or ends “A plausible
presumption in action theory is that he who wills the end also wills the means.” Ibid., 326. With DDE
3 a person “must, at most, only foresee that he will or may cause (or allow) the evil effect.” Ibid.,
327.
831

832

For other articulations of the DDE see the New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1021; Daniel P.
Sulmasy, “The Use and Abuse of the Principle of Double Effect,” Clinical Practice Management, no.
3 (1996): 87.
833

In carrying out the hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman's life while
merely foreseeing the death of the foetus. Performing an abortion, by contrast, would involve
intending to kill the foetus as a means to saving the mother. McIntyre, “Doctrine of Double Effect.”
834

See the distinction between the strategic (or tactical) bomber versus the terror bomber in
Oderberg, “The Doctrine of Double Effect,” 326.
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much discussed scenarios include sacrificing one’s life to save others versus suicide,835 and
killing in self-defence versus the pre-emptive killing of someone who intends to kill you.836
In order for an act to qualify as permissible, the action must not violate any of the
DDE conditions. The first three conditions are clear deontological principles. The last
condition could be (mis)read as a consequentialist principle but needs to be understood
deontologically.837 A consequentialist reading would misunderstand the DDE principle as
seeing the outcome as solely justifying the action. This would in fact render the first three
conditions unnecessary. On the proper deontological understanding, DDE 4, only comes into
play when the other conditions have been satisfied. In other words, no moral wrong in itself is
being committed by taking the action but the action still has consequences. This leads to the
question: is this morally allowable action also a permissible action, given there is a serious
unintended side-effect? One can only evaluate this by looking to see if the goods it produces
are sufficiently proportionate to the harm or evil that eventuates as a by-product of the action.
On this understanding of the fourth condition, the outcome itself does not justify the action or
nullify the first three conditions, but it may serve to confirm its permissibility or prohibit its
occurrence.838 The prohibition may be due to the lack of value or worth or gain or likelihood
of the good. In this way, the proportionality condition functions in a manner subsidiary to the

835

836

McIntyre, “Doctrine of Double Effect.”
Ibid.

The DDE 4 condition can be mistakenly read as “disguised consequentialist judgment” but
the “clause in no way requires one to compare good and bad states of affairs in order to judge the
overall balance of good over evil. All it says is that there must be a proportionate reason for causing
the evil effect.” Oderberg, “The Doctrine of Double Effect,” 327.
837

“But DDE is first and foremost a doctrine about what we may do, in other words it is a
doctrine of permissibility.” Ibid., 327. We can make further decisions within that sphere of
permissibility, we may do either what is advised or what is admirable. We may “take a more elevated
course of action than simply doing what we are allowed.” Ibid. But all of these decisions are only
made if something is permissible.
838
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deontological. The good gained by the action may be trivial and minor in comparison to the
harm it produces and thus impermissible. Consequences don’t in themselves determine right
or wrong but they may serve to reveal the wisdom or worth of an action.839

Use of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)
The applicability of the DDE to theodicy has been noted by others, although it is
surprising that there has not been greater use made of it. Examples of explicit reference to the
DDE in theodicy discussions include Porkoli’s and Haj’jari’s suggestion that Milton uses
double effect reasoning in his theodicy of Paradise Lost.840 Jeremy Evans, referencing Bruce
Reichenbach’s Natural Law theodicy, says that “there is a double effect from human
participation in a lawlike natural order.”841 In mind here are the natural evils which people
suffer from (examples given include diseases, sickness, disasters, birth defects, as well as the
fact that the fire which helps us cook can also burn us) which are the results of the natural
order we are part of. Evans quotes Reichenbach as saying that these “are the by-products
made possible by that which is necessary for the greater good.”842 It appears in Peter Byrne’s
discussion and critique of Paul Helm’s deterministic-style theodicy.843 Gwen Griffith-Dickson
includes it in her discussion of the problem of evil and her referencing of Trau’s free will

“For a consequentialist, all that matters is the weighing of out-comes. For the defender of
DDE, what matters is the relative importance of the reasons for taking a proposed course of action.”
Ibid. italics mine.
839

Jafar Mirzaee Porkoli and Mohammad-Javad Haj’jari, “Double-Effect Reasoning in
Paradise Lost: An Investigation into Milton’s God’s Will in Humankind’s Fall,” Brno Studies 42, no.
1 (2016): 18.
840
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Evans, The Problem of Evil, 11.

842

Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God, 101.

Peter Byrne, “Helm’s God and the Authorship of Sin,” in Reason, Faith, History:
Philosophical Essay’s for Paul Helm, ed. Martin Stone (Ashgate, 2008), 193–204.
843
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defence. She states that theodicy issues “can be considered with the doctrine of ‘double
effect’.”844 The DDE has been used by Alexander Pruss and Heath White to alleviate the
challenges theological determinism has in dealing with the problem of evil. Their discussion
will be returned to later.845

Applying the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)
This study will now apply the DDE to theodicies. Doing so clarifies a number of
things. It provides deontological proponents a structured way of evaluating the ethical
permissibility/ impermissibility of their own theodicies and also of other theodicies. It serves
to show that there are a class of theodicies which make the same criticisms that Anti-theodicy
makes of traditional theodicy, without falling prey to the same criticism. These
deontologically consistent theodicies resolve the problem of ethical contradiction (this
includes the free will defence structure of the Great Controversy theodicy). If Hick’s soulmaking theodicy is taken as an example (see Table 10), it can be seen that under a DDE
analysis his theodicy violates multiple conditions. It might pass DDE 1 (God acts to create a
soul-making environment). But it violates DDE 2 and especially DDE 3, as God positively
intends that suffering and evil will take place (contra DDE 2) and they function as the means
to bring about soul-making (contra DDE 3).846 Soul-making also spectacularly fails DDE 4 in
the form of dysteleological evils where many souls are crushed rather than made. To counter

844

Gwen Griffith-Dickson, The Philosophy of Religion (London: SCM Press, 2005), 326–
327. J M Trau has also published under the name J M Zwerner.
Heath White, “Theological Determinism and the ‘Authoring Sin’ Objection,” in Calvinism
and the Problem of Evil, ed. David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Eugene, OR: Pickwick
Publications, 2016), 78–95; Alexander R. Pruss, “The First Sin: A Dilemma for Christian
Determinists,” in Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, ed. David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016), 187–99.
845
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Note: Violations of DDE 1-4 are underlined and bolded in italics in the diagrams.
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balance this, Hick opts for souls having additional chances for soul-making in the afterlife
and asserts the heterodox doctrine of universalism. Both of these are theologically
problematic. Regardless of this, given that DDE 2 and 3 are violated, the action is ethically
impermissible. And because this is a deontological ethical construct simply overweighing the
evil by good consequences does not justify intending the evil.

Table 10: Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy and the Doctrine of Double Effect
GOOD EFFECT (Soul-making)

DDE-3
Bad is means to the Good

ACTION
DDE-1
Soul-making World

DDE-4 (Universalism is
theologically impermissible)

DDE-2
Bad is intended
BAD EFFECT (Evil/Suffering)

Plantinga’s felix culpa fails in a similar manner (Table 11). The action of God
creating a world in order to produce incarnation and atonement necessitates God not only
ensuring evil arises (contra DDE2) but also that the evil is the means to the production of the
greater good (contra DDE3).
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Table 11: Plantinga's Felix Culpa Theodicy and the Doctrine of Double Effect
GOOD EFFECT (Incarnation/Atonement)

DDE-3
Bad is means to the Good

ACTION
DDE-1
Create World with Fall

DDE-4 Greater Goods
outweigh evil/suffering

DDE-2
Bad is intended
BAD EFFECT (Evil/Suffering)

The divine glory defence (Table 12), like felix culpa, violates DDE 2 and 3. God
appears to need evil and the reprobate in order to accomplish his ends. God intends the fall
and evil (DDE2). The good effect is completely dependent on the evil. Divine glory defence
determinism also strengthens this evaluation. One could also argue that DDE4 is also violated
in regards to the wicked.

Table 12: The Divine Glory Defence and the Doctrine of Double Effect
GOOD EFFECT (Divine Glory Manifested)

DDE-3
Bad is means to the Good

ACTION
DDE-1
Decree Elect/Reprobate/Creation

DDE-4 Greater Goods
outweigh evil/suffering

DDE-2
Bad is intended
BAD EFFECT (Evil/Suffering)
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The DDE and the Free Will Defence
If the free will defence is foundational for the Great Controversy theodicy, then the
use of the partial-greater good defence version makes a significant difference when evaluated
by the DDE (see Table 13). The Divine action is good (DDE1). Evil is not intended, although
it is foreseen as a risk, and the risk is permitted (DDE2). It is important to note that it is only
the risk of evil, and not evil itself, which is the double effect. This is very significant, as
critics of the DDE sometimes raise the objection that intention and foresight are too close
together to be separated. In this criticism DDE2 is collapsed into DDE3 with foreseen effects
counting as intended means. DDE proponents reject this. However, even if this criticism was
accepted, the most that can be said is that God intended the risk of evil, not the evil itself,
although he foresaw the emergence of evil. God foresaw that a responsible, accountable free
will agent caused, intended evil. This act cannot be traced to God’s action, intention or
causation, only his permission.

Table 13: The Free Will Defence and the Doctrine of Double Effect
GOOD EFFECT (Free will agents)
DDE-3
Bad is NOT means to the good
ACTION
DDE-1
Create Free World
DDE-2
EVIL is NOT Intended
(Risk is unavoidable)

DDE-4 Degree of evil/suffering
appears out of proportion to value of free will
BAD EFFECT (Risk of EVIL)

The Problem of Ethical Permissibility (Problem 3A). Is Creation worth it?
The DDE has its own dual effect. It shows that a partial-greater good defence version
of the free will defence avoids ethical contradiction and resolves problem 2B (that is, it does
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not violate DDE 1-3) but unfortunately, in doing so it reveals a new problem (see Table 13).
It faces a real problem with DDE4 the ‘proportionate condition.’ Is a free creation (based on
the necessity of permitting the possibility of gratuitous evil) actually worth it? This is another
way of saying is the ‘risk’ worth it? This is the problem of “ethical impermissibility”
(problem 3A), the problem of the value of creation in face of the scale of evil. This is the
evidential problem of evil returned. Is good worth the risk of evil? Is creation morally
permissible but proportionately questionable?847 The free will defence is clearly not enough.
Continuing to maintain creation for the sake of the abstract value of freedoms when evil and
suffering are concretely overwhelming it, seems morally cruel and rationally foolish.
Offering only a minimal deontologically consistent defence, in which God is justified and
within his rights to preserve a freedom-enabling creation state, but ignoring the sheer
magnitude of the effects, leaves the impression that God is unfeeling and callous (questioning
God’s omni-benevolence). In this case the logical win is a moral loss. Gratuitous evil not
being in itself an argument against God, does not mean that any amount of gratuitous evil is
justified. Does a Petersonian partial-greater good defence answer the evidential problem of
evil according to the logical letter but fail its ethical or evidential spirit?
The problem is complicated further. Because a partial-greater-good appeals to an
antecedent good (free will creation) to justify the divine permission of evil, it cannot be
appealed to on its own to explain subsequent extreme evil. To do so is to transform it into a
full-greater good (GGSUB). Such a move ends up back in a consequentialist ethical position in
violation of key theological and deontological norms. So, while the free will defence helps to
explain the divine permission for evil’s origins, it needs some other help to account for
subsequent ongoing evil. It needs practical theodicy, it needs eschatology, it needs expanded
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The same could be said of the natural law defence which is often combined with the free
will defence.
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theism. It needs a fuller story. It needs all of this to be integrated together. It needs a narrative
theodicy like the Great Controversy, though the Great Controversy theodicy must itself avoid
retreating to ethical consequentialism in order to answer this reoccurring issue of value or
worth.

Resolving Ethical Permissibility and the Doctrine of Triple Effect
To respond to the problem of ethical permissibility (3A) this study will run the Great
Controversy theodicy through the moral matrix of the DDE. In doing so, use will be made of
an expansion of the DDE called the ‘Doctrine of Triple Effect’ (DTE). Before doing so it will
be noted how theological determinists have attempted something similar.848 In the book
Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, several authors attempt to read and validate deterministicstyle theodicies through the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). Alexander Pruss, a Catholic
Philosopher and non-Calvinist, broaches DDE as a way of conducting theodicy for a
deterministic theology.849 The reason to appeal to DDE is because in Thomistic determinism
“creaturely free actions are determined by God’s causality and not by any finite causes.” 850
This appears to make God violate the deontological principle (or DP), where DP stands for
the “the basic ethical principle that one may not do evil that good may come of it.”851 God
appears to determine and intentionally cause the first sin. This discussions interest is not in
how Pruss helps the Thomist or determinist but that in his discussion he looks at how other
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If the DDE/TDE is able to help the vastly more difficult challenges theological
determinism face with the problem of evil then such an approach may prove even more effectual
when used in a non-deterministic setting.
849

Pruss looks at Thomistic and Edwardsian Calvinism versions of determinism.
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Pruss, “The First Sin: A Dilemma for Christian Determinists,” 188.

851

Ibid.
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deterministic and non-deterministic theologies might utilise DDE.852 He does this because all
Christians face the issue of God’s permission of sin (he has the first sin particularly in
mind).853 He outlines how different theologies can argue a story of God intending an initial
set of conditions that lead to sin, but that God in fact intended those initial conditions for a
reason independent of the fact that they bring about sin.854 For example, he argues Open
Theists and exponents of Simple Foreknowledge could argue that initial conditions for
freedom are good reasons independent of the fact they lead to sin.855 He mentions that the
Edwardsian compatibilist might say God has a reason to produce the initial conditions which
are intrinsically valuable independent of the fact they necessitate sin. What these are is not
clear. Pruss, not being a Calvinist himself, simply leaves these as hypothetical possibilities.856
He mentions that Molinists may argue the same except the initial conditions “do not
necessitate sin, but they counter-factually imply it.” 857 While these explanations work as far
as they go, Pruss argues that they are problematic as Christian responses because they do not
use Adam’s sin as felix culpa, “a sin that happily leads to the great goods of redemption.”
Pruss regards use of felix culpa as essential because it “seems plausible that any theodicy
faithful to the Christian tradition will have to make use of the valuable consequences of sin”,
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The deterministic theologies he has in mind are Edwardsian Calvinism and Thomism, the
non-deterministic theologies are Molinism, Simple Foreknowledge, and Open Theism.
“For all Christians hold that God at least permits sin to happen. A theodicy for that
permission is needed, and it seems that the theodicy will need to make reference to the goods to which
the sin will be a means.” Pruss, “The First Sin: A Dilemma for Christian Determinists,” 190.
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Ibid., 191.

He notes that “in these two stories, it is the great good of significantly freely acting well
that is involved in the theodicy, rather than just the good of significant freedom.” Ibid.
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One Calvinist-compatibilist possibility is the “Integrity of Humans Defense” of John
Feinberg, see The Many Faces of Evil, 165–191; 388–390.
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Pruss, “The First Sin: A Dilemma for Christian Determinists,” 191.
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but he notes the sketches he gave do not make such use.858 Instead, they reply on initial
conditions (free will, natural order, etc.) and not the goods of redemption. He then notes that
“this highlights an apparent tension in the Christian tradition between DP and standard
Christian theodicies.” 859
Pruss then suggests a way of incorporating felix culpa into these sketches without
violating the DP.860 In constructing this alternative way Pruss significantly modifies felix
culpa so that it is not the same as the full greater good version (i.e. Plantinga’s version) which
we have been examining. Due to such modification, his discussion is a significant advance on
Plantinga. What interests us is the structure of Pruss’ version. He argues that God has a divine
reason R for producing the initial conditions that is independent of them leading to sin or the
valuable consequences of sin (redemption). These initial conditions R have a defeater. There
“is a defeater S for these reasons: the fact that sin might (Open Theism, simple
foreknowledge), would (Molinism), or must (Edwards) result.” 861 However, felix culpa, the
great goods of redemption, acts as a defeater-defeater for S. Pruss explains it in such a way as
to avoid violating DP. “God does not, then, produce the initial conditions in order to produce
the great goods of redemption. To do that would be to intend sin as a constitutive means to
these great goods. Rather, God recognizes these great goods as a defeater to a defeater to R,
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Ibid., 191.
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Ibid.
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This is another way of saying we mustn’t engage in consequentialist reasoning.

Pruss, “The First Sin: A Dilemma for Christian Determinists,” 191. Italic’s mine. I see
these differences as significant and would argue that not all use of DTE is equal. The necessity
(‘must’) of the Edwardsian approach calls into question to what extent the evil is unintended. The
Great Controversy theodicy use of the DTE is preferable to the deterministic use.
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and what God intends are the goods in R such as orderly initial conditions, freedom, etc.”862
The structure is as follows:

Table 14: Pruss’ Felix Culpa as a Triple Effect
Act
Reason (R)

Double Effect
Defeater (Sin)

Triple Effect
Defeater-Defeater (felix culpa)

Pruss observes that this is structurally like Francis Kamm’s “triple effect” story of the
party (here termed as the Doctrine of Triple Effect or DTE).863 In brief, Kamm argues that
you might want to throw a party, but there is a defeater in that it will create a mess. However,
the guests are the kind of people you can expect to help you clean up. You don’t hold a party
with the intention of having people clean up. Your intention is the party but the clean-up is a
defeater-defeater to the mess a party might bring.

Modelling the Great Controversy Theodicy through Double/Triple Effect
The DDE has helped vindicate the free will defence as deontologically consistent but
also shown that the free will defence on its own fails the fourth condition of proportionality
(DDE 4). Will the Great Controversy theodicy, which builds on the free will defence but goes
beyond it, maintain deontological consistency while resolving disproportionality? When the
Great Controversy theodicy is modelled using the DDE, it corresponds to Kamm’s and Pruss’
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Ibid., 192.

Francis Kamm, “The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend
the Means to His End,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 74 (2000):
21–39. “Kamm, in one characteristically intricate discussion, explores the superiority of a doctrine of
triple effect and argues that an unintended side effect of one intended action may be a means to
another legitimate and intended outcome, thus rejecting the view that one intend the means to one’s
intended end.” C. A. J. Coady, Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 140.
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‘triple effect’ (see Table 15). God’s divine act is to create a good and free creation. This is
good in itself and his intention for doing so is independent of the evil that may arise or the
redemption that may ensue. This act has a defeater. A good free creation risks the possibility
of evil as cosmic war/cosmic controversy. Nevertheless, by means of conducting a cosmic
controversy in response to evil, which respects and preserves the freedom of a good creation,
God can redeem creation.

Table 15: The Great Controversy Theodicy as a Triple Effect
Act
Reason (R)
R =Good Free Creation

Double Effect

Triple Effect

Defeater (D)

Defeater-Defeater (DD)

D =Evil as Cosmic War
& Cosmic Controversy

DD=Redemption (Cosmic Victory)

In this model, God does not operate consequentially. God is not creating in order to
produce a fall into sin or evil. This good creation is valuable in and of itself but it is also
worth undertaking, even in the face of great evil, because this good creation is redeemable.
Redemption (and specifically a redemption that solves the cosmic controversy) removes the
defeating potential of failing the fourth condition of ‘proportionality.’ Even if evil
temporarily arises, creation maintains its worth and value by being permanently redeemed
from evil. This resolves problem 3A of ethical impermissibility. Creation is good and
rational. It is not self-defeating. If the Great Controversy theodicy is formulated it becomes
apparent that it follows the DTE structure that Pruss uses but also highlights the different way
various ‘goods’ operate (Table 16).
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Table 16: Great Controversy Theodicy "Good's" and Triple Effect
Greater Good (ANTECEDENT)
Free Creation

Risk
Evil as Great Controversy

Redeemed Good
Restored Creation

Redemption restores the original ‘good’ (creation)

The Redeemed Good Defence
In this formulation, a ‘free creation’ is a partial greater good defence (a good
antecedent to evil) and the good of redemption is in service to the antecedent good of
creation. This contrasts to full greater good defences (i.e. Plantinga’s felix culpa, the divine
glory defence) in which evil is necessary to achieve subsequent ‘greater goods.’ In the Great
Controversy theodicy, redemption is occasioned (not necessitated) by evil occurring in the
antecedent good it seeks to recover. Therefore, redemption is a ‘great good’ that restores an
earlier ‘greater good’ but it is not itself the ‘greater good.’ It is restorative of the antecedent
good. Thus, in terms of justificatory patterns, the Great Controversy theodicy combines a
partial-greater good version of the free will defence with a supplementary ‘Redeemed Good
Defence.’
The Great Controversy theodicy is very clear that God did not ordain evil in order to
achieve a greater good.864 The original purpose or ends of creation were not a means to evil or
redemption. Instead, it is the reverse. Redemption is a means back to the original ends or
purpose. The plan of salvation was to “restore in man the image of his Maker, to bring him
back to the perfection in which he was created …that the divine purpose in his creation might

God had foreknowledge of the future of sin and “allowed matters to develop and work out.
[but] He did not work to bring about a certain condition of things” and instead planned to meet it with
redemption, see Ellen G. White, “The Mystery of God,” The Signs of the Times, March 25, 1897.
italics mine.
864
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be realized – this was to be the work of redemption.”865 Evil is what defeats God’s purpose.
Redemption restores it. Evil is not instrumental to redemption. Redemption is instrumental to
the original purpose.866 This brings us to the relationship between creation and covenant.867
God knew the risk involved in a free creation and he foresaw evil’s actual emergence. Divine
deliberation about creation, therefore, involved deliberation about risk and evil in the form of
redemption. Creation and covenant go together.868 What this means for this discussion of
DDE/DTE, is that God’s ‘Act’ of Creation is in fact a dual act. God acts to create but
simultaneously within that act he covenants to redeem creation. Creation’s risk necessitates
redemptive covenant, redemptive covenant guarantees creation. God is, from all eternity, the
God who covenanted to be the Father who gives himself in his Son and Spirit for our creation
and redemption.869 Creation is built on Christ’s sacrifice. The Great Controversy theodicy
postulates Felix Creatio via Felix Soter870 (a fortunate creation through a blessed Saviour)

White, Education, 15,16. In the end “All that was lost by sin has been restored ... God's
original purpose in the creation of the earth is fulfilled as it is made the eternal abode of the
redeemed. White, The Great Controversy, 674. italics mine.
865

God’s “purpose that the longer man lived the more fully he should reveal this image--the
more fully reflect the glory of the Creator.” White, Education, 15. Had man never fallen he would
“have fulfilled the object of his creation, more and more fully [he would] have reflected the Creator's
glory. Ibid.
866

By ‘covenant’ we are talking about the divine covenant to save humanity, also known as
the everlasting covenant or covenant of mercy.
867

“The salvation of the human race has ever been the object of the councils of heaven. The
covenant of mercy was made before the foundation of the world. It has existed from all eternity and is
called the everlasting covenant. So surely as there never was a time when God was not, so surely there
never was a moment when it was not the delight of the eternal mind to manifest His grace to
humanity. White, “Spiritual Growth.”
868

“God gave His only begotten Son to die for mankind. How could He have given more? In
this gift He gave Himself. “I and My Father are one,” said Christ. By the gift of His Son, God has
made it possible for man to be redeemed and restored to oneness with Him.” Ellen G. White, “Words
of Admonition Elmshaven, St Helena, Cal,” The Workers’ Bulletin, September 9, 1902. italics mine.
869
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Or ‘Felix Salvator’.
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and not felix culpa. The ‘Redeemed Good Defence’ is based in a ‘Felix Soter’ theodicy.871
God doesn’t require or use evil as a means to an end, God freely becomes the means to
restoring an end we lost and don’t deserve.
The risk of a free creation, therefore, becomes a risk to God. Creation could not
proceed unless God was willing to open himself up to personal risk, to vast suffering, and
even to sacrifice himself for a hostile creation.872 If God was not willing to redeem a creation
that would fall then while his initial act of creation would still be a good act (satisfying DDE
1-3), it would not be wise nor permissible because that creation would be destined to defeated
by evil. A non-redeemed or non-redeemable creation fails the ‘proportionate condition’ (DDE
4). Evil would be an undefeated-defeater. This is not so much a matter of evil outweighing
good, it is more a matter of evil defeating good.873 It would not be rational for God to engage
in self-defeating behaviour.874 But if God is willing to sacrifice himself for creation then even
evil cannot defeat this great good and the ‘proportionate condition’ (DDE 4) is satisfied and
problem 3A is resolved. Of course, one may object that evil does defeat the purpose of
creation in the case of the lost.875 But this is not a sustainable objection, as even in this, God is

“Redemption was not an afterthought, a plan formulated after the fall of Adam, but an
eternal purpose, suffered to be wrought out for the blessing, not only of this atom of a world, but for
the good of all the worlds that God had created.” Ellen G. White, “The Plan of Salvation,” The Signs
of the Times, February 13, 1893 (italics mine). Here we have redemption as an eternal purpose
(covenant and creation are counterparts), as a great good and blessing for the universe, but also that as
a response to evil it is ‘suffered’ to be permitted. Redemption reveals God’s character in a
supererogatory manner.
871

872

See White, Education, 263,264.

Even the language of ‘defeat/victory’ corresponds to warfare theodicy, whereas,
‘outweighing’ corresponds to greater good theodicy.
873

Having no redemption would be inconsistent with God’s compassionate character.
Deliberately not offering redemption, so as to ensure there are reprobates who may be eternally
punished in order to display divine glory view, is even worse on Great Controversy theodicy grounds.
874
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This is not the case. God freely and non-coercively offers the lost salvation. Their rejection
is not a defeat for themselves but not God because he willed that they be allowed that choice.
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rightly maintaining his commitment to a free creation (God is not determining any to be lost),
and God offers them salvation (it could be otherwise for the lost). God defeats evil in the
cosmic war, therefore, no one needs to be defeated by evil. There is no necessity nor
intention. Therefore, creation is worth it. This is true from creation’s perspective for many
reasons. Creation is a good within itself. Evil, as a cosmic controversy, is only a risk not a
necessity. The risk is not inevitable but it is foreseen. God prepares for the risk by
covenanting himself. The period of evil and suffering is limited in time. The special way God
conducts himself in this cosmic controversy means redemption is offered for the fallen, and
evil and risk will be permanently eliminated. From God’s perspective, despite the suffering
he experiences, creation is worth it.876 From both the Creator’s and creation’s perspective the
negative side-effect of risk and evil is proportionate to the act of God creating a redeemable
creation. All of this is deontologically consistent. Ethical impermissibility is resolved without
introducing ethical contradiction.877 This is shown in the following diagram (Table 17) which
brings together the many elements of the Great Controversy Theodicy discussed in chapters
three, four and five to reveal how its ethical structure works.

“The compensation for this sacrifice is the joy of peopling the earth with ransomed beings,
holy, happy, and immortal. The result of the Saviour's conflict with the powers of darkness is joy to
the redeemed, redounding to the glory of God throughout eternity. And such is the value of the soul
that the Father is satisfied with the price paid; and Christ Himself, beholding the fruits of His great
sacrifice, is satisfied.” White, The Great Controversy, 652.
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Because both sceptics and traditional theodicies operate on consequentialist reasoning they
end in a stalemate over whether evil outweighs greater goods or vice versa. The Great Controversy
theodicy obviously rejects this kind of ethical reasoning. It would ask how can evil or good be turned
into a unit of measurement and then compared or weighed? Moral actions must be evaluated against a
moral standard, not in terms of quantities. Due to this it is wrong for sceptics to say that God should
not create because some will suffer. What this actually means is that the mystery of evil, even by its
mere potential, should be granted a veto on God’s actions. Evil triumphs over God and good. This
gives an inexplicable thing (evil) an unjustified ontological status in which it is allowed to become
metaphysically ultimate and determinative. Not creating due to this objection would have God
conceding ethical ultimacy to evils effects. This is unthinkable. It is ‘un-deontological.’ This does not
mean God ignores evil. But he faces evil from the ground of his own ultimacy and goodness.
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Table 17: The Deontological (non-Consequentialist) Ethical Structure of the Great Controversy Theodicy
DIVINE
DELIBERATION

DIVINE
ACTA

DOUBLE
EFFECT

DIVINE
ACTB

FELIX SOTER

CREATION/COVENANT:
Based in foreknowledge
Divine decision to
(A) CREATE and
(B) COVENANT for
Creation’s redemption

FELIX SOTER

GOD CREATES a
GOOD CREATION
with FREE WILL
RISK but
REDEMPTIVELY
GUARANTEED

GOOD CREATION
(Risk unrealised in
majority of angelic/
unfallen worlds)

DDE 2: Bad
Effect foreseen
but not intended

DDE =
Doctrine of
Double Effect
is Good

PRESERVATION and
ETERNAL
SECURING of GOOD
CREATION
(risk removed)

DDE 1:
Intended Action
is Good

(FELIX CREATIO)

KEY:

TRIPLE
EFFECT

DDE 3: Bad
Effect does not
cause the Good

The MYSTERY
of EVIL
(Lucifer’s Embrace of
Evil = Ex Nihilo)

RISK REALISED in
SIN/ EVIL as COSMIC
CONTROVERSY
(Mystification of evil) &
COSMIC WARFARE
(Multiplication of evil)

The Universe is
Eternally Secure

The MYSTERY
of GODLINESS

DDE 4: Good
Proportionate to
Bad effect

REDEMPTION via
ATONEMENT PROCESS
(Christology: Incarnation, Cross,
Resurrection, Priestly Ministry, Pentecost,
Soteriology: Justification, New Birth,
Sanctification, Glorification)

REDEMPTION of
PENITENT and
COMPLETE
RESTORATION of
FALLEN CREATION

God is Eternally
Vindicated in the
Cosmic Controversy

Unbroken Line = Direct/
Intended Divine Effect
FULL and FINAL
JUSTICE:
ELIMINATION of
EVIL/
END of COSMIC
CONTROVERSY and
ANNIHILATION of
IMPENITENT
(Final acts of
GRATUITOUS EVIL
in impenitent rejection
of redemption)

Broken Line =
Indirect/ Unintended Effect

Lucifers Action =
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Risk and Evil are
Eternally Removed

The Issue of Equivocating Theories of Freedom (Problem 3B)
Having established a Great Controversy Theodicy that is ethically consistent with its
own theology (resolving ‘ethical equivocation’), and that can answer the question of whether
creation is ‘worth it’ in the face of the scale of evil (resolving ‘ethical impermissibility’), it is
now time to turn to the final major challenge. Can the Great Controversy theodicy answer the
‘victory’ or ‘win it’ question if it maintains the idea of the open-ended risk inherent in
libertarian freedom which is so essential to the free will defence? Risky freedom can account
for evil’s origins but resists the idea of evil’s end (eternal libertarian freedom implies endless
risk). Chapter four revealed Boyd’s unsuccessful attempted to resolve this problem by
equivocating between different theories of freedom. This is the ‘free will equivocation’
problem (problem 3B) in the face of the ‘win it’ question. The Great Controversy theodicy
needs to resolve the ‘win it’ question without engaging in equivocating theories of freedom.
In chapter four we foreshadowed ‘virtue libertarianism’ as a way out of this problem. In this
section, it will be shown that virtue libertarianism can be incorporated into the Great
Controversy theodicy in a way that is consistent with its storied/narrative nature (the
particularities of the story should not be flattened), and how application of this theory
resolves the free will equivocation problem, while avoiding a fall into consequentialist ethics.
By looking at a recent attempt by Richard Shenk to resolve this issue, it will show that this is
ultimately the problem of the place of theological anthropology within theodicy. At the end
of a Great Controversy theodicy modelling that resolves problem 3B will be shown.

Shenk’s Theodicy
Richard Shenk attempts to form a theodicy by offering a larger theory of freedom,
placed within a Cross-focused framework, as a key way of addressing the problem of evil.
While Shenk’s sympathies are with theological determinism, he is very keen to avoid ethical
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consequentialism.878 Shenk’s work builds upon earlier discussions of the changing nature of
human freedom in Christian theology. Timpe and Jenson sum up the three stages to human
free will in theological anthropology.879 These are the progression from status integritatis
(also called status naturae elevatae or status iustitiae originalis) through to status
corruptionis to the status gloriae.880 The status integritatis refers to the pre-fall state in which
humans were able to freely sin or not sin. Status corruptionis is the post-fall state in which
fallen humans are freely able to sin due to sin’s effects but they are not able to refrain from
sinning. The status gloriae refers to the post-glorification state in which the redeemed are
able not to sin and are not able to sin.881 There are libertarian and compatibilist versions of
both. There is also a fuller version going back to Augustine and frequently used by Reformed
theologians in which humans were 1) pre-fall posse peccare/posse non peccare (able to
sin/able not to sin); then 2) post-fall non posse non peccare (not able not to sin); then 3)
regenerated posse non peccare (able not to sin); and finally 4) glorified non posse pecccare
(unable to sin).882 This four stage rendering is more complete than the three stages. Shenk
builds on this theological anthropology in constructing his theodicy. Shenk’s thesis argues
that God is taking Creation through the various stages of freedom in order to arrive at his
ultimate aim of creation possessing “conforming freedom.” This is a final eschatological

878

Shenk, The Wonder of the Cross, 106.

Kevin Timpe and Audra Jenson, “Free Will and the Stages of Theological Anthropology,”
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That is, the state of integrity (state of elevated nature /state of original justice); the state of
corruption; and the state of glory, respectively.
881

Timpe and Jenson, “Free Will and the Stages of Theological Anthropology,” 235.
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form of freedom where creatures will “be as free as God in respect to evil” and thus
“perfectly and permanently free from evil and suffering.”883 With this conclusion Shenk is
able to answer how God’s people will persevere in heaven when they did not in the garden of
Eden.884 The ‘how’ is seen in the progression within the various eras. Shenk says that each
stage of freedom develops because of a Creation-Crisis event. The Creation event begins with
“Unfettered Freedom.”885 This is a form of ‘perfect’ freedom but which is not fettered or tied
to God’s perfection.886 Interestingly, Shenk also maintains that this is a “freedom decreed to
defect from perfection in time.” 887 God intends this freedom to defect, although God does not
cause it to defect. This defection is due to the crisis event of the fall. This leads to the second
stage of “Forfeit Freedom” in which people are enslaved to disobedience. Shenk sees this era
and the following era as more similar to compatibilist freedom. Then follows the CreationCrisis event of the Cross and the Church, which opens up the possibility of “Penultimate
Freedom.” This is a kind of ‘now-not-yet’ freedom in which people experience both the
struggle of ‘forfeited’ and a taste of ‘conforming’ freedom. Finally, following the Crisis and
Creation events of the final judgment and the new heavens and new earth, God’s elect enjoy
“Conforming Freedom.”888
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Shenk, The Wonder of the Cross, xvii, 11, 157–187.
Ibid., 158–160.
Also called “defectable” or “defective” freedom. Ibid., xviii.

886

Shenk sees it as similar to libertarian freedom where creation is free to choose for or
against God. Ibid.,170.
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Ibid., xviii.

Shenk’s conforming freedom shares structural parallels and similarities to virtue libertarian
freedom in which freedom has reached its goal of virtue. Ibid., 250–253.
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Table 18: Shenk’s Four Stages of Freedom and the Three Creation-Crisis Events
Unfettered Freedom

Forfeit Freedom

Creation
& Fall

Penultimate Freedom

Cross &
Church

Conforming Freedom

Judgment &
New Creation

Shenk’s argument is that God uses ‘Evil and Suffering’ to overcome ‘Evil and
Suffering’ and that this is the necessary way evil is overcome. He is clear that God cannot
achieve this by force. God must use this historical process so that creation can develop
conforming freedom. God creates creation with a freedom liable to fall, so that he can move
them to a freedom invulnerable to falling. Shenk tries to bridge theological determinism889
and free will approaches, libertarian and compatibilist versions of freedom. He wants to
affirm theological determinist style theodicies like the divine glory defence890 but without its
consequentialism,891 and to utilise the idea of free will but without the libertarian free will
defence. It is a difficult balancing act. He wants to be able to answer why creation can begin
free and liable to evil but end up free and yet unable to do evil. This is part of the ‘win it’ or
‘victory’ question. He does this without the idea of libertarian risk. In a sense, he offers a
reformed version of Boyd’s tactic of moving between different kinds/definitions of freedom.
Shenk equivocates between models of freedom. Given the diversity of freedom-states that a
theodicy must account for, how can such equivocation be avoided?

“I am proposing that those who understand God’s will as determinate in all things are
correct.” Ibid., 159.
889

890

891

Ibid., 158–160.
Ibid., 105-106.
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It is an open question whether Shenk’s theodicy manages to maintain determinism
and completely avoid consequentialism.892 This will not be explored directly here, although, a
later critique will raise questions about its successfulness. His argument is a sophisticated and
substantial advance on previous deterministic theodicies with much to adapt and admire,
especially, in his Cross-centeredness.893 Shenk is especially helpful to the Great Controversy
theodicy in two ways. First, his predominantly theological rather than philosophical response
is one friendly to the Great Controversy narrative approach. Second is his attempt to correlate
an ethically non-consequentialist theodicy onto the dynamics of theological anthropology and
freedom. This is exactly what the Great Controversy theodicy seeks to do.

Applying Virtue Libertarianism to Theological Anthropology to Resolve Problem 3B
If virtue libertarianism is used as the Great Controversy theodicy understanding of
freedom and is mapped onto the stages of theological anthropology and the question of evil,
we arrive at an alternative model compatible with cosmic warfare views. As Shenk and others
have argued, there are four eras or stages with freedom progressing through each stage.
Important events lie behind the changes in each era. But most significantly, unlike Shenk and
Boyd, there is only one model of freedom.
Shenk recognises problems with both libertarian and compatibilist versions of free
will when tackling evil and that neither of them, as they are, properly describes freedom in all
eras.894 The Great Controversy theodicy agrees with this perception but while Shenk opts for
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Such questions are raised by Simon Oliver in the “Foreword,” in The Wonder of the Cross,

xi.
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Ibid., 246, 249. The improvements seem to be linked to his willingness to play, even in a
limited way, with libertarian-style freedom, and clarifying metaphysical constraints on divine power.
He is in effect modifying determinism.
894

Ibid., 158–160.
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differing kinds of freedom, the Great Controversy theodicy offers a singular parsimonious
theory of freedom that coherently accounts for all eras and various states of freedom (and
kinds of beings whether angelic or human, something Shenk struggles with, as will be shown
later). This parsimony suggests but does not establish superiority. At the least, virtue
libertarianism avoids problematic and needless equivocations regarding the nature of
freedom. The following diagram (Table 19) depicts the states and stages of freedom in the
Great Controversy theodicy utilising virtue libertarianism:

259

Table 19: The Four Stages and Six States of Freedom
1. Pre-Sin (Risk)

Angelic
Confirmation
Loyalty tested

Creation
Covenant

2. Post-Sin
Virtue-PerfectedUnfallen
Never-Fallen
Perfected Free will
Loyal Angels

3. Redemption

(Creation/Freedoms
Goal Attained)

Virtue-OrientatedUnfallen
Perfectible or
‘Defectible’ Free
will
Angels/Adam/Eve

4. Post-Redemption
Virtue-PerfectedRedeemed
No Longer-Fallen,
now Redeemed
Free will
Glorified Saints

Freely-Fixed-Moral
Character
Moral Freedom fully
formed/perfected.
Direction settled.
Development open.

New Creation
Sanctified/
Glorification/
Resurrection
Unfallen
Fallen

Mystery
of Evil
Fall/Sin/
Warfare

Mystery of
Godliness
Salvation/
Conversion
Virtue-IncapableFallen
Enslaved Free will,
but Redeemable
Post-fall Humanity

Unfallen
Fallen
Virtue-RenewedFallen
Fallen-Regenerated
Free will
Converted Believers

End of Probation
Final Judgment

Unfixed-CharacterIn-Process
Moral Freedom in
process of being
formed.
Direction open.
Development open.

Freely-Fixed-Moral
Character
Moral Freedom
completely lost.
Direction settled.
Development
degenerates and
decreases

Virtue-RejectedFallen
Hardened Free will
Unredeemable
Satan/Fallen
Angels/Impenitent

This Model can be mapped onto the formulation of the Great Controversy theodicy in
the previous section, like so:

Free Will Defence/Greater Good(ANTE)

Evil as Cosmic War/Controversy

Redeemed Good Defence

Like Shenk, the Great Controversy theodicy argues that God cannot instantaneously
create beings with perfected freedom, nor will he use force or coercion. Creatures can be both
perfect and yet able to fall. But unlike Shenk, the Great Controversy theodicy shows that evil
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is not necessary for perfected freedom.895 The never-fallen angels experience the test between
good or evil in the first stage of the cosmic controversy, but they resist evil, and are
confirmed in their character and have their freedom perfected in virtue.896 As with Shenk’s
theodicy such freedom is perfect yet morally mutable. But in contrast to Shenk the origin of
evil is not described as decreed897 nor is freedom described as completely unfettered to God’s
character. The ‘virtuous’ nature of even immature libertarian freedom could be understood as
‘weakly’ or ‘resistibly’ fettered to God’s character, but fettered nonetheless, and as much as
is possible.898 Freedom from the beginning is deliberately orientated to virtue by God.

Table 20: Comparing the Eras/Stages of Freedom in Shenk and the Great Controversy
Theodicy

Shenk’s Stages of
Freedom

Proposed Stages
and States of
Freedom in the
Great Controversy
Theodicy

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Unfettered Freedom

Forfeit
Freedom

Penultimate Freedom

Conforming Freedom

Virtue Incapable
(redeemable)
Virtue Orientated
(unfallen)

Virtue Perfected
(never fallen)
Virtue Renewed

Virtue Rejected
(irredeemable)

Virtue Redeemed
(once fallen)

“Man was created a free moral agent … he must be subjected to the test of obedience; but
he is never brought in such a position that yielding to evil becomes a matter of necessity.” White,
Patriarchs and Prophets 331, see also The Great Controversy 492-493. italics mine.
895

It is also possible that some angels’ characters were already fixed before the testing. The
test revealed and reinforced the established character.
896

“In the judgment of the universe, God will stand clear of blame for the existence or
continuance of evil. It will be demonstrated that the divine decrees are not accessory to sin. There was
no defect in God's government, no cause for disaffection. White, Desire of Ages 58. italics mine.
897

“God made man … with noble traits of character, no bias towards evil … high intellectual
powers … strongest possible inducements to … obedience.” White, Patriarchs and Prophets 49.
italics mine.
898
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Like Shenk each era happens due to some creation or crisis event but there are more
of these events in keeping with the larger narrative the Great Controversy theodicy operates
with. The co-joining of ‘covenant’ with creation makes clear that danger is foreseen from the
beginning. The fall is given more definition as the ‘mystery of evil’ leading to the larger ideas
of controversy and warfare. The problem of evil (intrinsic only as risk) to creation is
overcome by a greater mystery, that of the saving ‘mystery of godliness’. The acceptance or
rejection of salvation settles freedom in either virtue or vice which is finally confirmed by
judgment or glorification. Freedom is capable of both moral direction (to good or evil) and
development within each direction. The openness of direction is not endless, eventually
character attains a definite moral state, and development is only endless when freedom is
coupled with virtue, else it eventually degenerates and ends in self-destruction. The Great
Controversy theodicy can learn from Shenk’s approach but only with important
modifications. Central would be a change to his idea of evil as a ‘subordinate-metaphysicalnecessity.’ By this Shenk means that God does not cause or author evil, however, because
creation is finite it is inevitable that evil will result.899 This concept is helpful only if it is
understood to describe the risk of evil and not evil itself. Risk is necessary. Evil is not.900 Risk
is the subordinate-metaphysical-necessity which accompanies God’s choice to create free
creatures.

899

God is a metaphysical necessity. Evil is not. But because God desires creatures with
conforming freedom he subordinately needs evil as part of the process to achieve that.
The Great Controversy theodicy might need to say that, given God’s foreknowledge of
risk-eventuating-in-evil such evil was contingently inevitable. Inevitable once such contingencies are
known and permitted. But inevitable is different to necessary. Many angels for example did not fall.
900
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Shenk, Angels, Satan, and the Cosmic Controversy Perspective
Another key difference between Shenk’s theodicy and the Great Controversy theodicy
is the role and place of angels and Satan, and the nature of the warfare God must fight. When
these are factored these into the discussion an increased strain on Shenk’s model is seen.
Shenk’s whole thesis operates on the assumption of the marginality of Lucifer/Satan, the
angels, and their fall, to the overall storyline of Scripture and to theodicy. If angels (unfallen,
fallen, Lucifer to Satan, demons) are significant then, as will be shown, Shenk’s approach is
incomplete. It fails to tell the whole story. This is the main Great Controversy criticism of
Shenk’s view. His view has much to offer but fails because it neglects to seriously
incorporate vital evidence. A number of issues result from this neglect. If evil and suffering
are necessary for the production of conforming-freedom and necessary for God’s plan, then
how is it that some angels appear to have conforming-freedom without passing through the
preceding stages? Some angels never fall. This appears to show that God can produce
conforming-freedom without suffering and evil. Shenk acknowledges this. Non-defecting
angels indicate that human sin is not a subordinate-metaphysical-necessity but only an
accidental necessity.901 In this scenario, unfettered freedom did not have to fall. But if this is
so, then why would God decree evil? If God decreed what was not subordinately-necessary,
then Shenk’s theodicy would seem to end up in ethical consequentialism (God decreed it
because it would bring the greater good of conforming-freedom) which Shenk is at pains to
avoid.
Realising this problem, Shenk argues that it is impossible to know what angelic
freedom was like, and so no one can say it was libertarian like Adam’s.902 Shenk is not really

901

Shenk, The Wonder of the Cross, 287.
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Ibid., 288–289. Shenk argues that angels are totally different to humans, especially in
regards to freedom. But there is no reason to assume complete difference, especially in regards to
angels lacking free will. One should not even assume that because they are not explicitly described as
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agnostic on this, however, when he does try and address the issue, he sides with theological
determinism and the compatibilist freedom approach of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, in
which angels fall because God did not give them persevering grace.903 On this view, God is
not responsible for this sin. The angels freely choose what they desired. However, nondeterminists would point out that they did so only because God has complete control over the
secondary causes which ensured that particular desire and choice. God purposely and
intentionally, ordained their exact choice and so his decision is the ultimate reason they fell.
Amazingly, after labouring so hard to avoid the consequentialism of a greater good approach,
Shenk resorts to that very approach. Shenk ends up with a divine-glory-defence-style
argument for angelic sin. “We do know that for his own glory, God could have created some
angels with a freedom that permitted them to defect and created others who could not
defect.”904 Shenk seems to embrace the consequentialism he resists. What Shenk gains in his
theodicy for humans, he loses in his comments on angels.
The difficulties deepen if Shenk’s view of that particular fallen angel, Satan, is
probed. In a footnote, Shenk wonders about how Satan fits in. He asks “Of what need does

being in the image of God that they don’t bear some image of God. After all angels are termed the
‘sons of God’ just as humans are (Job 1:6; 2:1; 38:7). Angels are spirits in a similar way to God being
Spirit and humans having a spirit (John 4:24; 1 Cor 2:10,11; Heb 1:7,14; 12:9,23). Angels are clearly
moral beings, else they could not fall or be holy. They clearly possess personhood and will. All this
becomes more significant when we remember that humans were made a little lower than the angels
(Ps 8:4-6). It would be odd if those higher than us lacked such a basic feature as freedom of will.
Shenk’s musings on angels seem to calculated to remove the problem angels pose for a theodicy that
has no necessary place for them.
Ibid., 288. Contrast this to, “Nothing is more plainly taught in Scripture than that God was
in no wise responsible for the entrance of sin; that there was no arbitrary withdrawal of divine grace,
no deficiency in the divine government, that gave occasion for the uprising of rebellion. Sin is an
intruder, for whose presence no reason can be given. White, The Great Controversy, 492–493. italics
mine.
903
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Shenk, The Wonder of the Cross, 289.
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God have of Satan?”905 It would seem God needs to kick off the progression of eras so he can
eventually arrive at a conformingly free (human) creation. Shenk says that “God’s Story
minimally requires Satan theologically; Satan has a purpose in God’s Story theologically, or
he would not appear.” He confesses he doesn’t know the answer. But he ventures one. “Could
it be that God’s plan required that evil not begin with humanity and that it not ever be
impersonal?” He also asks “Is personified evil a kind of mercy to God’s human wilfulcreatures?”906 There are two discomforts with this. First, is the recurring drift to
consequentialism. Shenk starts using instrumental language to describe Satan, even
suggesting a ‘personal’ Satan may be a ‘mercy.’ This sounds like a strange Luciferian twist
on felix culpa. Satan is a kind of Felix Tentator (fortunate tempter) producing a Felix
Temptationem (fortunate temptation). God is using, even needing, Satan/evil to produce
good. (The end justifies the means?). Shenk could avoid this if he offers a similar theodicy
for angels as he does for humanity. But that is a problem. Angels don’t experience the four
stages of freedom. So, what place do angels have, and what value are the stages for them,
when they do not participate in them? The second problem is broader. The Great Controversy
theodicy would argue that Shenk dramatically underplays Scripture’s perspective on Satan.
When evil is discussed neither Satan nor cosmic warfare is marginal.907 Satan may not be allprevalent in Scripture but he appears in major story-defining moments in the Scriptures
narrative of evil and suffering. The serpent of Genesis chapter 3 brings sin and suffering into
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Ibid., 290. Notice the deterministic language of necessity.
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Ibid.

907

This is not to discount that the predominant Scriptural focus is evil is human sin. But for
the importance and unavoidability of angels and Satan to evil in Scripture, see, Boyd, God at War:
The Bible & Spiritual Conflict; Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian
Warfare Theodicy; Tonstad, Saving God’s Reputation: The Theological Function of Pistis Iesou in the
Cosmic Narratives of Revelation; Graham, Evil and Christian Ethics.
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the world and starts the whole story rolling. Satan is crucial to the story of Job’s suffering
(Job 1 & 2). The entire ministry of Jesus, his wilderness temptations, exorcisms, healings,
teachings, the sin-solving-Cross (John 12:27-33; Col 2:13-15), his death-defeatingresurrection, (Heb 2:14, 15), as well as the ministry of the church (Eph 6:10-20), and,
especially Revelation, with the end of sin, suffering and death (Rev 12 & 20), are all
predicated on the essential importance of defeating Satan. Shenk’s claims are unpersuasive.
How can Shenk develop an adequate theodicy of evil when Satan, the power behind evil, is
marginalised? Shenk speaks often of God’s need to fight evil but it is cast more as a fight
against a subordinate-metaphysical-necessity rather than the Scriptural account of a fierce
conflict with principalities and powers. All of this is an argument in favour of a cosmic
warfare theodicy.

The Dual Risk of Freedom
It is advanced here that the Great Controversy theodicy with its idea of cosmic
controversy, combined with a theory of virtue libertarianism, better handles Scripture’s
testimony concerning humanity (theological anthropology), angels, Satan and evil, and thus
better responds to the problem of evil. The Great Controversy is a fuller theodicy. But
something else is at work. The placement of virtue libertarianism within a Great Controversy
metanarrative reveals deeper elements to freedom and evil, and highlights what is another
unique emphasis and distinct element of the Great Controversy theodicy. Freedom is not just
a volitional risk, it is also a cognitive and collective risk. Usually freedom’s risk is restricted
to the volitional potential for evil based in the libertarian definition of freedom as the power
‘to do otherwise.’ This volitional approach is very rarely expanded in theodicy discussions to
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include the intellectual component to freedom.908 In contrast, the Great Controversy sees it as
essential for theodicy to consider freedoms power as volition and intellectual (“the power to
think and to do”909), as well as individual and collective, and all are equally essential to
understanding evil. Risk is not restricted to the moral bivalence of volition. Risk is more than
that. Risk concerns the will (freedom to choose and act) and mind (freedom to think and say).
It is volitional-intellectual. In view here is not the non-culpable possibility of cognitive
mistakes which is an innocent part of finite creaturely limitation. Instead, freedom’s deeper
risk lies in the profound power of intellectual revolt. It encompasses the potential for
mutinous ideas, seditious philosophy and subversive politics. In theodicy, risk is not often
explored as hostile independent thought, political subterfuge, and organised ideological
opposition. Sin is not only the mysterious act of perverse wilful volition, it is also the wilfully
perverse assertion of a mind justifying itself and condemning its creator. In the Great
Controversy, freedom’s risk is evil-as-cosmic-controversy. The Great Controversy theodicy
theory of freedom could more accurately be termed, Cognitive Virtue Libertarianism,
bringing together the inseparable elements of moral character, intellect, and volition, all of
course necessarily existing in a social or communal context. I doubt most theists would object
to this in principle but it is telling that theists do not pursue this fact and instead rely on
philosophical and metaphysical explanations as the key to the heart of theodicy.
This helps confirm the earlier observation in chapter four as to why Boyd has a
warfare theodicy but no controversy. He is restricted to the metaphysics of volition and lacks
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The exception to this is medieval and modern discussions of evils origins. But even here,
the exploration of the intellectual dimensions of freedom, is limited to demonstrating the plausibility
of the seemingly irrational claim that an individual perfect being (i.e. Satan), in a perfect environment,
would chose evil. Once this is answered (or often seen as unanswerable) any follow-up construction
of theodicy proceeds without a key role for the intellectual risk of freedom.
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White, Education, 17.
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the intellectual dimension of the war. How was Satan able to convince himself and so many
others to rebel? How does evil spread, reproduce, mutate, acquire new justifications, and
prove so resilient for so long? This is largely left untouched or undeveloped. This then makes
it harder to answer how sin and warfare can be ended. In a non-deterministic context, this
must be answered with more than assertions that evil will end by recourse to raw power and
control on God’s behalf. Shenk rightly has an historical process which majors in
transformation of the volition state but regrettably neglects the intellectual side. Shenk’s
process tackles subordinate-metaphysical-necessity not deeply conceptualised rebellion. But
humans (and I would argue angels) are free, cognitive beings with minds, opinions and
thought-processes. None are infinite or all-knowing, and so all creatures are challenged by
great questions and must work through them. This also means in the long-term God cannot
deal with these intellectual controversies and doubts by sheer force or by using an endless
‘trust but don’t question or think’ as an evasion of answering. In doing this, God would
disregard the temporal psychology of his own creation. These things can only be answered by
demonstration and evidence. God’s process in response must deal with both the minds of
individual beings and the collective mind of creation (hence a special atonement-vindication
process is needed by God not simply to save creation but to also answer the political attack).
To do this the actual issues which lie behind evil’s power and spread must be identified and
addressed. For the Great Controversy theodicy, this intellectual element is not a lesser issue
or secondary adjunct to the issue of depraved volition. These are the inseparable dual
dimensions of freedom and evil. Free will as volition is not enough. Warfare is not enough.
There is a need to understand the generating, sustaining power of ideological controversy.
There is need for a bigger concept of risk and then a broader means of dealing with that risk.
The Great Controversy theodicy needs a theory of freedom which adequately accounts for
risk, and particularly the kind of risk that makes sense of the vastness of evil as cosmic war
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and controversy. At the same time it must be capable of accounting for the non-endlessness
of evil and risk, and their cosmic resolvability, all the while avoiding the problem of
equivocating between conflicting ideas of freedom. A cognitive-virtue-libertarianism
successfully meets these needs and helps commend the Great Controversy as a substantial
theodicy.

Conclusion
In this chapter, how the Great Controversy theodicy works at resolving the problem of
evil in its evidential form was laid out. The Great Controversy theodicy is able to resolve the
evidential argument by successfully dealing with self-defeating internal contradictions and
perceived unlikelihood due to a apparent disparity with external evidence. To do this the
Great Controversy theodicy makes a decisive break with traditional approaches to theodicy. It
rejects the full-greater good defence and builds on a distinct version of the free will defence
which affirms the evidence for gratuitous evils and is ethically congruent with a Christian
deontology. This particular free will approach is a crucial departure from traditional theodicy
and succeeds in avoiding the traditional failings but is not completely successful as it
generates some new problems (ethical impermissibility and free will equivocation). It is at
this point that the distinctive elements of the Great Controversy theodicy help take the free
will defence beyond its limitations and produce a more comprehensively coherent theodicy.
The Great Controversy theodicy succeeds by both rescuing and going beyond the free will
defence. A modelling of the Great Controversy theodicy demonstrates that it is able to use a
version of the doctrine of double effect to rationally show how it is ethical permissible for
God to permit evil in a non-consequentialist manner. The Great Controversy theodicy does
not retreat to a full-greater good defence but employs a ‘redeemed good defence’ (a
deontological extension of the non-consequentialist partial-greater good defence) based in a
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‘Felix Soter’ theology. In this a sacrificial Saviour makes possible a risky world. This is in
contrast to felix culpa in which a fallen world making possible the great goods of a saviour. A
complementary modelling also shows that a singular model of freedom, (a Great Controversy
theodicy version of virtue libertarianism which is sensitive to the metanarrative of cosmic
controversy and thus places equal emphasis on volitional and intellectual-cognitive elements
of the free will), avoids equivocating between models of freedom and at the same time can
account for the emergence and ending of evil, without compromising the achieved ethical
consistency. The Great Controversy theodicy therefore expands the notion of free will as a
defence into a theodicy of cosmic warfare, and beyond that into a broader theodic idea of
cosmic controversy, by means of specific and self-consistent ethical and volitional theories.910
It is the making explicit of these expanded elements which enables the metanarrative of Great
Controversy to function as an effective response to the problem of evil, especially in its
evidential form, within the discipline and conversation that is theodicy.
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A K. Anderson developed a typology for theodicies based on when they resolve the
problem of evil within the Divine narrative. The four are the Protological (e.g. Plantinga’s free will
defence deals with creation), the Christological (e.g. Dorothee Soelle focuses on Christ), the
Enestological (this means ‘here and now’ e.g. Griffin’s Process theodicy), and the Eschatological (e.g.
Hick’s afterlife dependent Soul-making theodicy). Anderson suggests a theodicy able to incorporate
all four types would be a maximal Christian theodicy. A. K. Anderson, “Evil and the God of
Narrative: Four Types of Contemporary Christian Theodicy” (Graduate Theological Union, 2006),
149–150. I would argue that the Great Controversy theodicy incorporates all four types and qualifies
as a maximal Christian theodicy.
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CONCLUSION

The quest of this study been to understand how the idea of the Great Controversy
responds to the most pressing modern challenge to theism - the evidential problem of evil.
The guiding question asks how the narrative of Great Controversy resolves the evidential
argument and functions as a theodicy. It is now time to venture an answer to the thesis
question and offer a conclusion. In summary, this study suggests the Great Controversy
functions as a theodicy by fulfilling the free will defence.911 The word ‘fulfilling’ is used here
to mean the completing and enabling of the free will defence to succeed as a theodicy. 912
More exactly this idea of fulfilling or completing the free will defence is accomplished by an
interlocking process of reframing, freeing and furthering the free will defence. Once properly
fulfilled in a larger cosmic conflict framework, the foundational idea of free will presents a
theodicy that more adequately corresponds to the observable evidential reality of evil while
maintaining consistent conceptual coherence (theologically and ethically).

Reframing
The main way the Great Controversy theodicy fulfils the free will defence is by
reframing the context for free will. The free will defence is placed within the new framework
of a theodicy based in cosmic warfare which itself is placed within a metanarrative of

Here by ‘free will defence’ I do not mean specifically and restrictively Alvin Plantinga’s
version but rather the basic or generic idea of free will common to free will theologies and theodicies.
911
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This does not mean no other theodicy may function in a similar manner, only that this is
how the Great Controversy theodicy does. Gregory Boyd’s TWT attempts to do the same, although,
my study suggests the Great Controversy theodicy does so more satisfactorily. See Martha Duah, “A
Study of Warfare Theodicy in the Writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A. Boyd” (PhD, Andrews
University, 2012) for a similar assessment.
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controverted love called the Great Controversy.913 The initial effect of the reframing is to
move a defence (free will defence), that is adequate to the logical problem of evil but
ineffective against the evidential version, into a theodicy. A theodicy is more equipped to
offer reasons for God’s permission of gratuitous evil, something defence does not do.
The more significant effect of this reframing is the resulting three explanatory layers
of 1) free will, 2) cosmic warfare and 3) Great controversy. The free will defence then only
needs to account for more limited dimensions of evil (e.g. evil’s origins). Free will introduces
the idea of the risk of evil as a potential but non-necessitated by-product of God’s decision to
make a free creation capable of love. The second layer of cosmic war allows for a cosmic
sized expansion of the free will defence’s explanatory ability. Together free will and cosmic
war are able to argue that the extreme degree of evil in the world reflects the fact that the
world is a cosmic war zone. Gratuitous evil is not unnatural in a cosmic war zone. This
cosmic scaling of moral evil to include Lucifer/Satan, in addition to Adam, also enables free
will to account for natural evil, something that is often considered a weakness of the free will
defence. These two layers give a more satisfactory account of evil’s origins, its vast scale and
ongoing continuation than just the free will defence alone.
The third layer of Great Controversy encapsulates the initial layers of free will and
cosmic war within itself but goes beyond them and even transforms them with its more
extensive narrative framework. The Great Controversy allows for a cosmic-historicalpolitical layer of explanation for many of the elements of evil. This strategically reduces the
need to appeal to metaphysical explanations to account for challenges that metaphysics is illequipped to deal with. The Great Controversy theodicy is not necessarily anti-metaphysical,
in fact, one of its central ideas is a metaphysical one. This is its idea of the ‘mystery of evil’

913

Boyd likewise argues that his TWT is all about reframing the problem of evil from the idea
of God controlling evil to the idea of God fighting evil. Boyd, God at War, 291.
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which claims original evil is inexplicable and unjustifiable, and due to this it is also
inherently confounding to creaturely reason. The entire Great Controversy theodicy narrative
rests and arises on this presupposition. Building on it, and inseparable from it, is the narrative
idea of Satan’s ‘mystification of evil’ where he attempts to justify and rationalise evil. This
results in a cosmic-moral-political-ideological war which can only be answered by an
extensive divine process which exposes all dimensions of evil, its architect and his
mystifications, and responds with a redemptive counter-demonstration vindicating the divine
character, government and law. This supplies non-metaphysical reasons for evil’s long but
circumscribed continuation. It also makes clear how evil can be ended.914
This reframing ultimately rejects as inappropriate the way the evidential problem of
evil frames the question of evil. The evidential argument is not neutral. The Great
Controversy theodicy accepts the evidential arguments factual premise that gratuitous evil
exists. But in contrast to traditional theodicy it rejects the theological premise of the
evidential argument that theism necessarily affirms meticulous providence.915 It also rejects
the unwarranted way the evidential problem and greater good theodicies assume ethical
consequentialism. Therefore, the Great Controversy theodicy affirms the strongest element of
the evidential argument (the factual premise) but reframes it in a different theistic context
where it no longer serves as an argument against God. This requires sceptics and traditional
theists alike to engage in a very significant paradigm shift.

914

Once the issues in the cosmic controversy are perfectly clear then evil can be ended. Truth
and demonstration instead of coercion overcome accusation and deception. Metanarrative rather than
metaphysics is the key.
915

It also rejects ‘restricted standard theism.’
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Freeing
Reframing free will in this larger cosmic framework frees it from a number of selfdefeating contexts and strategies. Examples of self-defeating contexts include Augustine’s
theological determinism, which nullifies any utility free will may have for theodicy and
process theologies finite god who is incapable of ever ending evil.916 As referred to earlier the
denial of gratuitous evil or the factual premise of the evidential problem of evil is another
self-sabotaging strategy. This denial of something people experience as axiomatic puts
traditional theodicy at a fatal disadvantage. An alternative theodicy capable of integrating
gratuitous evil has both removed a significant objection to theism and commended its
plausibility. Interrelated to this is the ubiquitous but deeply problematic use by theists of a
full greater good defence to cover all evil. These greater goods necessitate evil and make God
dependent on what is morally reprehensible to him in order for him to accomplish his goals.
A theodicy unburdened by this unworkable expectation is truly free and more feasible. These
problems are connected to a doctrine of meticulous providence which intimately links an allpowerful or omni-controlling God with every occurrence of evil. It is hard to avoid a sense of
divine culpability. In contrast, a God of general but careful providence who fights, overturns
or even repurposes evil, rather than ordaining and willing it, is on a more defensible side of
the moral ledger.
Underlying all of this reasoning in the evidential argument is an assumed ethical
consequentialism (unchallenged by traditional theodicy) that directly conflicts with the
deontological ethics of Christian theism. This internal theoretical incoherence is devastating
and makes theodicy unworkable. The burden to find greater goods for extreme evil has
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Other examples could be added. Origen placed free will within a theological context with a
number of unorthodox, speculative and even heretical features. We could also add Gregory Boyd’s
Open theist rejection of full divine foreknowledge which exasperates the risk of risk as seen in chapter
4.
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proven unachievable, as has justifying God for instrumentally ordaining evil as a means to
the greater good. To be free of ethical consequentialism allows the Great Controversy
theodicy to affirm an ethics, theology, and theodicy which are harmoniously deontological
and without contradiction. This deontological consistency is revealed in its compatibility with
the Doctrine of Double effect.
Instead of acquiescing to the flawed assumptions of the evidential argument, the Great
Controversy theodicy uses a Michael Peterson-style partial-greater good understanding of
freedom. The great good of freedom is not subsequent to nor dependent upon a necessary
prior evil. Instead evil is an unnecessary, unjustified intruder that abused an antecedent
greater good and catalysed cosmic war. This abuse of free will is foreseen, planned for and
fought against but not foreordained or willed. God is justified in making the original good
which he also rescues and restores.
The Great Controversy theodicy reframing also frees its eschatology from tilting in
one of two theodicy undermining theological extremes. On the one hand are distortions of
divine mercy that compromise God’s justice. Greater good theodicies require eschatology to
provide overbalancing good ends to justify God’s use of evil as a means to these goals. This
often leads to innovations which are highly speculative or lacking in biblical support
(examples include post-mortem salvation opportunities, purgatory, and universalism). On the
other hand, is the ‘problem of (an eternal) hell’ with its merciless justice. Hell is the most
egregious example of divinely ordained suffering and evil. When combined with endjustifies-the-means reasoning917 it is a most extreme and insoluble form of the problem of
evil.918 The Great Controversy theodicy avoids both extremes by opting for a deontologically
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Or even worse still add double predestination.
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Hell arguably eternalises evil in time and internalises evil in God’s will.
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based annihilationist perspective. In the cosmic controversy God mercifully holds off
eradicating evil and evil-doers until the justice of doing so is seen and conceded by all,
including evil-doers themselves. This eschatology balances well the justice and mercy of
God.
Lastly, the idea of the ‘mystery of evil’ has a very practical outcome in that it frees
theological and philosophical reason from the dangers of self-deception and self-sabotaging
because it enables reason to humbly recognise the inherently confounding nature of evil as
well as the artificial confounding based in Satan’s ‘mystification of evil.’

Furthering
This reframing and freeing results in furthering or extending the explanatory power of
free will within the Great Controversy theodicy. This study identified that the Great
Controversy theodicy requires a move from standard libertarian freedom to soft or virtue
libertarianism. This move resolves the ‘win it’ problem of how evil will end if the freedom to
choose good or evil is permanent. Free will has the goal of virtuous character and when it has
been solidified into the right moral state, it is free from the possibility of evil (or conversely
freedom is justly eliminated if virtue is irredeemably rejected). This new theodicy therefore
avoids Boyd’s equivocation between incompatible models of freedom.
The reframing of the free will defence within the Great Controversy theodicy means it
is no longer vulnerable to the criticisms of anti-theodicy that (traditional) theodicy is
unethical. The Great Controversy Theodicy like anti-theodicy both rejects ethical
consequentialism and shifts the problem of evil from a sterile theoretical-metaphysical issue
to a practical one. This new theodicy is not a metaphysical response but a narrative
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articulation of God’s activity in fighting evil through atonement – a fight we are invited to
join.919
This metanarrative approach produces an authentically Jesus-centred theodicy. This is
very significant. Philosophical and theoretical approaches are notorious for radically
marginalising Jesus as inconsequential to the actual theodicy and instead make natural law,
soul-making, process philosophy, or even free will central.920 The placement of free will
within the Great Controversy context produces a new Jesus and trinitarian centred set of
justificatory patterns. These are the Redeemed Good Defence which is based in a Felix Soter
theodicy. The Redeemed Good Defence shows that original greater goods by God (i.e. the
making of a good, loving but free creation) are not created as means to an end but are good
ends which are redeemable. Because these great goods necessarily come with risk they are
only actualised by God because they are redemptive guaranteed goods. God covenants
himself to his creation as its blessed saviour or Felix Soter. Creation is a risk to itself but God
foreknows and embraces that risk as his own. We are not a means to God’s end, God is the
self-guaranteed means to our (inclusive of God and creation) end.

Answering Scott’s Five Questions Essential to Theodicy
Taken together this reframing, freeing, and furthering by the Great Controversy
metanarrative fulfils the potential of the free will defence and provides new and substantial
responses to the five theodicy questions of Mark Scott.
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In line with anti-theodicy the Great Controversy theodicy also exhibits a cruciform

theodicy.
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Jesus does play a significant role in Felix culpa (and to a lesser extent the divine glory
defence). This role is compromised by various self-defeating contexts (e.g. consequentialist ethics or
theological determinism).
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In response to Scott’s first question of how evil originates and who is responsible, the
Great Controversy answers that this cannot be understood abstractly or generically but only
in relation to evils actual history. While the idea of free will is crucial, it is the free will of a
particular being that originates evil. This being is the rebel angel Lucifer who willingly falls
into evil’s mysterious irrationality and aggressively justifies himself with a deceptive
mystification of evil as a ‘liberating’ alternative to the divine rule.
The Great Controversy answers Scott’s second question about the ontology of evil
and how it exists by affirming evil as ultimately inexplicable and confounding. Not
understanding this point confounds human reason and further contributes to evil’s dangerous
effects. Metaphysically evil is privative but perversely and parasitically so. A created being
misuses God’s good creation. Evil is essentially and unavoidably a moral and personal
conflict. No metaphysically account of evil is adequate. Evil entails a free-self, justifying the
unjustifiable rejection of God’s character, law, love, and government. There is no accurate
non-confounding understanding of evil without this cosmic controversy perspective.
Scott’s third question about how evil poses a problem to theodicy, is for the Great
Controversy theodicy, the problem of freedom’s risk to creation itself. The actualisation of
this risk takes the form of evil as cosmic war and cosmic controversy. That is the real
‘problem of evil.’ The classical problem of evil trilemma is a secondary problem resulting
from the epistemic limitations of finite creatures and aggravated by their fallen condition.
Scott’s fourth question asks what is God’s morally sufficient reason for permitting
evil. The Great Controversy theodicy responds that evil itself has no reason. However, the
divine act of making a good creation with free will is justified even if subsequently it is
tragically and unjustifiably abused by that creation. This is because God is willing to be the
guarantor and redeemer of creation in order that the risk of evil does not veto the eternal good
of his creatures being able to exist by grace. God takes our risk as his own. The unjustified

278

embrace of evil by some of creation does not prevent or prohibit the divine right to create a
good creation which will be sustained in its original goodness or restored by redemptive
divine sacrifice to its original goodness.
Scott’s fifth and final question is about how God will end evil. In response, the Great
Controversy theodicy claims that evil’s end is brought about by the comprehensive extensive
way God deals with evil’s mystery, mystification, and multiplication via the manner he
conducts himself in the cosmic conflict culminating in his own work of atonement (the
mystery of godliness). This is articulated in a ‘Redeemed Good Defence’ based in a Felix
Soter theodicy. The additional use of virtue libertarianism as a model of freedom shows how
the freedom that makes evil possible is no impediment to evil subsequently becoming
‘impossible.’

Areas for Further Study
The Great Controversy is understudied as a theodicy at an academic level. There are
many areas for further study. For instance, more work could be done on exactly how the
Great Controversy theodicy relates the question of natural evil to moral evil and cosmic
conflict. The nature of love and law is crucial for the Great Controversy theodicy but more
study could be conducted on the various theological models of love and law and their
relationship to the idea of cosmic conflict. Exegetical and biblical theological work needs to
be done in the area of cosmic warfare and to what degree the various elements of cosmic
controversy can be discerned in Scripture. Finally, a deeper study of ethical theory in
theodicy is needed.
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